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Abstract 
Definitions of incapacity are socially constructed, resulting in inconsistency in judicial 
approaches to supporting people with mental illness with diminished capacity in New 
Zealand.  Debates on the nature of incapacity and decision-making during diminished 
capacity have largely occurred in academic, legal and professional arenas, yet people 
with mental illness are uniquely able use their experience of diminished capacity to 
contribute to these debates.   
This mixed-methods, exploratory study sought to ascertain the range of views held by 
people with mental illness on:  1. factors deemed relevant to capacity assessment, 2. who 
should be involved in capacity assessment and decision-making, and 3. how decisions 
should be made during diminished capacity.  Twenty-eight people participated in 
qualitative focus groups and / or individual interviews in Dunedin.  Constant 
comparison analysis, content analysis, keyword-in-context and quantitative statistical 
analysis were used to analyse data.  
There was no significant consensus in response to the research questions.  Instead, 
participants argued for holistic, individualised assessment and decision-making that 
accounts for their individuality, their context and their experience.  Participants wanted 
choice in who was involved, often preferred more than one person, and wanted these 
people to have knowledge of them, their illness and their sense of ‘control’.  Significant 
barriers to involving others were identified, often culminating in stigma and social 
isolation.  Participants endorsed their own involvement in decision-making and 
supported decision-making in the first instance.  Beyond this first preference, 
participants favoured an individualised menu of decision-making options.  Several 
requested decisions be overridden should these prove ‘risky.’ A spontaneous finding 
highlighted the importance of relational autonomy in facilitating capacity, whether 
retained or diminished.  It is recommended that current legislation be reviewed to allow 
flexibility and choice in capacity assessment, decision-making, and involving others, and 
that people with mental illness be encouraged to engage in discussion on principles 
guiding decision-making should their capacity be diminished.
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Chapter 1:  Assessing and Intervening in 
Times of Incapacity 
 
 
Are we competent to support, empower and protect people with diminished 
capacity1?  Specifically, do we appropriately attend to the needs of people with mental 
illness, whose capacity may fluctuate (Coverdale, 1996; Ryan, 2011)?  There are a range 
of judicial options in New Zealand legislating allowable interventions when someone’s 
capacity is diminished.  Yet ideas about what is capacity and how those with diminished 
capacity should be supported are hotly contested (Nys, Welie, Garanis-Papadatos, & 
Ploumpidis, 2004), and New Zealand legislation is inconsistent in its approach. 
This chapter gives a brief overview of understandings of, and debates on, the 
nature of incapacity and approaches to supporting people with diminished capacity.  
Current New Zealand legislation is reviewed in the context of these debates and shown 
to be inconsistent.  Shortcomings of studies ascertaining the views of people with mental 
illness on the nature of incapacity and their preferred decision-making approaches, 
should they lack capacity, are highlighted.  In light of this background, it is argued that 
people with mental illness are uniquely able, when they have capacity, to reflect on what 
it is like to lack capacity.  Specifically, that they will have unique insights into what 
elements are relevant for capacity assessment, how decision-making should occur when 
capacity is diminished, and who should be involved in these processes.  Amidst calls by 
commentators to review existing legislation in light of its inconsistencies (Atkin, 2011; 
                                                        
1 A quick note on the use of ‘capacity’ versus ‘competence’:  Strictly speaking, capacity is a distinct 
legal concept applied to a specific decision (Nys, Welie, Garanis-Papadatos, & Ploumpidis, 2004), whereas 
competence relates to the impact of one’s psychological and emotional state on decision-making in 
general (Atkin, 1997).  However, capacity and competence are often used interchangeably (Nys et al., 
2004; Skegg, 2011); this document will do the same. 
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Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; Court, 1996; Ministry of Health, 2008; O’Brien, 2010), it is vital 
that the voices of people with mental illness be included in these debates. 
 
 
1.1 Measuring (In)capacity 
 
 
Determining whether or not a patient is mentally capable of 
making a decision . . . is one of the most conceptually and 
ethically challenging areas of clinical practice. 
(Banner, 2012, p. 1038) 
 
1.1.1 The Development of Assessment Tools 
Historical development.  Despite the use of capacity in legal, medical and social 
arenas, the lack of a clear definition (Garrison, 2007) results in ongoing debates as to its 
nature and the factors to be considered in its assessment. 
Traditionally, incapacity was considered a global, all-encompassing condition 
understood categorically (Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; Berghmans, 2001; Buchanan & 
Brock, 1989; Court, 1996)– people had either full capacity or none (Garrison, 2007; Nys 
et al., 2004).  Diagnostic labels were considered indicative of a person’s capacity and 
large groups of people, such as the mentally ill, were excluded from all aspects of 
decision-making.  This is termed a ‘status’ approach (Carney, 2012; Nys et al., 2004; Okai 
et al., 2007).   
A number of factors have conspired to change this, notably the growing 
recognition of the principle of autonomy (Atkin, 1997; Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; 
Berghmans, 2001; Carney, 2012; Carney & Tait, 1998; Oliver, 1997).  Autonomy as a 
principle guiding medical intervention is fairly new (Blackhall, Murphy, Frank, Michel, & 
Azen, 1995; Dresser, 1993; Freyenhagen & O’Shea, 2013; Hanssen, 2004; Levine, 1991; 
Ruhnke et al., 2000); in the past doctors acted paternalistically to further what they 
considered the patient’s best interests (Atkin, 1997; Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; 
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Coverdale, 1996; Donnelly, 2009; Wand & Chiarella, 2006).  With the acknowledgement 
of patient autonomy came a concurrent right to refuse treatment and the concept of 
informed consent (Beauchamp & Childress, 2006); subsequently a need arose for 
measures to assess whether someone was capable of giving this consent (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009; Roberts, 2002, in Bell & Brookbanks, 2005).  This latter provided the 
impetus to develop measures of capacity. 
Over time, most jurisdictions have moved towards an understanding of 
incapacity as decision-specific and variable (Berghmans, 2001; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; 
Carney, 2012; Court, 1996; Nys et al., 2004; O’Brien, 2010; Ryan, 2011), fluctuating 
throughout the lifespan and affected by a range of variables (Carney, 2012; Court, 1996; 
Nys et al., 2004).   This change in understandings of capacity has led to a ‘presumption of 
competence’  (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Skegg, 2011), recognising that even during a 
psychiatric crisis people often retain some capacity (Nys et al., 2004).  With incapacity 
no longer tied to diagnosis, attention turned to the processes used to reach a decision.   
 
Current assessment models – The MacCAT.  Currently a functional, ‘cognitive’ 
approach, the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool (MacCAT) (Appelbaum & Grisso, 
1995; Appelbaum & Roth, 1982; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998; Grisso, Appelbaum, & Hill-
Fotouhi, 1997; Grisso, Appelbaum, Mulvey, & Fletcher, 1995) is the most commonly 
accepted method of capacity assessment (Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; Coverdale, 1996; 
Garrison, 2007; Lamont, Jeon, & Chiarella, 2013; Nys et al., 2004; O’Brien, 2010; Okai et 
al., 2007). 
In developing the MacCAT, Appelbaum and colleagues reviewed case law and 
identified four, discrete, measurable standards used to make legal judgements of 
capacity (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Appelbaum & Roth, 1982; Grisso & Appelbaum, 
1998, 2007; Grisso et al., 1997, 1995): 
1. The ability to communicate a choice, 
2. The ability to understand relevant information, 
3. The ability to reason with, or evaluate, this information, and 
4. The ability to appreciate the significance of this information to one’s situation 
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Communicating a choice requires the person to express a (minimally consistent) 
decision, whether verbally or otherwise.  The ability to understand relates to the 
person’s comprehension of the decision and the benefits and risks of available options.  
Reasoning, or evaluation, involves the cognitive manipulation of this information, with 
assessors judging whether the decision follows logically from the individual’s 
explanations.  Finally, appreciation requires individuals to recognise information as 
personally relevant to themselves and their situation.  This tool, initially used in 
research settings, was later adapted to assess medical decisions and called the 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Treatment (MacCAT-T) (Grisso & 
Appelbaum, 1998; Grisso et al., 1997).  In a 20 minute, semi-structured interview, the 
MacCAT-T asks the individual to make a choice and explain his or her rationale, with 
questions targeted to assess understanding, reasoning, and appreciation (Grisso & 
Appelbaum, 1998; Grisso et al., 1997).   
Although multiple tools have been developed to measure capacity (Lamont et al., 
2013; Okai et al., 2007), they generally contain one or more  components of the MacCAT; 
a review by Lamont et al., (2013) of 17 assessment tools found 59 percent utilised all 
four domains of the MacCAT.  The MacCAT and these derivatives are generally referred 
to as ‘descriptive’ (Charland, 2001, in Banner, 2012), ‘cognitive’ models due to their 
measurement of practical reasoning (Berghmans, 2001; Garrison, 2007; Wand & 
Chiarella, 2006) and it is argued these cognitive models allow capacity to be objectively 
assessed (O’Brien, 2010).  A meta-analysis reported that “although diverse measures of 
mental capacity have been used, they are capable of making fairly consistent estimates 
[of incapacity]” which are statistically more reliable “than cardiologists interpreting 
exercise electrocardiograms, radiologists interpreting mammograms or haematologists 
reading peripheral blood films” (Okai et al., 2007, p. 295). 
However, there is some criticism of cognitive approaches to assessment.  For 
example, Lamont et al. (2013) found inconsistencies in what was measured among tools 
using MacCAT domains, particularly in appreciation and reasoning.   Further, some 
believe cognitive models miss key variables which may not be cognitively based but 
nevertheless influence decision-making, this point is further discussed in Part 1.1.2.  
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Incapacity and mental illness.  Numerous studies measuring the prevalence of 
incapacity have concluded that people can no longer be deemed to lack capacity simply 
by virtue of mental illness (Banner, 2012; Court, 1996; Coverdale, 1996; Ryan, 2011).  
For example, a meta-analysis not only found that “a sizeable proportion – usually the 
majority” of psychiatric inpatients had capacity, but that “the frequency of incapacity did 
not differ greatly from that in general hospital inpatients” (Okai et al., 2007, p. 295).  
When people with mental illness did lack capacity, this was correlated with psychosis 
(Amer, 2013; Jenkins & Williamson, 2012; Okai et al., 2007), illness severity (Okai et al., 
2007), involuntary admission and treatment refusal (Owen et al., 2008, in Jenkins & 
Williamson, 2012; Okai et al., 2007).    
Instead, it is recognised that although mental illness may not necessitate 
incapacity, mental state can influence it, and people with mental illness may have 
‘chronically and variably impaired’ capacity, (McCulloch et al., 1992, cited in Coverdale, 
1996).  For example: 
 Communication can be affected in cases of catatonia or mutism (Appelbaum & 
Grisso, 1995; Appelbaum & Roth, 1982).  It can also be disrupted when 
extreme thought disorder renders decisions unintelligible (Coverdale, 1996; 
Grisso et al., 1997; Torke, Alexander, & Lantos, 2008) or when a person’s 
choice fluctuates “to such an extent that a course of treatment cannot be 
implemented before they change their minds again” (Appelbaum & Grisso, 
1995, p. 109; Bell & Brookbanks, 2005).  
 The ability to attend to and understand information can be interrupted by 
delusions, hallucinations or thought disorder (Amer, 2013; Appelbaum & 
Grisso, 1995; Appelbaum & Roth, 1982; Coverdale, 1996; Grisso et al., 1995; 
Owen et al., 2013).   
 Reasoning can be disrupted by paranoid or grandiose ideas, delusions, or 
affective disorders disrupting cognitive processes and the weighing of 
consequences (Appelbaum & Roth, 1982; Clausen, 2014; McKenna, Simpson, 
& Coverdale, 2007; Meynen, 2011). 
 Finally, appreciation can be undermined by denial, or lack of insight  
(Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Appelbaum & Roth, 1982; Bell & Brookbanks, 
2005; Coverdale, 1996; Grisso et al., 1995).   Others contend appreciation 
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refers to the individual’s ability to “feel” a decision’s implications, and 
contend this can be impaired by fear, delusion, or depression (Buchanan & 
Brock, 1989; Elliott, 1997; Garrison, 2007; Grisso & Appelbaum, 2007, 2007; 
Paulus & Yu, 2012). 
 
1.1.2 Debates on the Nature of Capacity and its Assessment 
Despite its prevalence, there are numerous critics of cognitive models of capacity. 
Debate focusses on three fronts: 
First, some argue cognitive models fail to consider non-cognitive factors 
undermining decision-making (Brudney, 2009; Garrison, 2007; Sjöstrand, Eriksson, Juth, 
& Helgesson, 2013; Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008) such as emotionality (Banner, 2012; 
Breden & Vollmann, 2004; Bursztajn, Harding, Gutheil, & Brodsky, 1991; Charland, 
1998; Drane, 1985; Elliott, 1997; McKenzie & Watts, 2011, in Jenkins & Williamson, 
2012; Meynen, 2011; Nys et al., 2004; Paulus & Yu, 2012; Tan, Hope, & Stewart, 2003), 
unusual beliefs (Banner, 2012; Berghmans, 2001; Elliott, 1997; Garrison, 2007; Grisso & 
Appelbaum, 1998) and distorted values (Banner, 2012; Brock & Wartman, 1990; 
Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Charland, 1998; Karel, Moye, Bank, & Azar, 2007; Kontos, 
Freudenreich, & Querques, 2013; Lamont et al., 2013; Tan et al., 2003; Tan, Hope, 
Stewart, & Fitzpatrick, 2006).  
Second, some disagree on whether capacity assessment should prioritise past, 
present or future selves, and question how this should be decided (Craigie, 2013; 
Donnelly, 2009; Dresser, 1993; Dworkin, 1993; Meynen, 2011; Pellegrino, 1994; 
Sjöstrand, 2013).   
Third, legal capacity remains a threshold concept (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; 
Garrison, 2007; Nys et al., 2004; Sjöstrand, 2013), and there is debate about whether the 
border between capacity and incapacity should be based on the complexity of the 
decision or the severity of its consequences (Brock, 1991; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; 
Buller, 2001; Cale, 1999; Skene, 1991; Wicclair, 1991a, 1991b, 1999; Wilks, 1997, 1999).  
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Capacity, autonomy, and authenticity.  Critics claim cognitive models of 
capacity are ‘parsimonious’ (Banner, 2012; Garrison, 2007), focussing wholly on the 
internal rationality of a person’s decision (Berghmans, 2002, in Nys et al., 2004) without 
considering non-cognitive factors – “a patient may be confused, combative, depressed or 
despairing.  But if she can accurately describe the treatment choice, its corollary risks, 
and its potential benefits to her, she is competent to consent” (Garrison, 2007).  Instead, 
these critics argue there is a distinction between a decision demonstrating capacity 
using a cognitive model and an autonomous decision deriving “from the person’s own 
values and beliefs . . . not . . . internal or external constraints” (Beauchamp et al., 1984, 
cited in Coverdale, 1996, p. 62).   
There are multiple conceptualisations of autonomy.  At its most basic level, 
autonomy refers to ‘individual autonomy’ (DuBois, 2008; Ho, 2008; Jenkins & 
Williamson, 2012; Kontos et al., 2013; Pellegrino, 1994; Tauber, 2003) and people’s 
ability to decide for themselves (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Bell & Brookbanks, 
2005; Dworkin, 1993; Garrison, 2007; Kontos et al., 2013; Pellegrino, 1994).  However, a 
broader view of autonomy maintains that it is “a distortion of the idea of autonomy to 
equate it with total independence from . . . others in making treatment decisions” 
(Pellegrino, 1994, p. 50), and that internal processes can influence autonomy by 
undermining the ‘authenticity’ of a person’s decision (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; 
Brudney, 2009; Freyenhagen & O’Shea, 2013; Garrison, 2007; Hope, Tan, Stewart, & 
Fitzpatrick, 2011; Sjöstrand, 2013; Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008; Skegg, 2011; Tan et al., 
2003, 2006).   
The first argument points to the concept of relational autonomy.  Relational 
autonomy acknowledges that humans exist within communities and social influences 
shape decision-making (Kontos et al., 2013; Martin & Hickerson, 2013; Pellegrino, 1994; 
Sjöstrand, 2013; Tauber, 2003).  It recognises that decisions are not made in isolation; 
justifications for decisions often reference their impact on others (Ho, 2008), and 
“deciding for oneself is not something that one typically does by oneself” (Martin & 
Hickerson, 2013, p. 203).  Cultural arguments are also made for relational autonomy; in 
some cultures involvement of, and deferral to, others in decision-making is integral to 
competent decision-making (Leever, 2011; Minkoff, 2014). 
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The second argument relates to one’s authenticity.  Authenticity refers to a 
person’s sense of self, of his or her decisions as arising from “deeply set values, aims and 
interests” (Brudney, 2009; Sjöstrand, 2013; van Willigenburg & Delaere, 2005, in 
Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008, p. 116) and the idea that ‘the wants and desires I act upon 
are my own’ (Sjöstrand, 2013).  This references the autonomy-negating effect of external 
influence, but goes further to suggest a sense of internal coherence.  Authors citing 
authenticity argue for three factors to be included in capacity assessment; emotionality, 
changes in beliefs and distorted values.  Although linked, they are addressed separately 
here. 
Emotionality.  Most people can identify times when extreme emotional states 
have influenced decision-making.  Common aphorisms such as ‘blinded by rage’ or 
‘paralysed by fear’ reference this experience.  Yet emotionality is not explicitly 
addressed in any standard capacity assessment tool.  Both the presence of excessive 
emotions and the complete absence of emotions are cited as reasons for including 
emotionality in capacity assessment. 
“Extreme” emotions.  Some cite the potential for emotions to “interfere” with 
decision-making processes (Rivers v Katz, 1986, in Garrison, 2007, p. 798), arguing that 
capacity assessment must identify decisions “disproportionately influence[d]” by 
extreme emotions (Banner, 2012, p. 1042; Breden & Vollmann, 2004; Bursztajn et al., 
1991; Charland, 1998; Elliott, 1997; Garrison, 2007; Meynen, 2011; Paulus & Yu, 2012).   
Extreme emotions could affect decision-making by altering the evaluation of 
future consequences (Banner, 2012; Breden & Vollmann, 2004; Bursztajn et al., 1991; 
Charland, 1998; Elliott, 1997; Garrison, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Meynen, 2011; Paulus & 
Yu, 2012).  For example, research demonstrates people with depression may be unable 
to ‘feel’ possible future benefits as personally relevant and instead selectively attend to 
negative consequences (Bursztajn et al., 1991; Elliott, 1997; Paulus & Yu, 2012).  
Similarly, anhedonia, an inability to experience pleasure and enjoyment, can alter the 
way losses and gains are balanced (Paulus & Yu, 2012).  Other, more subtle effects relate 
to one’s emotional attachment to certain “unhealthy” conditions (Garrison, 2007; Tan et 
al., 2003); for example, a person with schizophrenia may be emotionally invested in 
believing he or she is the son of God.  Over time, this persistent erroneous decision-
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making process could alter belief systems (Charland, 1998; Elliott, 1997; Paulus & Yu, 
2012).   
Emotions can also undermine an individual’s control over decisions 
(Freyenhagen & O’Shea, 2013).  This is related to the notion of first-order versus second-
order desires (‘what I want’ versus ‘what I want to want’) (Appelbaum, 1998; Hope et al., 
2011; Sjöstrand, 2013).  For most people, emotions signal incompatibility between these 
desires, resulting in an attempt to resolve the conflict (Appelbaum, 1998), but for some 
this can be overwhelming.  For example, in compulsive disorders the distress associated 
with obsessive thoughts compelling a decision to act (a first-order desire) can cause a 
person to feel ‘forced’ to engage in the act, despite a second-order desire not to do so 
(Freyenhagen & O’Shea, 2013).   
The absence of emotion.  Conversely, Charland (1998), a key proponent for the 
inclusion of emotionality in capacity assessment, suggests that decision-making requires 
an emotional component.  Citing Lazarus’ (1991) Cognitive Appraisal Theory, he argues 
that without emotional appraisal – defined as the “continuing evaluation of the 
significance of what is happening for one’s well-being” – “knowledge is cold . . . [but] 
when knowledge touches on one’s personal well-being . . . it is hot, or emotional” 
(Lazarus, 1991, p. 144).  Consequently, although a person may realise a decision is 
relevant on an abstract, intellectual basis, “emotive capacities” are crucial to fully 
appreciate the decision; “individuals cannot be said to appreciate fully the choices they 
face unless the choices mean something to them personally” (Charland, 1998, p. 367).  
He subsequently questions why “the cognitive capacities that underlie emotion should 
be unilaterally excluded from the cognitive capacities that underlie competence” 
(p.364).   
Certainly, the absence of any emotional appraisal – if nothing personally means 
anything and individuals simply don’t care – could undermine capacity (Appelbaum, 
1998; Charland, 1998).  Patients with areas of frontal lobe damage can still perform 
adequately on tests of cognition and decision-making, but severe deficits in their 
experience of emotions mean they do not care ‘enough’ about the decision; “they appear 
preternaturally calm and detached, even when discussing material with striking 
emotional content” (Appelbaum, 1998, p. 383).  Consequently, “decision making can be 
impaired subtly by disorders in which a person is perfectly capable of fulfilling the 
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capacity criteria as an abstract exercise . . . while attaching no affective significance to 
the process or outcome” (Banner, 2012, p. 1042). 
Beliefs.  Beliefs form an important part of decision-making, underpinning our 
evaluation of likely outcomes (Brock & Wartman, 1990; Coverdale, 1996; Paulus & Yu, 
2012; Tan et al., 2006).  
The potential for emotions to influence a person’s belief system has already been 
raised  (Coverdale, 1996; Elliott, 1997; Paulus & Yu, 2012), however perhaps the belief 
most influential in capacity assessment is belief in one’s diagnosis – one’s level of insight.  
A failure to recognise the nature and severity of one’s illness is considered by many to 
indicate incapacity to make decisions regarding that illness.  (Appelbaum & Grisso, 
1995; Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; Garrison, 2007; Grisso et al., 1995).  Accordingly, patient 
insight is deemed “highly relevant” to assessors (Diesfeld, 2003, in Bell & Brookbanks, 
2005, p. 228).  Yet inclusion of insight is controversial, as psychiatrists themselves often 
disagree on diagnosis and treatment approaches (Banner, 2012; Berghmans, 2001).   
Rather than focussing on insight, some authors suggest assessment should 
identify “rigidly held” (Grisso et al., 1995, p. 128) or patently untrue beliefs (Banner, 
2012) something they consider already accounted for by the reasoning or appreciation 
components of standard cognitive models (Grisso & Appelbaum, 2007; Grisso et al., 
1995).  However, beliefs are subjective things, built upon experience and personal 
evaluations (Brock & Wartman, 1990; Coverdale, 1996; Paulus & Yu, 2012; Tan et al., 
2006).  Thus, although a person’s beliefs when depressed could be considered 
inauthentic as they are different from when the person is well (Elliott, 1997), it is hard 
to say whether the beliefs regarding treatability held by a person with longstanding 
depression, where numerous interventions have failed, is distorted.  This begs the 
question, who decides when beliefs are ‘patently untrue’?  
Values.  Decision-making is a complex, multivariate process involving a range of 
personal, familial and cultural values (Charland, 1998; Lamont et al., 2013).  In 
proposing the inclusion of a values component in capacity assessment, three motives are 
put forward; first, to ensure decisions are consistent with values (Banner, 2012; 
Berghmans, 2001; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Charland, 1998; Donnelly, 2009; Sjöstrand, 
2013; Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008); second, to identify ‘distorted’ values (Banner, 2012; 
SERVICE-USER VIEWS ON INCAPACITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
11 
Freyenhagen & O’Shea, 2013; Pellegrino, 1994; Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008; Tan et al., 
2003); and third, to increase transparency (Banner, 2012; Freyenhagen & O’Shea, 2013; 
Kontos et al., 2013). 
In determining the authenticity of a decision, a value assessment would verify  
whether there is a reasonable relationship between people’s enduring value system and 
their decisions – a degree of internal rationality (Banner, 2012; Berghmans, 2001; 
Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Charland, 1998; Donnelly, 2009; Sjöstrand, 2013; Sjöstrand & 
Helgesson, 2008).  The assertion that values are enduring (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; 
Charland, 1998; Freyenhagen & O’Shea, 2013; Grisso & Appelbaum, 2007) also suggests 
any sudden changes could be considered inauthentic.   This focus on temporal and 
internal consistency would identify apparently reasonable decisions that are either 
inconsistent with the individual’s stated values or based on values differing widely from 
his or her norm (Brock & Wartman, 1990). 
However, what if someone’s values are stable over time, but appear to others to 
be distorted?  In raising this question, the case of a patient with anorexia is often cited.   
In anorexia the illness can become valued of itself (Tan et al., 2003, 2006).  This valuing 
of anorexia, considered by some to be an illness-driven distortion, results in a weighing 
of risks and benefits which passes standard cognitive capacity assessments (Tan et al., 
2006) but which are considered unusual by outsiders (Banner, 2012; Brudney, 2009; 
Pellegrino, 1994; Tan et al., 2003, 2006).  This has fed the argument that people with 
anorexia fail to demonstrate decisional capacity due to a value system distorted by the 
“complex interplay between positive evaluations associated with the anorexic identity, 
self-control and thinness, distorted beliefs about body shape and extreme fears about 
weight gain, to name but a few factors” (Tan et al., 2008, in Banner, 2012, p. 1042; 
Pellegrino, 1994; Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008; Tan et al., 2003).  Yet, the plurality of 
human experience (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Sjöstrand et al., 2013; Sjöstrand & 
Helgesson, 2008) means identifying ‘distorted values’ is a normative judgement 
(Freyenhagen & O’Shea, 2013) holding people to the ‘tyranny of the majority’.   
Finally, capacity assessments are often requested when there is conflict between 
patients’ values and those of their doctor; “when health is the end-all and be-all . . . any 
treatment refusal seems irrational” (Kontos et al., 2013, p. 105).  Conversely, blindly 
accepting the plurality of values without challenging those contrary to the individual’s 
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stated interests could be considered neglectful (Kontos et al., 2013).  Consequently, 
Kontos and colleagues (2013) argue that an explicit values component reveals instances 
where questions of capacity stem from differences in values while allowing 
inconsistency to be challenged (Freyenhagen & O’Shea, 2013; Kontos et al., 2013).  
 
Past, present or future selves?  So far discussion has identified how people 
could be deemed to lack capacity based on questions about the ‘authenticity’ of their 
decisions.  Thus, assessment (loosely) relies on identifying a ‘past competent self’ and 
comparing current decision-making with this self, privileging past selves at the expense 
of current selves.  Conversely, the MacCAT requires consideration of the consequences 
of a decision, implying an ability to consider future selves (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; 
Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998; Grisso et al., 1997, 1995).  Yet people are constantly 
changing and evolving; one’s ‘self’ is rarely fixed.  This leads to two dilemmas; first how 
can capacity assessment acknowledge the plurality and changing nature of a person’s 
‘self’, and second, does this dynamism undermine the MacCAT requirement to consider 
future selves?   
Consider, John, a person with bipolar affective disorder, and how his decisions 
might change in a manic phase.  Now consider Jane, an academic who has always vowed 
she would never want to live with a cognitive impairment and signed an advance 
directive to this effect, yet who, on developing advance-stage dementia, lives a simple, 
but apparently happy, life.  Finally, consider Alice, a person with anorexia, who cannot 
conceive of an identity not involving her illness.  Can the same approach be used for each 
of these people?  
Three approaches seek to reconcile the tension between past, present and future 
selves.  A ‘liberal’ view maintains that past selves must be respected, even if 
contradicting current selves (Craigie, 2013; Donnelly, 2009).  In contrast, a ‘longitudinal’ 
view argues that “people experiencing various life events . . . may revise their goals, 
values and definitions of personal wellbeing” (Donnelly, 2009), and consequently 
present (and potentially future) selves should be prioritised.  Finally, Buchanan and 
Brock (1989) reconcile these views using the concept of ‘psychological continuity’ – “the 
connectedness of psychological features . . . across a lifetime” (Parfit, 1983 & 1984, cited 
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in Craigie, 2013, p. 9).  They suggest the weight given to past or present selves should 
reflect the continuity “between the prior capable patient and the current incapable one” 
(p.26).  Applying these approaches to the case studies above highlights difficulties 
inherent in each approach.   
In the case of John, psychological continuity is significantly broken but is 
expected to be regained.  Consequently past selves should be used to measure decision-
making capacity.  This fits with the often transient impact of mental illness on a person’s 
sense of self.   
Yet where would this leave Jane, the cognitively impaired academic?  How would 
we weigh her previously held preference to die if faced with these circumstances?   In 
this case, while psychological continuity is dramatically broken, it is not expected to be 
regained.  Instead, according to a longitudinal view, a new self has been created and 
capacity should therefore be assessed in accordance with this current self.   
What about Alice, the woman with anorexia? Many people with anorexia describe 
their identity as inextricably tied to their diagnosis (Freyenhagen & O’Shea, 2013; 
Garrison, 2007; Hope et al., 2011; Tan et al., 2003), with some struggling to distinguish 
between their authentic and their anorexic selves (Tan et al., 2003).  The argument for a 
distinct break in psychological continuity is therefore weak – change may be gradual and 
there may be little hope for the ‘past self’ to be regained.  Instead, the process of value 
formation could fit with a longitudinal view of identity development, entailing an 
assessment of authenticity based on current selves.  Yet many feel hesitant to do so. 
This hesitancy could be tied to Alice’s failure to consider future selves.  Under a 
cognitive assessment model, a person must be able to evaluate the consequences of a 
decision, with failure to do so indicative of incapacity (Craigie, 2013).  Yet Craigie (2013) 
questions the validity of this requirement, stating that a person may not hold the same 
values in the future and therefore not giving consideration to your future self is only 
relevant to the extent you are your future self.  In other words, while the ability to 
consider one’s future self may be useful in denying Alice decision-making capacity, could 
we comfortably accept Jane’s advance directive as based on a true understanding of her 
future (incapacitated) self? 
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Incapacity thresholds – Risk-relative or decision-specific?  The final debate 
refers to the threshold at which person is deemed to lack capacity, with some proposing 
it should be risk-relative while others argue it should be decision-specific (Berghmans, 
2001). 
According to advocates of the risk-relative approach, the outcome of the decision 
is relevant to capacity assessment (Brock, 1991; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Oliver, 1997; 
Wilks, 1997, 1999).  This outcome-oriented (Wicclair, 1991a, 1991b), externalist 
position asks ‘what level of capacity is required for this choice’ (Berghmans, 2001; 
Buller, 2001)?  Advocates for this stance often argue for a sliding scale of capacity, with a 
low threshold where decisions are low risk, increasing commensurately as the risks or 
irreversibility of the decision increase (Brock, 1991; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Oliver, 
1997; Wilks, 1997, 1999).  They consider it to best balance patient autonomy with 
beneficence (Brock, 1991; Buchanan & Brock, 1989) and to be efficient, allowing 
interventions agreed to by an incompetent individual to commence where an otherwise 
lengthy capacity assessment would order the same treatment regardless (Garrison, 
2007).   
In contrast, advocates of the decision-specific approach believe thresholds should 
be based on the complexity of the decision (Berghmans, 2001; Buller, 2001; Cale, 1999; 
Coverdale, 1996; Wicclair, 1991a, 1991b).  This task-based, process-oriented, internalist 
approach asks ‘what level of capacities are needed in order to make this decision’ 
(Berghmans, 2001; Buller, 2001; Wicclair, 1991a, 1991b)?  Advocates for a decision-
specific approach maintain that risk-relative thresholds result in an asymmetric model 
of capacity; allowing a person to choose for a treatment, but asserting lack of capacity 
should they choose against (Berghmans, 2001; Cale, 1999; Coverdale, 1996; Skegg, 
2011; Wicclair, 1991a, 1991b).  Thus, when the question remains the same but the 
outcome of one choice is more ‘risky’ than another, “insofar as a choice between these 
options requires an ability to comprehend and weigh the consequences of both, it seems 
odd to maintain that accepting treatment calls for significantly less decision-making 
ability than refusing treatment” (Wicclair, 1991b, pp. 103–4 emphasis added).  They 
argue this asymmetry undermines a person’s right to decide, implicitly signalling ‘we 
will overrule you if you do not agree with us’ (Berghmans, 2001; Cale, 1999).   
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 By and large a risk-relative approach has been taken in practice, as advocated in 
the New Zealand Family Physician Journal (Perkins, 2002) and in Bell and Brookbanks’ 
(2005) overview of New Zealand mental health law.  However, it is unclear whether this 
is the approach preferred by people with mental illness. 
 
1.1.3 Summary 
Summarising the above discussion regarding capacity, a few conclusions can be 
drawn.   
 Capacity is now accepted to be variable and decision-specific. 
 Cognitive models assess capacity on four dimensions; communication, 
understanding, reasoning and appreciation.   
 A diagnosis of mental illness no longer automatically denotes incapacity.   
 Debates about capacity assessment centre on three main topics: 
o Whether capacity assessment should consider factors undermining 
decisional authenticity, such as emotionality, altered beliefs or 
distorted values.  
o Whether capacity should be pegged to past, present or future selves. 
o Whether thresholds for incapacity should be risk-relative or decision-
specific. 




1.2 Intervening in Times of Diminished Capacity 
 
 
As views of capacity and mental illness have changed, so too have interventions 
for individuals experiencing diminished capacity.  This section looks briefly at the 
historical context before exploring the ethical frameworks underpinning decision-
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making with, or for, someone with diminished capacity.  Four decision-making models 
are briefly described and aligned with these ethical frameworks and debates on the 
nature of incapacity.  This lays the groundwork for Part 1.3, examining current New 
Zealand legislation. 
 
1.2.1 Historical Development 
Just as understandings of incapacity have developed in accordance with social 
and cultural changes so, too, have approaches guiding decision-making for, or with, 
people with diminished capacity. 
The early ‘status’ approach combined with the traditional paternalistic stance of 
‘doctor knows best’ (Atkin, 1997; Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; Brock & Wartman, 1990; 
Carney, 2012; Coverdale, 1996), meant large groups of people, such as the mentally ill, 
were stripped of their decision-making rights by virtue of their diagnosis and allotted a 
surrogate – often a state-appointee – with wide-reaching powers to make decisions for 
them (Atkin, 2011; Carney, 2012; Wareham, McCallin, & Diesfeld, 2005).  Little emphasis 
was placed on participation of the individual and no distinction was made as to whether 
incapacity was chronic or variable, total or partial (Atkin, 2011; Carney, 2012; 
Coverdale, 1996). 
However, throughout the 1970s and 80s social movements began to advocate for 
greater recognition for the rights of those with diminished capacity (Atkin, 1997; Carney 
& Tait, 1998; Court, 1996; Mental Health Commission, 2002).  The deinstitutionalisation 
movement gathered steam (Carney & Tait, 1998; Court, 1996; Mental Health 
Commission, 2002; Ministry of Social Development, 2011) stimulating a focus on 
community integration and ‘normalisation’ (Carney, 2012; Court, 1996).  Models such as 
the Social Model of Disability, which acknowledges the role of society in ‘disabling’ 
citizens (Hansen, 2005), gained predominance, promoting inclusion, rejecting 
dependence, and entitling everyone, regardless of ability, to citizens’ rights (Carney, 
2012; Court, 1996; Mental Health Commission, 2002; Ministry of Social Development, 
2011).   Significant social and economic upheaval in the 1980s and 90s emphasised the 
free individual as a consumer of health services (Atkin, 1997; Mental Health 
Commission, 2002; Wareham et al., 2005), precipitating a shift in power and requiring 
SERVICE-USER VIEWS ON INCAPACITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
17 
medical practitioners to consult with patients (now called consumers or service users) 
(Wareham et al., 2005).   
Concurrently, the practice of enshrining generalised statements of human rights 
into international and national legislation became increasingly popular (Bell & 
Brookbanks, 2005; Court, 1996; Ministry of Justice, n.d.; New Zealand Law Commission, 
2002).  One of the most important of these has been the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Bell & Brookbanks, 2005), which includes the rights to 
“self-determination” (ICCPR, 1966, Art. 1), to “liberty and security of person” (ICCPR, 
1966, Art. 9), and to be “equal before the law . . . and entitled . . . to the equal protection 
of the law” (ICCPR, 1966, Art. 26).  More recently, the 2006 United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD),  introduced the notion of supported 
decision-making (Carney, 2012; Donnelly, 2009; United Nations, 2007; CRPD, 2006).   
Models of decision-making similarly began to shift from a paternalistic 
framework where a state-appointed surrogate made decisions for the incapacitated 
person to a “genuine respect for individual autonomy and due process”  (Carney & Tait, 
1998, p. 148).  Greater emphasis was placed on individual autonomy and informed 
consent, individuals were granted the right to refuse treatment (Bell & Brookbanks, 
2005; Skegg, 2011) and health practitioners came under increasing pressure to justify 
any subversion of individual autonomy (Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; Ryan, 2011).  
Emphasis shifted to working collaboratively with consumers and maximising their 
participation in decision-making (Court, 1996; Mental Health Commission, 2002; CRPD, 
2006; Wand & Chiarella, 2006).  Most recently, the Bournewood case in the United 
Kingdom led to the requirement for safeguards to protect a person of diminished 
capacity even when the individual ostensibly agrees with medical decisions (Nys et al., 
2004; O’Brien, 2010).   
 
1.2.2 Philosophies Underpinning Intervention 
In light of these social, political and economic changes a range of interventions 
have been used to meet the decision-making needs of people with diminished capacity 
(Atkin, 2011; Carney, 2012; Oliver, 1997).  Atkin (2011) has positioned these 
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approaches on a spectrum between ‘best interests’ and ‘individual wishes;’ alternatively 
conceptualised as a tension between the ethical principles of beneficence and autonomy.  
 
Best interests, beneficence and paternalism.  At one end of the spectrum is a 
philosophy emphasising  decisions  based on the individual’s ‘best interests’ (Atkin, 
2011).  This stance is underpinned by the ethical principle of beneficence and its 
exhortation to promote the welfare of patients (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; DuBois, 
2008). 
Best interests judgements involve balancing the net benefits and risks of a 
decision  and determining a course of action (Atkin, 2011; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; 
Dresser, 1993).  They often involve value judgements relating to the individual’s 
perceived quality of life (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Dresser, 1993) and require “an 
omniscient decision-maker operating against a backdrop of undisputed (although 
unspoken) values against which the best interests of the person lacking capacity can be 
measured” (Donnelly, 2009, p. 28).   Dresser (1993) criticises these normative 
judgements, suggesting they more closely reflect the desires, values and interests of the 
decision-maker than of the incapacitated individual. 
Best interests judgements are often frowned upon because of their association 
with paternalism.  However, some distinguish between strong and weak paternalism 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Berghmans, 2001; DuBois, 2008; Sjöstrand et al., 2013).  
Strong paternalism is often invoked when people discuss the ‘evils’ of paternalism, 
where the values of the decision-maker are imposed on the individual irrespective of the 
individual’s capacity or whether he or she holds similar values (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009; Berghmans, 2001; Sjöstrand et al., 2013).  In contrast, weak, or soft, paternalism 
allows an individual’s current or past wishes to be overridden only to prevent non-
autonomous actions (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Berghmans, 2001; Pellegrino, 1994; 
Sjöstrand et al., 2013).  This approach could also justify interventions to restore or 
promote a person’s future autonomy (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Sjöstrand, 2013; 
Sjöstrand et al., 2013; Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008).  However, weak paternalism is 
frowned upon by others as tokenism, giving people the illusion of choice but ultimately 
sanctioning its veto (Dresser, 1993; Mental Health Commission, 2002).   
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Individual wishes and autonomy.  At the other end of the spectrum is an 
approach prioritising the individual’s ‘wishes,’ or autonomy (Atkin, 2011).  It is based on 
the idea of human agency as inviolate, with individuals best positioned to know their 
own ‘best interests’ (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Dworkin, 1993; Mill, 1859; 
Pellegrino, 1994); consequently, a wishes approach maximises self-determination 
(Court, 1996). 
Interventions prioritising the individual’s wishes take as a starting point a 
presumption of competence and respect for the individual (Atkin, 2011; Carney & Tait, 
1998; Mental Health Commission, 2002).  They recognise the often transient and 
decision-specific nature of incapacity and endeavour to either facilitate the person’s own 
decision-making or promote decision-making based on the individual’s views when 
competent (Atkin, 2011; Court, 1996).   
However, ‘wishes’ models are often undermined by the subtle inclusion of 
elements of paternalism.  For example, Pellegrino (1994) comments that while 
autonomous models are often positioned as antithetical to paternalism, in compelling a 
‘positive’ obligation “to foster the capacity of self-determination” (p.49) they could, in 
theory, advocate paternalistic, invasive intervention against someone’s wishes (such as 
electroconvulsive therapy) in the name of restoring autonomy.   
A second issue asks to what extent should a wishes paradigm should privilege a 
person’s past autonomy over his current autonomy (Craigie, 2013; Donnelly, 2009; 
Dworkin, 1993; Sjöstrand, 2013)?  This relates to previous discussions about whether 
past, present or future selves should be privileged and whether a person can realistically 
plan for a future of which one has no experience (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Craigie, 
2013; Dworkin, 1993; Pellegrino, 1994; Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008).     
Two approaches have been suggested to resolve this.  Dworkin (1993) suggests 
decision-making should focus on a person’s “integrity” – the capacity of the individual 
“to express one’s character – values, commitments convictions” (p.224) and to make “a 
judgement about the overall shape of the kind of life he wants to have led” (p.226) – 
despite any inability to foresee certain circumstances.  Although not explicitly stated, 
this seems to be tied to the idea of psychological continuity and suggests the inclusion of 
a values component with the view that if current, incapacitated, wishes are consistent 
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with the general character of the individual’s life, these should be respected.  A second 
approach would have the decision-maker honour the decision with the least negative 
consequences and irrevocability (Kohn, Blumenthal, & Campbell, 2012; Wilks, 1999).  
However this would again sanction the inclusion of a ‘best interests’ judgement into 
decision-making.     
Finally, although proxies are often instructed to make decisions based on ‘what 
John would have wanted,’ people do not “always lead structured, reflective lives” 
(Dworkin, 1993, p. 224) and it is often difficult to assess what decision the individual 
would have made (Bailey, 2002; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Donnelly, 2009; Dresser, 
1993; Jenkins & Williamson, 2012; Lowy, 1988).  Consequently, past “remote and 
impersonal” statements are often used as the basis for decision-making, with decisions 
frequently reflecting the “values, needs and interests of the people who [remain]” 
(Dresser, 1993, pp. 619, 620; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Donnelly, 2009).   
 
1.2.3 Models of Decision-Making 
Between wishes versus interests, a number of models provide frameworks for 
decision-making for, on behalf of, or with, the individual with diminished capacity.  
These models, although overlapping significantly, can be divided into four categories; 
surrogate decision-making, substituted judgement, advance directives and supported 
decision-making.  These are discussed briefly, placed on the continuum of ‘best interests’ 
versus ‘wishes,’ and linked to the debates relating to the assessment and definition of 
mental capacity. 
Surrogate decision-making.  Surrogate or substitute decision-making refers to 
the appointment of someone to make decisions for another (Gooding, 2013; Kohn et al., 
2012; O’Brien, 2010).  As it is generally applied, surrogate decision-making refers to 
those models where there is no direct reference to the individual’s wishes, or, where 
such references are made, they are tempered by requirements such as those to consider 
the individual’s welfare “first and paramount” (PPPR Act, 1988, sec. 18(3)).    
Surrogate decision-making according to this definition refers to the (generally) 
paternalistic exercise of the state’s power with little or no input by the individual 
(Buchanan & Brock, 1989) in an attempt to secure the individual’s ‘best interests’ and 
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“provide against abuse and exploitation by others, or potentially harmful actions by the 
individual themselves” (Gooding, 2013, p. 434).   Although sold as a method of ‘last 
resort,’ Kohn et al. (2012) comments that processes for guardianship, especially in cases 
of intellectual disability, are often streamlined, indicating the continued influence of a 
‘status’ approach. 
Considering the debates on capacity, surrogate decision-making is based on a 
notion of ‘global incompetence.’  It sets a high, risk-relative threshold for capacity that 
includes elements of authenticity such as emotionality, beliefs or distorted values, and 
sits on the ‘best interests’ end of the spectrum, prioritising ‘future selves.’ 
 
Substituted judgement.  Substituted judgement refers to decision-making on 
behalf of a person with mental illness.  Like surrogate decision-making, it often involves 
the appointment of a proxy, however this proxy is enjoined to find out “how [the 
incapacitated individual] would choose if competent, and then act in accordance” (Lowy, 
1988, pp. 15–6; Atkin, 2011; Bailey, 2002; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Court, 1996; 
Donnelly, 2009; Wand & Chiarella, 2006).  Ideally, the person making the substituted 
judgement has a close association with the person and a detailed understanding of his or 
her wishes (Bailey, 2002; Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008), and for this reason family are 
often the first to be considered (Bailey, 2002; Donnelly, 2009; Lowy, 1988). 
Substituted judgement is considered to respect self-determination and integrity 
(Atkin, 2011; Bailey, 2002; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Court, 1996; Lowy, 1988; Torke et 
al., 2008).  However, in the absence of specific evidence of a person’s preferences, 
substituted judgement decisions can often be based on normative “generalizations [sic] 
about what most people would want” (Lowy, 1988, p. 17; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; 
Donnelly, 2009; Dresser, 1993).  This denies those forms of life not conforming to a 
mainstream (competent) world view, inserting a degree of beneficence into decisions.   
The extent to which the now-incapacitated person is the same as the previous, 
competent individual poses another difficulty (Bailey, 2002; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; 
Lowy, 1988; Torke et al., 2008).  Rather than promoting autonomy, a substituted 
judgement model could deny the incapacitated individual the right to self-
determination; the decision-maker is required to consider the beliefs and values of the 
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individual “only as they were up until the time that the individual became incapacitated.  
The incompetent individual has no opportunity to revise previously held desires” 
(Bailey, 2002, p. 486; Lowy, 1988).  This ties to questions of psychological continuity and 
whether to privilege past, present or future selves. 
Finally, concern is expressed about the inclusion of personally-involved others in 
decision-making on behalf of the incapacitated individual (Bailey, 2002; Buchanan & 
Brock, 1989; Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008).  On the one hand this is seen as necessary 
and beneficial; those closely connected to the now incapacitated individual are often 
best placed to determine prior wishes (Bailey, 2002; Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008).  
However, because professionals have little knowledge of the individual’s “value history,” 
they are unable to verify accounts given by decision-makers, opening substituted 
judgement models to abuse (Bailey, 2002; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Sjöstrand & 
Helgesson, 2008).   
Substituted judgement models ostensibly view capacity as cognitive and 
decision-specific, although the exclusion of the individual from decision-making could 
suggest undercurrents of ‘global incompetence.’  It sits towards the ‘wishes’ end of the 
spectrum, privileging past selves, although there is potential for best interests 
judgements to influence decisions.  
 
Advance directives.  At the extreme end of protecting autonomy lie advance 
directives, which allow individuals to dictate in advance what should happen should they 
lack capacity (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Carney, 2012; Clausen, 2014).    An advance 
directive can be instructional, directly specifying one’s wishes, or it can involve the 
nomination of a proxy (Buchanan & Brock, 1989).  Advance directives are considered to 
safeguard a person’s right to self-determination (Brudney, 2009; Buchanan & Brock, 
1989) and in mental health are lauded for promoting consumer involvement in recovery 
planning (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Clausen, 2014).   
However, while advance directives most closely reflect a person’s wishes and 
preserve his or her (past) autonomy (Dworkin, 1993), there are scenarios where the 
application of an advance directive can be problematic; What if the advance directive is 
contrary to the individual’s current welfare (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Dresser, 1993)?  
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What if the now-incapacitated self disagrees with the past-competent self (Dresser, 
1993; Pellegrino, 1994)?  And, to what extent could the person making the advance 
directive have foreseen the current circumstances (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Pellegrino, 
1994)? 
All point to the dilemma between privileging past versus current or future selves:  
To what extent is the current incapacitated individual the same as the past, competent 
individual, and therefore to what extent does the advance directive apply to this new 
self?  To what extent can people foresee the reactions of their ‘future selves’ to future 
circumstances, including their emotional responses (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Dresser, 
1993; Pellegrino, 1994)?   
Furthermore, although presented by some as a form of supported decision-
making (Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; Davidson et al., 2015; Kohn et al., 2012), advance 
directives could be considered to completely remove the incapacitated individual from 
decision-making, undermining current (compromised) selves.   
Thus, while advance directives privilege individual wishes, even so far as 
allowing the individual to pre-emptively stipulate a preferred capacity assessment 
model and thresholds for incapacity, they clearly privilege past selves to the exclusion of 
others. 
 
A new paradigm:  Supported decision-making.  Supported decision-making 
(SDM) is a model where, rather than transferring the powers of decision-making to 
another, the individual is supported in decision-making with “the presumption . . . in 
favour of the person with a disability who will be affected by the decision.  The 
individual is the decision-maker” (United Nations, 2007, p. 89; Carney, 2012; Gooding, 
2013; Jenkins & Williamson, 2012; Kohn et al., 2012; Pathare & Shields, 2012).   
SDM is a central component of the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of People with Disabilities (CRPD), which requires signatories to “take appropriate 
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require 
in exercising their legal capacity” (CRPD, 2006, sec. 12).  In the United Nations’ 
Handbook for Parliamentarians, this is explained more fully: 
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Supported decision-making can take many forms. Those assisting 
a person may communicate the individual’s intentions to others 
or help him/her understand the choices at hand. They may help 
others to realize that a person with significant disabilities is also 
a person with a history, interests and aims in life, and is someone 
capable of exercising his/her legal capacity. 
(United Nations, 2007, pp. 90–1) 
Arguments for SDM fall into two categories.  The civil rights argument contends 
that SDM is best placed to protect and enhance an individual’s autonomy (Gooding, 
2013; Kohn et al., 2012; Pathare & Shields, 2012).  It is in keeping with the social model 
of disability, which considers capacity to be impaired by society’s inability to scaffold the 
decision-making of less capable citizens (Kohn et al., 2012) and is in accordance with 
international law (Donnelly, 2009). 
Others advocate for SDM from a best practice perspective (Donnelly, 2009; Kohn 
et al., 2012).  Involvement in decision-making is a core element of recovery (Mental 
Health Commission, 2002), allowing individuals to practise decision-making skills and 
empowering them through increased self-determination, self-esteem, and self-
confidence (Davidson et al., 2015; Kohn et al., 2012; Pathare & Shields, 2012).  SDM is 
also believed to facilitate better decision-making (Donnelly, 2009) while reducing the 
‘burden’ of responsibility on support people (Davidson et al., 2015). 
SDM acknowledges the need for different levels of support depending on the 
individual, the decision, and the context (Gooding, 2013).  Referring to the debates on 
capacity, SDM sees capacity as decision-specific, privileges the person’s current self and 
prefers a ‘limited’ circumscription of capacity as seen in cognitive models.  However 
SDM does come up against a “potentially unavoidable paradox in acknowledging that a 
person has diminished decision-making capacity but maintaining that he or she is 
nevertheless capable of meaningfully contributing to decision-making discussions and 
that the decisions that result from such discussions reflect his or her wishes” (Kohn et 
al., 2012, p. 1140).  This hearkens back to the idea of authenticity, suggesting that 
although a cognitive model of capacity may be preferred, elements of ‘authenticity’ may 
intrude.  
  




These four models of decision-making, their underlying philosophies, their views 
of capacity, (including their likely views on current debates) and their empowerment 
patterns are summarised in Table 1 (overleaf).    
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1.3 New Zealand Legislative Approaches 
 
 
The law necessarily reflects the views and values of the country 
and the times in which it is enacted.  
(Carney, 2012, p. 4) 
 
So how do these frameworks apply to New Zealand legislation relating to the 
assessment and management of people with mental illness and diminished capacity?  
This section briefly describes key New Zealand legislation pertaining to people with 
mental illness and diminished capacity before identifying inconsistencies related to 
contemporary debates on capacity.  
 
1.3.1 Current New Zealand Legislation 
In New Zealand, three pieces of legislation have specific relevance to people with 
diminished capacity and mental illness: 
The 1988 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act [the PPPR Act] is the 
“principal statutory vehicle for providing adult guardianship” (Atkin, 1997, p. 77).  It 
allows for three kinds of orders in respect of the person with diminished capacity; 
Personal Orders (including appointment of a welfare guardian), Property Orders 
(including appointment of a property manager) and Enduring Powers of Attorney 
(EPOA).  It is based on two principles: 
1. A presumption of competence, including a recognition that unwise decisions are 
not grounds for a judgement of incapacity, and 
2. An emphasis on the least restrictive intervention and a duty to encourage 
individuals to develop and exercise capacity.  
(PPPR Act, 1988) 
The 1993 Health and Disability Commissioner Act [the H&DC Act] and its 
subsequent Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights (the H&DC Code) 
SERVICE-USER VIEWS ON INCAPACITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
28 
sets out ten rights of persons receiving health and disability services (Health and 
Disability Commission, 2009).  These include rights to respect (Right 1), freedom from 
discrimination, coercion, harassment and exploitation (Right 2), dignity and 
independence (Right 3), and full disclosure and informed consent (Rights 6 and 7) 
(Health and Disability Commission, 2009).  Of particular importance, Right seven sets 
out a hierarchical decision-making procedure for when capacity is diminished and 
introduces the right to an advance directive (Health and Disability Commission, 2009). 
The 1992 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act [the 
(MH(CAT) Act], allows a person to be detained and treated against his or her will 
provided there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that person is “mentally disordered” 
to such a degree it; 
 Poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or of others, or 
 Seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of himself or 
herself. 
(MH(CAT) Act, 1992, sec. 2(1)) 
The MH(CAT) Act also allows for Community Treatment Orders, compelling 
individuals to accept outpatient treatment. 
 
1.3.2 Inconsistencies 
Several commentators have noted inherent contradictions between these laws 
(Atkin, 1997; Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; Butler & McVeagh, 2008; Court, 1996; Oliver, 
1997; Wareham et al., 2005).  In part, this could be due to fundamental differences in 
understandings of capacity and underlying principles.  Using the framework provided in 
Table 1, these inconsistencies are briefly considered. 
The PPPR Act is underpinned by principles such as the presumption of 
competence, the right to make an unwise decision, a recognition of ‘partial’ capacity and 
the requirement to support the individual to exercise his or her capacity (PPPR Act, 
1988).  It describes incapacity as an inability to “understand the nature, and foresee the 
consequences of decisions and to communicate these decisions” (PPPR Act, 1988, sec. 5).  
Thus it appears to utilise a decision-specific, cognitive model of capacity assessment, 
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with decision-making based on the individual’s contemporaneous wishes by utilising a 
form of supported decision-making (Bray, Dawson, & Van Winden, 2000; PPPR Act, 
1988).  However, Carney (2012) argues the requirement for an individual to “wholly” 
lack capacity before a welfare guardian can be appointed tends toward a notion of 
‘global incompetence,’  while the requirement for the appointee to act in the individual’s 
“best interests” (PPPR Act, 1988), implies a paternalistic decision-making model.  
Furthermore, Bray et al. (2000, p. 24) note that the court’s role as final arbitrator and 
protector of “vulnerable people” suggests a paternalistic, ‘best interests’ stance.   
Like the PPPR Act, the H&DC Code also stresses a presumption of competence 
(Health and Disability Commission, 2009, sec. 7(2)), suggesting a decision-specific 
model of capacity endorsing respect for an individuals’ wishes.  It offers a hierarchical 
‘menu’ of decision-making models, preferring in the first instance the informed consent 
of individuals to the level of their ability (autonomous/supported decision-making), 
next seeking consent from a legal surrogate, and finally a “best interests” decision 
incorporating substituted judgement through the requirement to ascertain whether the 
decision is “consistent with the informed choice the consumer would have made if he or 
she were competent” (Health and Disability Commission, 2009, sec. 7(4)).  It provides 
for the recognition of advance directives; however as these are not legally binding 
(McKenna et al., 2007) it is unclear how this balances with the requirement for a “best 
interests” decision.  This hierarchy of decision-making privileges individual autonomy, 
potentially at the expense of family or collective interests (Court, 1996), something 
discussed further in Part 1.4. 
In contrast to the PPPR Act and the H&DC Code, there is little reference to 
capacity in the MH(CAT) Act (Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; Butler & McVeagh, 2008; Court, 
1996; Oliver, 1997); a person can be detained when capacity is retained provided he or 
she is “mentally disordered” and poses a “serious danger to . . . that person or [to] 
others” (MH(CAT) Act, 1992, sec. 2(1)).  Furthermore, while the MH(CAT) Act requires 
the responsible clinician to seek informed consent to treatment, a competent refusal can 
be overridden provided the treatment is in a person’s best interests (MH(CAT) Act, 
1992, sec. 59).  Consequently,  some writers (Atkin, 2011; Bell & Brookbanks, 2005; 
Court, 1996; McKenna et al., 2007; O’Brien, 2010) suggest the MH(CAT) Act continues to 
apply a notion of ‘global incompetence,’ with a person deemed to lack capacity by virtue 
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of involuntary admission.  The MH(CAT) Act privileges the individual’s “best interests” 
(Atkin, 1997; McKenna et al., 2007; O’Brien, 2010), utilising a surrogate decision-making 
model (Court, 1996; O’Brien, 2010) which, although imposing a duty to consult with 
family/whānau (MH(CAT) Act, 1992, sec. 7A), does not mandate family involvement in 
decision-making (Ministry of Health, 2006).  The implication seems to be that the 
MH(CAT) Act promotes a model of “medical determination” (Atkin, 1997, p. 95), where 
“any treatment that may seem to clinicians to be desirable may be administered 
irrespective of the wishes of the patient or his or her family” (Brookbanks, 1994, p.190, 
in Court, 1996, p.14).  
 
1.3.3 Summary 
New Zealand laws have fundamentally different approaches to incapacity which 
reflect disparities in perceptions of capacity and philosophies underlying intervention.  
Accordingly, decision-making interventions for those with diminished capacity vary.  
These differences are summarised in Table 2 (opposite). 
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1.4 What About Culture? 
 
 
Ehara tāku toa i te toa takitahi, engari he toa takitini 
My strength is not mine alone, it comes from the collective 
(Māori Proverb, Brougham & Reed, 1999, p. 135). 
 
Ko te whānau ko hau, ko hau ko te whānau 
I am the whānau and the whānau is me 
(Moeke-Pickering, 1997, p. 18) 
 
The shift in ethical, legislative and policy imperatives towards autonomy 
described above has been a fairly recent, Western, phenomenon (Blackhall et al., 1995; 
Dresser, 1993; Freyenhagen & O’Shea, 2013; Hanssen, 2004; Levine, 1991; Ruhnke et al., 
2000).  Consequently, some argue insufficient consideration has been given to the 
influence of cultural norms on decision-making (Charles, Gafni, Whelan, & O’Brien, 2006; 
Hanssen, 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Pellegrino, 1994; Ruhnke et al., 2000; Wand 
& Chiarella, 2006).   
Current models of capacity assessment and intervention in incapacity could be 
seen as ethnocentric, failing to account for cultural differences in decision-making.  For 
example, a study by Blackhall et al. (1995) compared the opinions of Korean-Americans, 
Mexican-Americans, African-Americans and European-Americans on whether a patient 
should be advised of a terminal diagnosis and who should make treatment decisions.  
The study found Korean-Americans were more likely to believe patients should not be 
told their diagnosis and families should make treatment decisions.  A study by Ruhnke 
and colleagues (2000) comparing the attitudes of Japanese physicians and patients with 
their American counterparts found similar differences. 
Many theories have been posited to explain these differences.  These include 
theories on beliefs about the need for family to “protect” the patient from bad news 
(Dalla-Vorgia et al., 1992, in Blackhall et al., 1995), cultural differences in deference to 
hierarchy (Hanssen, 2004), learned responses informed by discrimination, differences in 
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world views relating to health and wellbeing, and differences in health literacy (Patel & 
Bakken, 2010).  However, by far the most oft-cited explanation is the difference between 
Western, individualistic, independent cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) and 
collectivist, family-centred (Blackhall et al., 1995; Bujo, 2005; Ujewe, 2012), 
interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) cultures. 
In individualistic societies, members are encouraged to develop an independent 
self, “detached from context,” with actions and behaviour arising from one’s own 
internal, coherent set of values, beliefs and attitudes (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 225; 
Hanssen, 2004).  Asserting oneself is seen as appropriate and desired, typified by the 
aphorism “the squeaky wheel gets the grease.”  This independent self is privileged by the 
cultural emphasis on individual autonomy. 
In contrast, collectivist societies tend to emphasise group solidarity (Hanssen, 
2004) and an “interdependent” self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  Interdependent 
societies see the self as part of a greater whole, with actions arising from social context 
rather than individual desires, feelings or thoughts (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  In fact, 
in Japan, “the straightforward claim of the naked ego is experienced as childish . . . 
immature” (Hanssen, 2004, p. 33; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  People are motivated by a 
desire to fit in, and the normative imperative is to maintain one’s interconnectedness 
and interdependence, typified by the Japanese saying “the nail that sticks out gets 
pounded down” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 224). 
This difference between independent and interdependent selves could influence 
decision-making in ways not accounted for by traditional capacity assessment and 
intervention models.   For example, Doi (1986, in Markus & Kitayama, 1991) asserts 
Americans are “decidedly more concerned with consistency between feelings and 
actions than are the Japanese” (p.240) and that the requirement for decisions to be 
motivated by “internal, individually rooted needs or motive[s]” (p.239), may not be as 
strong for people with interdependent selves, who are accustomed to regulating private 
emotions.  Thus, the current emphasis on coherence between one’s values and one’s 
decision may be a Western concept.   
Furthermore, the focus on individual decision-making may also be culturally 
bound.   Cultures focussing on independent selves treat the involvement of and deferral 
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to others in decision-making as inherently suspicious (Ho, 2008).  Yet in interdependent 
cultures, this is a normal, natural and supportive part of decision-making (Leever, 2011; 
Minkoff, 2014).  In contrast, the Western focus on individual decision-making can be 
“isolating and burdensome” (Blackhall et al., 1995, p. 824; Gostin, 1995).  This hearkens 
back to the discussion of relational autonomy in Section 1.1.2, and suggests that 
decision-making models privileging individual autonomy may not account for natural 
decision-making processes. 
This is relevant to the New Zealand context.  New Zealand considers itself a 
bicultural society, with the Crown obligated to bicultural service delivery and to provide 
for Māori perspectives and practices (Mental Health Commission, 2002; Wareham et al., 
2005).  Within the Māori world view the individual is inextricably tied to whānau, hapū, 
iwi and the environment (Moeke-Pickering, 1997; Wareham et al., 2005), with whānau 
involvement essential to decision-making (Atkin, 1997; Durie, 1998; Moeke-Pickering, 
1997; Wareham et al., 2005).  This  calls into question the appropriateness of 
individually-oriented models of capacity and decision-making, such as advance 
directives or the allowance for only one welfare guardian under the PPPR Act (Atkin, 
2011). 
Further, while discussion has focussed on independent, ‘Western’ cultures versus 
interdependent cultures, individuals within Western societies themselves differ in the 
extent they value individual autonomy over relational autonomy (Blackhall et al., 1995; 
Dresser, 1993; Hanssen, 2004).  Consequently, acknowledging that capacity, placed 
within the doctrine of individual autonomy, is a largely Western construct allows us to 
question ‘taken for granted’ assumptions about the nature of capacity and the 
appropriate balancing of individual versus relational autonomy in decision-making.  
Ironically, by insisting on autonomy in all situations, the medical profession may be 
reinforcing a paternalistic stance that while people can decide what they want, the 
‘doctor knows best’ when it comes to how they arrive at this decision (Blackhall et al., 
1995).   
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1.5 Service-User Perspectives 
 
 
I think when I was unwell the worst aspect of it was in and 
around that whole thing [losing capacity].  I love the fact that I 
can run my own life and I had lost that for a period.  One  of  the  
most  disabling  factors  in  and  around  mental  health  is  the  
fact  of that very issue.  
(Participant 4 Amnesty International Ireland, 2009, p. 27) 
 
So far, different models of capacity and approaches to intervention with people 
with diminished capacity have been discussed.  New Zealand legislation has been 
introduced and found to be inconsistent, and there is a suggestion prevailing models and 
assumptions may be culturally circumscribed.  Yet what are the views of people with 
mental illness?  The following section explores this question. 
 
1.5.1 Views on Capacity 
Within the debates regarding the nature of capacity, the voices of those who lack 
capacity are virtually silent, and studies examining people’s perceptions of capacity have 
focussed primarily on people’s self-assessment of abilities (Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, 
Dunning, & Kruger, 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Mabe & West, 1982), rather than 
factors deemed relevant for capacity assessment.   
Only one study looked at the attributes individuals considered relevant for 
capacity assessment.  This qualitative study, conducted by Amnesty International (2009) 
and republished by McDaid and Delaney (2011), asked eight people with mental illness 
to comment on proposed mental capacity legislation in Ireland and found that although 
most participants agreed with a cognitive model of capacity, “a range of physical, 
environmental and social factors” (Amnesty International Ireland, 2009, p. 33) were also 
deemed relevant, such as how decisions are presented, the “creation” of incapacity by 
medications, emotional factors such as fear, and the importance of external validation.  
Participants felt the “all-or-nothing” approach to capacity did not fit their experience; 
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even when significantly unwell they felt they retained the ability to make some decisions 
(McDaid & Delaney, 2011).  The researchers insisted these findings, particularly the 
finding that affirmation of abilities could enhance capacity, provide evidence for a 
socially constructed model of incapacity (Amnesty International Ireland, 2009; McDaid 
& Delaney, 2011).  
The veritable dearth of research on what individuals with diminished capacity 
believe should be relevant criteria for assessing capacity is in many ways 
understandable; people need a degree of capacity to engage in the debates regarding the 
nature of capacity.  However, if we accept mental illness as only temporarily influencing 
capacity, then it could be argued that people with mental illness should be able, when 
competent, to reflect on what it is like to lack capacity. 
 
1.5.2 Preferences for Participation 
That inclusion in decision-making leads to better outcomes is widely accepted, 
even if the final decision is contrary to the individual’s wishes (Donnelly, 2009; Mental 
Health Commission, 2002).  Correspondingly, people, including those with mental illness 
(Noble & Douglas, 2004), have increasingly sought involvement in medical decision-
making since the 1970s (Chewning et al., 2012). 
A series of studies have been conducted to ascertain the preferences for 
involvement in decision-making of people with mental illness.  Most of these used 
quantitative rating scales to assess participant preference, such as the Control 
Preferences Scale (CPS) or the Autonomy Preference Index (API).  These studies have 
found that while the majority of people with mental illness desire some involvement in 
decision-making, there is less certainty about their preferred role.  For example, one 
such study administered the CPS to 84 people with serious mental illness and reported 
that 82 percent preferred a collaborative relationship with their prescriber.  Similarly, a 
study of 122 inpatients with schizophrenia using the API indicated “there is no interest 
on the patients’ part  to take over decisional control completely but rather that patients 
strongly wish to participant in medical decisions on an equal footing” (Hamann, Cohen, 
Leucht, Busch, & Kissling, 2005, p. 2383).  However, other studies variously indicated 
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that people with mental illness have greater preference for information than 
involvement, or simply want to check decisions are ‘right’ (Woltmann & Whitley, 2010).   
In an endeavour to ascertain why preferred involvement varied, subsequent 
research has attempted to correlate scores on the API or CPS with demographic, 
diagnostic, experiential or decisional factors.  For example, the study above by Hamann 
et al. (2005) indicated that people who had experience of involuntary treatment showed 
more interest in participation.  Adams, Drake and Wolford (2007) surveyed 30 people 
with mental illness living in the community using the API and CPS and reported that 
participants’ preference for involvement differed according to the decision to be made; 
participants preferred a more passive role for decisions regarding psychiatric 
medication than general medical medication.  Using a similar correlational methodology, 
O’Neal et al. (2008) found that people with mental illness preferred a more collaborative 
role for medical decisions compared to a more autonomous role for psychosocial 
decisions (such as housing or employment.  Patients, whether medical or psychiatric, 
also differed in their preferred involvement in decision-making according to their 
educational level, health status, severity of health difficulties (Ende, Kazis, Ash, & 
Moskowitz, 1989; Vick & Scott, 1998), age (Ende et al., 1989; Hamann et al., 2005; Vick & 
Scott, 1998), satisfaction with care (Hamann et al., 2011), trust in the medical 
practitioner (Hamann et al., 2011; Myron, Gillespie, Swift, & Williamson, 2008), and self-
perceived decision-making skills (Amnesty International Ireland, 2009; Hamann et al., 
2011; McDaid & Delaney, 2011).  Diagnosis also seems to play a part, with people with 
depression and anxiety typically showing preferences for passive roles in decision-
making (Stacey et al., 2008) while people with schizophrenia placed higher value on 
surrogate decision-making (Swartz, Swanson, Van Dorn, Elbogen, & Shumway, 2006).    
However, the two tools typically used to assess preference for involvement in 
decision-making, the CPS (Adams et al., 2007; Mahone, 2008; O’Neal et al., 2008) and API 
(Adams et al., 2007; Hamann et al., 2011, 2005; O’Neal et al., 2008), have a number of 
shortfalls: 
 Both focus on current preferences.  Thus research captures two response 
categories; those of people who are well and want decision-making 
autonomy, and those who are unwell and who may have different preferences 
for participation than they would prescribe for themselves when well.  
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 Where studies do ask people to imagine prospective wishes, scenarios don’t 
explicitly address loss of capacity.  Consequently, these studies don’t address 
people’s prospective preferences for involvement when capacity is diminished.   
 Furthermore, where studies have asked people to imagine future scenarios, 
answers are combined in overall results.  Failing to separate these results 
means differences between people’s current and prospective wishes for 
participation are lost. 
 Both ask questions about medical decision-making and suggest alternatives 
necessitating the involvement of a doctor or psychiatrist.  This fails to detect 
whether people wish to delegate responsibility to another not their doctor.   
Only two studies using an alternative research methodology were found, both 
conducted fairly recently: that by Amnesty International (2009; republished by McDaid 
& Delaney, 2011), and another by Myron et al. (2008).  Both studies utilised qualitative 
interviews to explore the experiences of people with mental illness when decisions were 
made by others during periods of incapacity (Amnesty International Ireland, 2009; 
McDaid & Delaney, 2011; Myron et al., 2008).  These studies found that while some 
participants acknowledged that delegating decision-making to another could be 
necessary or a welcome relief, even if they did not agree at the time (Amnesty 
International Ireland, 2009; McDaid & Delaney, 2011; Myron et al., 2008), others had 
negative experiences, with one individual stating “[I felt] like I was an object to be 
discussed,” “like a rag doll being torn around the place” (participant, in Amnesty 
International Ireland, 2009, p. 28; Myron et al., 2008).  Many spoke of feeling unheard, or 
believing their involvement was only elicited on a tokenistic basis (Myron et al., 2008).  
Others spoke about withholding views for fear of being a burden or of having services 
withdrawn should they question decisions (Amnesty International Ireland, 2009; 
McDaid & Delaney, 2011; Myron et al., 2008).  Several spoke about wanting some 
assistance with decision-making, whether practical help, having someone to talk to, or 
help with problem-solving, suggesting a valuing of supported decision-making (Amnesty 
International Ireland, 2009; McDaid & Delaney, 2011; Myron et al., 2008).     
This paints a complicated picture of preferences for autonomy and involvement 
in decision-making, with some preferring an approach where decision-making is wholly 
abdicated to another, others preferring a supported decision-making approach, and 
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some desiring a mixed approach (Amnesty International Ireland, 2009; McDaid & 
Delaney, 2011; Myron et al., 2008; Pathare & Shields, 2012).  This has important 
implications for structuring interventions for times when people have diminished 
capacity. 
 
1.5.3 Preferences for Involvement of Others 
Traditionally, where there has been a need for involvement of others in decision-
making, this ‘other’ has been a medical practitioner acting in the individual’s ‘best 
interests’.  While the increased focus on individual autonomy has resulted in greater 
consultation with family (Donnelly, 2009; Roupie et al., 2000), the preferences of people 
with mental illness for involvement of others is unclear. 
For example, while a quantitative study surveying 92 psychiatric inpatients found 
the majority of those experiencing a short-term psychiatric hospitalisation wanted 
relatives to be involved to some extent (Perreault, Paquin, Kennedy, Desmarais, & 
Tardif, 1999), Swartz et al. (2006), using a semi-structured, manualised discussion of 
choices involved in advance care planning concluded that community-based patients 
with mental illness “placed the highest value on continuity of care by gaining treatment 
their doctors think is best” (p.73).  And while a recent meta-analysis by Kelly, Rid & 
Wendler (2012) of 14 qualitative articles found that “the vast majority of respondents 
wanted close family to make decisions for them” (p.886), most of the studies included 
targeted the elderly or seriously ill, casting doubt on its applicability to people with 
mental illness. 
The type of decision and who is involved could explain some variation in 
participant responses.  For example, the study by Amnesty International (2009) asked 
participants to indicate who they would prefer to have involved in day-to-day, medical 
or legal decisions.  While participants unanimously preferred that someone trusted and 
close to them be involved in day-today decisions, when it came to mental health 
treatment decisions, participants expressed more varied preferences including an 
advocate, the multidisciplinary mental health team or a legal professional.       
Social isolation can also pose significant barriers to involving others.  In a review 
of the evidence for supported decision-making (SDM), Pathare and Shields (2012) 
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identified social isolation and stigma as a significant barrier; participants often spoke of 
no one being available despite a desire for support from others.  Similarly, a qualitative 
study by High (1990) of the preferences for family involvement of 71 elderly 
participants found that social isolation and concerns about being a ‘burden’ resulted in a 
greater reliance on friends and doctors as surrogate decision-makers.  
Thus, while there is research to suggesting people with mental illness want to 
share decision-making and involve others, studies on how this should operate and who 
should be involved paint a complicated picture.  This is important, as while in New 
Zealand involvement of family / whānau is culturally relevant and enshrined in 
legislation, it is not without shortcomings.   Although nominated others can be 
specifically empowered through the granting of an order under the PPPR Act, generally 
only one person can be nominated (PPPR Act, 1988, sec. 12(6)).  The MH(CAT) Act 
mandates consultation, not family involvement in decision-making (Ministry of Health, 
2006), while the H&DC Code privileges individual autonomy, giving little space to 
collective decision-making (Wareham et al., 2005).  Consequently, these models do not 
address the range of possible preferences of people with mental illness, particularly 
those identifying strongly as Māori, where decision-making is typically undertaken by 
the whole whānau (Atkin, 1997, 2011; Wareham et al., 2005). 
 
1.5.4 Summary 
In summary, little research appears to have been conducted to look specifically at 
how people with mental illness believe capacity should be assessed and how decision-
making should be undertaken if capacity is diminished.  Should capacity assessment be 
based on a purely cognitive model, or should other, authenticity-undermining, 
influences be considered?  To what extent do people wish to remain involved in 
decision-making if their capacity has been diminished, who else should be involved, and 
what role should this person take?  Do they want them to privilege wishes or interests?  
And what decision-making model would they want used?  It is these questions this study 
sought to answer.  
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1.6 Conclusion and Research Questions 
 
 
 (In)capacity is a social construct, hotly debated and constantly in flux.  
Accordingly, a range of interventions arise when someone’s capacity is diminished, 
interventions which differ according to their understanding of incapacity and the 
relative weight given to autonomy versus beneficence.  Although these debates impact 
significantly on the lives of people with diminished capacity through their 
operationalisation in legislation, there is a dearth of research canvassing the views of the 
people who are directly affected.  This may be due to the perception that the subject 
population lacks the ability to contribute meaningfully to this debate.  However, the 
work reported here is informed by a stance valuing the insights of people with varied 
capacity, such as those with mental illness.   
The research reported here seeks to give voice to the perceptions of people with 
mental illness, asking: 
 Their views on the debates regarding capacity, specifically; 
o Whether assessment of capacity should consider elements such as 
emotionality, beliefs and values, 
o Whether assessment of capacity should be pegged to past, present or 
future selves, and 
o Whether the threshold for capacity should be decision-specific or risk-
relative. 
 Their preferences for participation in decision-making, including prospective 
views on participation should their capacity be diminished. 
 Their prospective preference for involvement of others in decision-making, 
specifically; 
o Whom they want involved, 
o What role they would want this person to take, 
o Whether they want this person to focus on their wishes or interests, 
and whether past, present or future wishes should be emphasised.
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Chapter 2:  Methodology 
 
 
2.1  Epistemological Perspective and Rationale  
 
 
This research was undertaken using a postmodern research paradigm; a subset 
of what Guba and Lincoln (1994) term “critical theory.”  Utilising a constructivist 
ontology, it acknowledges that as certain discourses gain dominance, social 
constructions become “crystallized” [sic] within systems (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110; 
Payne, 1997).  This approach highlights how understandings of capacity have been 
constructed within academic and clinical/professional domains, privileging the 
priorities, beliefs and values of the elite, with tangible implications for people with 
mental illness.   
The researcher’s emphasis on social justice focussed attention on the views of 
one group of people who might be disadvantaged by these social constructions – people 
with mental illness.  However, a social constructivist stance acknowledges that people 
with mental illness are not a homogenous group and that individuals will have different 
perspectives; for example, someone with bipolar affective disorder, characterised by 
discrete episodes of unwellness (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), may have 
different views from someone with an eating disorder, which is viewed by many as 
integral to their identity (Tan et al., 2006).  
This research departed from traditional critical theory’s emphasis on 
transforming ‘false consciousness’ and political structures through engagement and 
confrontation, instead employing the principles of participatory research (Lincoln & 
Guba, 2003).  A participatory approach requires that research gives participants tools 
and insights while simultaneously producing findings that promote meaningful change 
(Lincoln & Guba, 2003).  Croft and Beresford (1994) identify four elements of 
participatory social work practice which, when applied to this project, stipulated that 
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the research: a. aimed to empower people, b. offered participants decision-making and 
planning control, c. equipped participants with knowledge and skills, and d. ensured 
systems were receptive to service-user involvement.   
 
 




The research utilised a cross-sectional, mixed methods design (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2011).  A qualitative approach informed sampling and data collection.  Data 
collection consisted of two distinct phases; qualitative focus groups followed by 
individual interviews, with the first informing the second.  Data were analysed using 
quantitative and qualitative methods.   
This mixed methods design was specifically chosen to allow qualitative and 
quantitative elements to offset each other’s shortcomings; this is addressed in Section 
2.5.   
Study procedures were approved by the University of Otago Human Research 
Ethics Committee in July 2014 and subsequently amended in November 2014.  The Ngai 
Tahu Research Consultation Committee provided a review of the study.  Access to 
current clients of the Southern District Health Board was approved by Health Research 
South, the Southern District Health Board’s Research Ethics Committee and locality 
approval was gained from all other participating organisations (Research approvals 
located in Appendix A). 
 
2.2.2 Setting 
Data collection took place within the boundaries of Dunedin, a coastal city in the 
South Island of New Zealand, with a population of just over 120,000 people in 2013 
SERVICE-USER VIEWS ON INCAPACITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
45 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2015).  In 2013 people of European / Pākehā ethnicity made up 
88.3% of the inhabitants, compared to a national average of 74%.  Māori are the second 
largest ethnic group, with 7.7% of the population; this is significantly below the national 
average of 14.9% (Statistics New Zealand, 2015).   Data on mental illness within 
Dunedin suggest that in 2010 1.54% of people within the city were in receipt of income 
support due to mental illness (Mental Health and Addiction Planning Project, 2011).  
This cannot be taken as a true indicator of the rates of mental illness within the 
community as many people with a diagnosis of mental illness do not receive a benefit. 
Nationally, it is estimated that 16.3% of the population have had a diagnosis of a 
common mental disorder (depression, anxiety and /or bipolar affective disorder) 
(Ministry of Health, 2013).  The rates are somewhat higher for women (20%) than men 
(13%), while the rates of Māori and non-Māori are comparable (Ministry of Health, 
2013).  However, of the 3.5% of the population accessing specialist mental health 
services in 2013 (Ministry of Health, 2014b), men and Māori had higher rates of service 
use (54.2% men versus 45.8% women; 5533 per 100,000 of Māori, versus 3338 per 
100,000 nationally) (Ministry of Health, 2014a).    
A household survey conducted in New Zealand in 2003 and 2004 found that 
anxiety disorders have the highest lifetime prevalence (24.9%), followed by mood 
disorders (20.2%), substance use disorders (12.3%) and eating disorders (1.7%) 
(Oakley Browne, Wells, & Scott, 2006).  Among mood disorders, the most prevalent is 
major depressive disorder (lifetime rate of 16.0%); with bipolar affective disorder 
accounting for a lifetime prevalence of 3.8% (Oakley Browne et al., 2006).  However, this 
survey was unable to comment on the prevalence of psychotic disorders due to 
difficulties with methodology (Oakley Browne et al., 2006). 
 
2.2.3 Sample 
General inclusion / exclusion criteria.  Specific sampling criteria differed 
slightly across phases, however broad inclusion / exclusion criteria stipulated that 
participants; 
 Have a diagnosis of mental illness and/or personality disorder as defined by 
the DSM-IV, 
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 Are aged between 16 and 67, 
 Reside within the Dunedin city catchment area, 
 Are able to give informed consent to research participation, and 
 Are not current clients of the researcher. 
It was hoped that a minimum of five focus groups of at least four participants 
would be held and no less than ten individual interviews be conducted. 
 
 




Research suggests people with mental illness are reluctant to participate in group 
research activities, whether due to symptomology, stigma associated with mental illness, 
or distrust of researchers (Allen, Carpenter, Sheets, Miccio, & Ross, 2003; Rauktis, 
Feidler, & Wood, 1998).  Consequently, researchers frequently have difficulty recruiting 
participants and the same individuals often participate in many research requests 
(Rauktis et al., 1998).  Accordingly, it was felt that recruiting using pre-existing groups, 
although not a representative sample, might overcome some barriers to participation.  
For example, Rauktis et al.  (1998) suggested that people with serious mental illness 
often lack social skills and may be withdrawn; therefore the reassurance of seeing 
familiar faces might facilitate group discussion.  Similarly, conducting focus groups on 
‘safe’ territory with the sanction of trusted group facilitators could reduce the distrust 
traditionally levelled at mental health professionals (Allen et al., 2003). 
Within Dunedin, a number of groups are run for people with mental illness.  A list 
of these groups was collated and facilitators contacted to request permission to 
approach group members and invite their participation.  Use of existing group time and 
facilities for focus groups and individual interviews was negotiated with facilitators.   
In total, eight organisations were contacted.  Facilitator guidance dictated the 
best method to approach group members; this involved one of two methods: 
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1. In the majority of cases (five out of eight), the researcher was invited to attend a 
group meeting to discuss the research in person, with facilitators indicating the 
best time to approach the group to maximise participant numbers.  This 
sometimes necessitated more than one visit.  Information sheets (Appendix B) 
were provided and a signup sheet circulated for those interested in participating 
in either focus group discussion, individual interviews, or both.  The facilitator 
then returned to the group at a pre-arranged time and a focus group was held 
with those who indicated an interest in participating.  In one group, members 
indicated a desire to engage in focus group discussion immediately and thus 
there was no delay between recruitment and data collection. 
2. In three groups, information about the research was provided to group 
facilitators who then discussed the research with their members and provided 
information sheets.  The group facilitator gauged interest and collected a list of 
interested persons to be contacted separately. 
Best results were obtained when the researcher spoke directly to the group; of 
the five approached directly, all agreed to participate in the focus group phase.  
However, two individuals from the groups who declined to participate in the focus 
group phase indicated an interest in the interview phase. 
Participating organisations included the local District Health Board (DHB), two 
major non-governmental mental health service providers contracted to the DHB, a major 
social service provider, and a small, member-run organisation.  The groups included 
daily drop-in vocational / activity centres, a cultural group and a series of 
psychotherapeutic / psychoeducational groups.  Of these groups, three were also open 
to people with intellectual disabilities.  Due to restrictions on attendance at one 
organisation, a total of three focus groups, each on a different day, were held at one 
facility.  Only one focus group was held at each of the other facilities.  In total, seven 
focus groups were held.   
To obtain greatest saturation and ensure depth of analysis, qualitative interviews 
were completed to investigate certain concepts in greater depth, including areas of 
variation or outliers.  Interview participants were drawn from all members of the host 
organisations who had indicated willingness to participate in this phase.  This included 
those who were unwilling to participate in the focus group phase, those who had 
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indicated a willingness to be involved in the focus group phase but who were 
unavailable on the day, and those who had taken part in a focus group but needed to 
leave early.  Although it had been hoped that purposive sampling could be used to 
ensure diagnostic representation, a lack of volunteers and access to diagnostic 
information prior to interviews made this impossible.  In total, ten interviews were held.   
Total number of focus groups and interviews conducted was guided by the 
principle of theoretical saturation; that is, sampling continued until no new findings 
were gleaned and all concepts appeared well-defined (Bryman, 2012). 
 
2.3.2 Demographic Data 
In order to describe the sample, all participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire providing brief demographic and social information including age, gender, 
ethnicity, diagnosis and basic information on social support networks.  A copy of the 
questionnaire is available in Appendix C.   
 
2.3.3 Procedure: Focus groups 
Focus groups were held between September 2014 and March 2015 at the sites of 
the host organisations during normal group hours.  Groups were generally held in a 
small side room, with light refreshments provided.   
Research began by orienting participants to the purpose and focus of the 
discussion, obtaining informed consent (Appendix D) and providing assistance to 
complete the demographic questionnaire.  Discussion commenced with a brief overview 
of current legislation relating to mental capacity and complaint mechanisms.  A handout 
summarising this information was provided (Appendix E).  Semi-structured focus group 
discussion was then encouraged, focusing on the three research questions identified in 
Section 1.6 (see Appendix F for Focus Group Guide Questions).  When themes identified 
in previous research or focus groups were not raised by participants, attention was 
drawn to these once natural discussion was exhausted.   
To frame discussion, participants were asked to reflect on personal experiences 
or to consider short case examples: 
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 When discussing risk-relativity, participants were asked to consider whether 
‘risky’ choices were indicative of diminished capacity in one of two scenarios; 
either choosing whether to eat dinner (usually a straightforward, low-risk 
decision) in the case of anorexia (where the risk is considered higher), or 
choosing to live “on the streets” when there was an option of more “suitable” 
accommodation.   
 When discussing ‘unusual’ values participants were asked to consider 
whether value priorities considered ‘unusual’ by the general public should be 
considered indicative of diminished capacity.  An example given was the 
potential valuing of ‘thinness’ over ‘life’ in the case of anorexia. 
 When discussing best interests versus individual wishes, participants were 
asked to consider a hypothetical scenario of a woman with dementia who 
wants to remain at home despite her condition placing her at significant risk 
of harm should she do so.   
These case examples facilitated participant understanding by anchoring complex 
concepts in concrete situations, while a feeling of distance between participants’ 
answers and themselves enabled more sensitive questions to be asked (Finch, 1987, 
cited in Bryman, 2012).  Conversely, this distance could depersonalise the study and 
vignettes may have limited discussion to that scenario. 
After each focus group detailed field notes were taken to capture researcher 
observations on setting, participants, process, insights, and further questions.  Focus 
group discussion was recorded and transcribed.  Preliminary data analysis was 
undertaken concurrently with further data collection, resulting in an inductive research 
process, with past focus groups informing future discussions.  Audio files of initial focus 
groups were reviewed by the research supervisor and discussed.   
 
2.3.4 Procedure: Individual Interviews 
Individual interviews were held between March and June 2015.  Light 
refreshments were again provided and all interviews were conducted in a side room 
made available by host organisation staff. 
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Interviews commenced by orienting participants to the purpose and focus of the 
discussion, obtaining informed consent, and providing required assistance to complete 
the demographics questionnaire (those participants who had previously attended a 
focus group were not required to complete the questionnaire a second time).  As with 
focus groups, participants were provided with a brief overview of current law, before 
opening the interview for discussion.  Although the overarching themes of discussion 
remained as described above, more attention was paid to the reasoning behind 
participants’ views and themes emerging from focus group discussion.  These themes 
included autonomy versus influence, closer questioning on the role of values, 
complications associated with involving others, and participant views on advance 
directives (see Appendix F for Interview Guide Questions). 
Field notes were recorded immediately after each interview to capture facilitator 
observations.  Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and as with focus groups, 
preliminary data analysis was undertaken concurrently with data collection.  Initial 
transcripts were reviewed by the research supervisor and discussed. 
 
 
2.4 Data Analysis 
 
 
Focus group and interview data were analysed with regard to the three themes 
identified above.  Data were analysed as follows. 
 
2.4.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Constant comparison analysis (CCA).  CCA is used to identify underlying themes 
and relationships between ideas and concepts (Krueger & Casey, 2009; Leech & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2007).  Questions related to research topics were asked of the data and 
transcripts coded into “component parts that seem to be of potential theoretical 
significance and/or that appear to be particularly salient” (Bryman, 2012, p.568).  Codes 
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were then ‘chunked’ into larger themes (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007).  Emerging 
themes were further explored by re-examining transcripts and in future focus groups 
and interviews.  Thus, for example, the theme ‘involving others’ in capacity assessment 
and decision-making was frequently raised with qualifying statements and provisos; 
raising questions such as ‘what attributes are required of involved others?’ and ‘what 
conditions promote positive versus negative involvement of others?’  This necessitated 
reflection on codes developed and identification of emerging themes while being 
sensitive to contrasts and similarities between them (Bryman, 2012).  Divergent 
opinions were also attended to, as these presented alternate viewpoints for exploration 
in future focus groups and interviews.  Themes were identified and coding sheets 
matched themes with relevant quotes.  These coding sheets were reviewed by the 
research supervisor who had experience in CCA.   
 
Content analysis (CA).  Key themes and categories identified through CCA were 
quantified using content analysis.  Content analysis facilitates the production of 
quantitative data for statistical analysis (Bryman, 2012; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007).  It 
goes beyond simply counting instances of words or themes, involving a “subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification of coding 
and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh, 2005, p. 1278 emphasis added).  Hsieh and 
Shannon (2005) identify three approaches to CA – conventional, directed and 
summative: 
 In conventional content analysis the researcher becomes immersed in the data 
to allow themes and insights to emerge rather than using preconceived 
categories.  This approach is appropriate when describing a phenomenon or 
where there is little pre-existing theory or literature. 
 Directed content analysis uses pre-existing theory or literature as its starting 
point, analysing the text to “validate or extend conceptually a theoretical 
framework or theory” (p.1281).  It is considered appropriate where previous 
literature or theory would benefit from further exploration for the purpose of 
validation, countermanding or expansion. 
 Summative content analysis analyses certain words or phrases in the wider 
text to explore their usage and underlying meanings.  It is considered 
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appropriate for research questions examining the usage of certain words or 
phrases. 
This research project used elements of all three approaches.  While existing 
theory and literature were used to develop the initial research questions and concepts, 
coding quickly moved beyond these pre-defined categories to explore aspects that were 
raised by participants, which were further explored in subsequent focus groups and 
interviews explored.  In this way data collection and analysis was sensitive to both 
current debates in academic literature and those factors considered important by 
participants.   Keyword in Context employed a summative approach, as explained below. 
 
Keyword in context (KWIC).  KWIC recognises that words have multiple 
meanings and so examines specific words with regard to their co-locates (words 
appearing within a specified distance) to analyse these meanings (Fielding & Lee, 1998).  
KWIC was used to analyse words used with greater frequency, such as the use of the 
word “know” in the context of involving others, and to determine the layered meanings 
attached to this word.  These meanings were then fed back into the CCA and CA, adding 
further layers of understanding.   
 
2.4.2 Quantitative Data Analysis 
The purpose of the study was to explore the range of participant preferences in 
response to the research questions raised in Section 1.6, not to provide a hierarchy of 
preference.  Because of this, quantitative data analysis did not use mutually exclusive 
categories. Instead, within each theme and subtheme, the range of responses was 
identified along with the number of respondents who gave each response, keeping in 
mind that some respondents gave multiple responses.   
Quantitative analysis was only conducted for measures where categories were 
mutually exclusive.   Quantitative data were analysed using Microsoft Excel and the 
online calculators available at www.socstatistics.com (Stangroom, 2015).  Due to the 
small sample size, Fisher’s exact test was used to test significance of quantitative data as 
contingency tables were no greater than 2 x 2 and categories were mutually exclusive.  
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2.5 Research Validity 
 
 
As mentioned, a mixed methods design was selected to allow qualitative and 
quantitative elements to offset each other.  In particular, reasons for qualitative and 
quantitative aspects were as follows; 
 The qualitative data collection strategies allowed an inductive methodology 
specifically attending to the priorities of the people being studied (Bryman, 
2012; Burke Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
 As it is inevitable that “the investigator and the investigated object are 
assumed to be interactively linked, with the values of the investigator . . . 
inevitably influencing the enquiry” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110), semi-
structured focus groups were chosen to allow the researcher to take a lesser 
role (Krueger, 1994).   
 As qualitative research is often criticised for its subjectivity and lack of 
transparency and generalisability (Bryman, 2012; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 
2007), a quantitative element was incorporated in data analysis. 
Specifically, it was hoped that the mixed-methods, multi-phase approach would 
systematically address the quantitative dimensions of reliability, validity, 
generalisability and replicability (Bryman, 2012) and their qualitative counterparts of 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
This shown in Table 3 (overleaf). 
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Table 3.  
 
Strategies to Increase Rigor and Quality of Research. 
Domain Strategies used 
Credibility / validity Analysis triangulation. 
Methods triangulation. 





Full transferability not focus of this research, as aim is 
exploratory. 
Use of thick description to “render a deeply detailed account . . . 
so that readers can judge the work’s . . . application to other 
times, places, people and contexts” (Barusch et al., 2011, p13). 
Quantitative data analysis may allow some generalisable 






Audit trail of procedures used and decisions made in data 




Audit trail.  
Transparent and reflexive approach. 
 
 
Credibility / (internal) validity.  Validity asks “are these findings sufficiently 
authentic . . . that I may trust myself in acting on their implications? . . . Would I feel 
sufficiently secure about these findings to construct social policy or legislation based on 
them?”  (Lincoln & Guba, 2003, p. 274).  This speaks to both internal validity and 
external validity; credibility refers to the former while transferability relates to the 
latter and is addressed separately below.  Credibility examines whether the research is a 
credible account of social reality as experienced by the people described (Bryman, 2012; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  Bryman (2012) argues for two strategies to ensure credibility; 
respondent validation (or member checking) and triangulation, both used here. 
Member checking involves seeking feedback from participants to check 
understandings and interpretations (Bryman, 2012).  Member checking occurred in data 
collection and data analysis.  Throughout data collection, techniques such as 
paraphrasing and reflecting were used to ensure the researcher’s understandings 
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matched those intended by participants.  Participant feedback on data analysis was also 
sought by sharing a summary of draft findings with all but two participants (one whom 
was unwell and another who declined to review findings).  Participants were 
encouraged to provide feedback; all endorsed the findings.  However, this approach is 
not without criticism; participants may agree with the researcher’s interpretation due to 
power differentials or a wish to please (Bryman, 2012).  There is also a risk that 
participants may change their accounts or that the selection of one interpretation over 
another in cases of disagreement can reflect power imbalances (Barusch, Gringeri, & 
George, 2011).   
Triangulation, using alternate sources of data collection or analysis to verify and 
augment findings, is recommended as it produces a more nuanced account (Barusch et 
al., 2011; Bryman, 2012; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2007) 
contend that at least two methods of data analysis should be used to increase the 
integrity of inferences drawn.  This research used triangulation in both data collection 
and data analysis.  At the data collection stage, two methods of data collection were 
used; focus groups and individual interviews, with the latter providing an opportunity to 
verify whether similar themes emerged outside norming group influences.  At the data 
analysis stage quantitative and qualitative data analysis strategies were used. 
 
Transferability / generalisability (external validity) .  Qualitative research, 
specifically focus group studies, are frequently criticised for their lack of generalisability 
(Bryman, 2012; Fern, 2001).  This was not a significant concern for this exploratory 
research, which aimed to ascertain the range of views held by people with mental illness 
for use in future, generalisable, research.  Yet the question still needs to be asked, how 
do we know the views held by these participants bear some relation to those held by 
people with mental illness as a whole? 
To address this concern, Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest the use of thick 
description; describing close observation of small instances rather than making 
sweeping grand statements, acknowledging that knowledge about a culture grows “out 
of the delicacy of its distinctions, not the sweep of its abstractions” (Geertz, 1973, p. 25).  
This description of observed phenomena in minute detail also allows others to assess 
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the transferability of findings to other settings or populations (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Barusch et al., 2011).  This study allowed for thick description through the use of 
detailed transcripts, field notes and reporting of findings. 
 
Dependability / reliability.  Dependability asks whether others involved in the 
research would reach the same conclusions (Bryman, 2012; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  To 
establish dependability, Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend developing a clear audit 
trail, recording all stages of the research and explicitly detailing why certain decisions 
were made.  This research project has employed a similar approach and attempts have 
been made to ‘lay bare’ the rationale behind decisions to allow these to be challenged.   
Peer review is also recommended to promote dependability (Bryman, 2012; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  At various stages of the project, ideas and concepts were shared 
with the research supervisor and colleagues in the field.  This included a formal peer 
review of the research proposal by a leading colleague in the field.  Transcripts and 
coding records were made available to the research supervisor, who scrutinised the data 
and conclusions drawn for theoretical and methodological integrity.  
 
Confirmability / replicability.  Confirmability asks whether the researcher has 
acted “in good faith” (Bryman, 2012, p. 392) and minimised the impact of personal 
values and objectives.  In quantitative research this refers to research replicability; if the 
research can be replicated and the same findings obtained, this gives greater credence to 
the data (Bryman, 2012).  In qualitative data, confirmability refers to the ability of others 
to confirm how conclusions were drawn.  Two strategies were used to enhance 
confirmability; an audit trail (as described above), and reflexivity. 
Reflexivity acknowledges that the researcher’s values and attitudes will influence 
the choice of research question, research methodology, data collection and data analysis 
(Lincoln & Guba, 2003).  Thus, a reflexive approach recognises that as a social worker 
employed in the mental health field and a student completing a Master’s thesis, the 
researcher is from the clinical and academic fields already well represented in debates 
on incapacity.  Without a personal experience of mental illness, the researcher is also an 
‘outsider,’ although experience walking alongside people with mental illness meant she 
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had gleaned some ‘insider’ knowledge.  In undertaking this research, these personal 
values and experiences influenced all research stages; for example an emphasis on social 
justice influenced the choice of research topic, design and methodology, as did the belief 
that constructions of incapacity are influenced by social, historical and political 
conditions.  A reflexive approach encourages an acknowledgement of these assumptions, 
questioning these as much as clarifying them.   To this end, reflexivity was not used in 
isolation but was instead combined with the above strategies to ensure the predominant 
‘voice’ heard in the research was that of the participants.  
 
 
2.6 Ethical Considerations 
 
 
This project raised ethical dilemmas relating to informed consent, privacy and 
confidentiality, and guiding versus leading discussion.  This section outlines an ethical 
framework and demonstrates how this was applied to resolve these dilemmas. 
A discussion of ethical dilemmas must commence by first outlining the ethical 
principles used to resolve them.  In developing this framework, Beauchamp and 
Childress’ (2009) Principles of Biomedical Ethics, outlined four key principles: 
 Respect for autonomy:  Acknowledging the individual’s right to “self rule . . . 
free from controlling interference and from certain limitations such as 
inadequate understanding” and to act “freely in accordance with a self-chosen 
plan” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 99).   
 Nonmaleficence:  Recognising human beings as vulnerable and obligating the 
researcher to avoid harm. 
 Beneficence:  Asserting that intervention should contribute to the welfare of 
the individual or society.  Beneficence is often contrasted with autonomy, 
with a contention that beneficence authorises others to act against someone’s 
autonomous choice if it is to that person’s benefit. 
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 Justice:  Maintaining that all humans are equal in value, that all should be 
offered a ‘fair opportunity,’ and imposing a duty to prevent unfair exploitation 
and discrimination. 
To these four principles, DuBois (2008) adds a fifth, relationality, the idea that 
human beings are “intrinsically related to others, a member of communities” and that 
“to flourish, actions must respect the relationships that an individual is in” (p. 34).   
 
2.6.1 Capacity, Capability and Contribution 
The most significant ethical dilemma faced was that presented by individuals 
who wished to participate in the research, but whose contributions could not be 
included.  This dilemma was relevant for eight participants, for one of three reasons: 
1. The participant wished to participate in the focus group but requested their 
contribution not be included in the research project (one participant). 
2. The participant did not have a diagnosed mental illness (five participants; four 
were identified after focus group completion). 
3. There were concerns about the participant’s ability to give informed consent to 
research participation (two participants). 
This discussion begins with arguably the most contentious of the above situations 
– capacity to consent to research – as the ethical reasoning in resolving this dilemma 
demonstrates a more exacting example of the same process followed in the other two 
situations.   
This research was founded on the premise that capacity is socially constructed 
and that those affected by this construction are often excluded from debate.  Yet at some 
point a decision needed to be made on an individual’s ability to give informed consent 
for research participation.  In particular, did some participants’ inability to understand 
more abstract concepts mean they were unable to give informed consent, or was there a 
difference between capacity to consent and capability to meaningfully participate? 
In deciding what action to take, the ethical principle of autonomy was key.  
Autonomy underpins the requirement for informed consent, however it does not 
necessitate that the individual has the capability to undertake a task (Beauchamp & 
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Childress, 2009; DuBois, 2008).  Thus, a person may be competent to decide to go horse 
trekking but it does not automatically follow that the person is a capable rider.  
Similarly, a distinction was to be made between ability to give informed consent and 
ability to contribute meaningfully to discussion. 
Informed consent involves disclosure of information by the researcher, 
understanding of this information by the participant, and his or her voluntary consent  
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; DuBois, 2008).  Throughout the research project, care 
was taken to outline the study purpose and procedure, what would happen to 
information gathered, that participation was voluntary, and that individuals could 
withdraw at any time.  To give informed consent, participants needed to understand 
these five things at a basic level and be free from undue influence.  On this basis, most 
individuals who struggled with the more abstract concepts were still considered capable 
of giving informed consent to participate (just as participants in a drug trial are not 
expected to understand the exact mechanisms of the proposed drug on their body); only 
two failed at the level of capacity to consent.  Tangential answers, misunderstandings 
and general issues relating to the ‘quality’ of participant contributions were deemed 
issues to be resolved through rephrasing, redirection and reflection.   
However, there were two individuals whose capacity to give informed consent 
was uncertain.  In both of these cases the decision was made to allow focus group 
participation but to omit their contributions from the research project.  On what basis 
was this decision made? 
First, it was deemed that they were capable of the autonomous choice to “be here 
in this group” – what was not certain was whether they understood that this was for 
research and what would happen to their information.  In other words, they 
demonstrated capacity to participate in the group activity but not to participate in the 
research project.  Thus the doctrine of autonomy encouraged respect for the individual’s 
decision to participate in group discussion while questioning the appropriateness of 
using that person’s information in ways he or she had not necessarily understood. 
Second, the principle of justice stressed that “no persons should be denied social 
benefits on the basis of undeserved disadvantageous properties” (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009, p. 248).  In other words, refusing to allow people to participate on the 
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basis of limited capacity may further exclude an already disadvantaged group.  Should 
some participants have been excluded simply because their understanding failed to 
meet an arbitrary standard, although their ‘lesser understanding’ may have meant the 
project had particular pertinence to them?  Morally, it felt that the answer should be no.  
Thus it could be argued that these individuals had a right to participate in the group, 
although there was a concurrent right not to be exploited. 
The principles of beneficence and non-malevolence necessitate a balancing of 
risks and benefits to research participation.  Risks to participation were deemed lesser 
than the benefits of participation; one host group facilitator specifically spoke of the 
marginalisation of her group attendees and her perception that they would benefit from 
participation and be harmed by exclusion from something they wanted to participate in.   
Finally, as their comments were reflected on and incorporated by other 
participants, allowing these two individuals to participate in focus groups enabled them 
to contribute indirectly.  This relates to the principle of relationality (DuBois, 2008); 
although their contributions may not be used directly, they nevertheless facilitated a 
richer experience for other group participants. 
In sum, it was felt that by allowing these two people to participate in the focus 
group but advising them that their contributions may not be able to be used, a balance 
was struck between autonomy, justice, nonmaleficence, beneficence and relationality.   
A similar decision to allow focus group participation but to exclude their data 
was made in the case of the five participants who did not have a diagnosis of a mental 
illness but who still wished to participate and the one individual who wished to 
contribute but who did not wish to be part of the research project.  In each instance it 
was felt that: 
 The individual was capable of exercising an autonomous choice to participate 
in the group in the knowledge that his or her contributions would not be used 
(autonomy), 
 Although the participants’ contributions could not be used directly, they may 
be valuable to the group as a whole (relationality), 
 Given their history of exclusion, there was a case for allowing these 
individuals the opportunity to participate, however indirectly (justice), and 
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 The risks to participation were low (non-malevolence) while the benefits (in 
feeling they had contributed to something important) was higher 
(beneficence). 
Whenever a person’s non-eligibility was known in advance, this was discussed 
with the participant prior to commencement of the focus group, however this was not 
always possible. 
 
2.6.2 Privacy and Confidentiality 
Privacy and confidentiality touch on the principles of nonmaleficence and 
autonomy; respecting the individual’s right to control access to, and distribution of, 
personal information while acknowledging that disclosure of personal information can 
cause harm (DuBois, 2008).  Although confidentiality and privacy were stressed at all 
times and data were anonymised to protect individuals, three concerns remained.  
First, while all data were anonymised, Dunedin is a small community and it is 
possible that participants could be identified by quotes used in publication.  All 
endeavours were made to avoid using quotes that could render the individual 
identifiable, and participants were asked to approve quotes used.  They were also 
reminded that they could withdraw from the research or request their quotes not be 
published should they have concerns about wider confidentiality. 
Second, there is no guarantee that focus group participants will maintain each 
other’s confidentiality (Carey & Asbury, 2012).  Many groups already had their own 
codes of confidentiality and these were stressed at the beginning and conclusion of each 
focus group.  Participants were reminded that they were free to leave the group or 
refrain from answering should they have concerns about confidentiality among group 
members.  In fact, there was a sense that participants felt supported by fellow group 
members and this facilitated discussion.  
Finally, related to nonmaleficence and confidentiality is the issue of required 
disclosure.  As part of the informed consent procedure, participants were advised that 
where there were significant concerns about their risk to themselves or others, this may 
need to be disclosed to appropriate third parties.  Fortunately, this issue did not arise 
within this research.    
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2.6.3 Leading, Guiding and Reactive Effects 
A final challenge related to the boundary between facilitating and leading 
discussion, particularly when participants required more prompting.  Traditional 
guidance stresses the importance of minimising verbal and nonverbal prompts to avoid 
leading discussion (Bryman, 2012; Krueger, 1994).  However, both Rauktis et al. (1998) 
and Fern (2001) allow for a more directive style.  Rauktis et al. (1998) comment that 
some people may be socially withdrawn or lack the cognitive or social skills for effective 
participation; accordingly, a more directive approach is needed to “nurture the talk” (G. 
Caruso, personal communication, 1995, cited by Rauktis et al., 1998, p. 82).  Further, 
while Fern (2001) contends a less directive style is appropriate for exploratory 
research, a more directive style may be useful where “the researcher is interested in 
uncovering shared experiences and knowledge about a particular phenomenon [and to] 
keep the group on track toward providing the necessary information” (p.85).  A 
combined approach was used in this project to explore the breadth of participants’ 
views while ascertaining their opinions on specific debates.  This opened the project to 
greater researcher bias, however it is hoped that this was done in a way that avoided 
leading participants and encouraged disagreement with inferences drawn.  Despite this, 
power imbalances and reactive effects (Bryman, 2012), such as the participant 
modifying answers to ‘please,’ are inescapable.   
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Chapter 3:  Findings  
 
 
As purpose of this study was to explore the breadth of participant preferences in 
response to the research questions asked in Section 1.6, the range of participant 
responses and the number of participants who conveyed each view are reported here.  
As most participants expressed multiple views, themes and sub-themes were generally 
not mutually exclusive and statistical analysis could not be conducted; those instances 
were categories were mutually exclusive are specifically identified in the text. 
 
 
3.1 Participant Demographics 
 
 
In total, 35 people took part in the research project; 27 in focus groups and ten in 
individual interviews (two people participated in both focus groups and interviews).  Of 
the 27 focus group participants, data from seven participants were excluded due to 
failure to meet the research criteria of a diagnosis of mental illness (five) or uncertainty 
as to their capacity to consent (two).   
The remaining 28 participants were aged between 20 and 67 years; 9 were male 
and 19 female.  Participant diagnosis was grouped as follows:  
 Psychotic disorders:  Schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorders (10);  
 Mood disorders: Anxiety, depression and borderline personality disorders 
(personality disorder was grouped in this category due to the symptom of 
emotional dysregulation) (13);  
 Bipolar affective disorder (4);  
 Other (Tourette’s Disorder) (1).   
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Ten participants reported having multiple diagnoses, although only two reported 
diagnoses that crossed groupings; these were categorised according to the first 




Demographic Characteristics of Total Sample (N=28) 
 Interview 
Participants a 
n = 10 
Focus group 
participants a 
n = 20 
Total a 
N = 28 (%) 
Gender    
- Male 3 6  9 (32) 
- Female 7 14 19 (68) 
 
Age 
   
- Maximum 61 67 67 
- Minimum 36 20 20 
- Average 53.4 49.7 49.5 
 
Diagnosis 
   
- Mood disorder 2 12 13 (47) 
- Psychotic disorder 4 6 10 (36) 
- Bipolar affective disorder 4 1 4 (14) 
- Other 0 1 1 (4) 
 
Ethnicity 
   
- NZ European / Pākehā 10 18 26 (93) 
- Māori 0 2 2 (7) 
 
Living situation 
   
 - Live alone 5 8 11 (39) 
 - Live with spouse / partner 1 4 5 (18) 
 - Live with family 1 2 3 (11) 
 - Flatting / boarding 1 3 4 (14) 
 - Supported accommodation 2 3 5 (18) 
Note.  Percentages in parentheses.  a Data from participants who contributed to 
both focus groups and individual interviews are replicated in both columns; 
duplication has been removed from “total” column. 
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Participants were asked to indicate whether they had been sectioned under the 
MH(CAT) Act, whether they had been assessed as lacking capacity, and whether they felt 
they had ever lacked capacity.  These answers are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. 
 
Participant Experiences of Interventions Overruling Decision-Making as a 
Function of own Beliefs Regarding Capacity (N=28) 
 
Participant beliefs re: capacity 
 Has lacked 
capacity 
n = 14 
Hasn’t lacked 
capacity 




n = 2 
 
Has participant been under the MH(CAT) Act? 
- Yes 9 (32.1) 6 (21.4) 2 (7.1) 
- No 4 (14.3) 6 (21.4) 0 (0.0) 
- Don’t know 1 (3.6) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
Has participant been assessed as lacking capacity? 
- Yes 8 (28.6) 3 (10.7) 0 (0.0) 
- No 2 (7.1) 7 (25.0) 1 (3.6) 
- Don’t know 4 (14.3) 2 (7.1) 1 (3.6) 
 
Note.  Percentages in parentheses.   
 
In order to test significance of association between participant beliefs about 
capacity and those of professionals as demonstrated through detainment under the 
MH(CAT) Act or a formal assessment of incapacity, the “don’t know” categories were 
treated as outliers and removed.  The remaining two 2 x 2 contingency tables were 
analysed using Fisher’s exact test; results are shown in Table 6 (overleaf). 
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Table 6.   
 
Statistical Relationship between Participants’ vs. Professionals’ Beliefs about 
Capacity (N=28). 
 
Participant beliefs re: capacity 
Fisher’s exact test 





Has participant been under the MH(CAT) Act? 
- Yes 9  6   
- No 4  6 .4283 
 
Has participant been assessed as lacking capacity? 
- Yes 8 3  
- No 2 7 .0698 * 
Note.  a Significant p-values in bold (*p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p <.01) 
 
While there is no significant relationship between participant beliefs about 
capacity and professionals’ (possible) belief about capacity as indicated by detainment 
under the MH(CAT) Act, the correlation between participants who considered they had 
lacked capacity and those who reported having been formally assessed as doing so 
trends towards significance (p = .0698).  This suggests that professional and participant 
perspectives generally agree on assessment of capacity. 
For ease of reference, Table 7 (opposite) provides a summary of research 
participants, identifying their pseudonym, age, ethnicity, diagnosis and data collection 
method. 
  




List  of Research Participants. 
 
Pseudonym Age Ethnicity Diagnosis a Data Collection 
Method 
Anthea 44 NZ European Anxiety  Focus group 
Brooke 42 NZ European Schizophrenia Focus group 
Camille 20 NZ European Depression  Focus group 
Cassandra 36 NZ European Schizophrenia Interview 
Cate 61 NZ European BAD b Interview 
Damon 44 NZ European Depression Interview 
Daniel 43 NZ European Depression Focus group 
Darren 28 NZ European Depression Focus group 
David 67 NZ European Tourette’s Disorder Focus group 
Desiree 58 NZ European Anxiety Focus group 
Dessa 56 NZ European Depression Focus group 
Esme 42 NZ European Schizoaffective 
disorder 
Focus group 
Faye 38 NZ European Personality disorder Focus group 
Gabe 54 NZ European BAD Focus group and 
interview 
Grace 58 NZ European BAD Interview 
Jacqui 63 NZ European Schizophrenia Focus group 
Julia 58 NZ European Depression Focus group and 
interview 
Kim 34 NZ European Anxiety Focus group 
Marjorie 60 NZ European Schizophrenia Interview 
Paige 56 NZ European Depression Focus group 
Pania 60 Māori Depression Focus group 
Richard 50 NZ European Schizophrenia Interview 
Rowan 58 NZ European Schizophrenia Focus group 
Ruben 58 NZ European Schizophrenia Focus group 
Sarah 68 Māori Depression Focus group 
Simon 52 NZ European Schizophrenia Focus group 
Tracey 55 NZ European BAD Interview 
Warren 58 NZ European Schizophrenia Interview 
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3.2 Capacity Assessment 
 
 
Examination of respondents’ views on what factors should be included in 
capacity assessment highlighted a vast array of often contradictory views.  Some 
participants felt that certain factors were irrelevant, others felt the same factors 
indicated a need for assessment, whereas still others felt the same factors should be 
determinative.  The findings have been organised to reflect this; Section 3.2.1 looks at 
what factors should be considered potential triggers for assessment, while Section 3.2.2 
looks at how a determination of capacity should be made. 
 
3.2.1 Triggering Assessment 
This section examines the range of participants’ views on triggers for capacity 
assessment.  Participants often held multiple, competing views, and the range of their 
responses is presented below.   
Although this research presumed mental illness does not denote incapacity, for 
many participants the presence of mental illness was an implied trigger for assessment.  
Their views are described, as well as the degree to which participants felt emotionality, 
beliefs and values were relevant for capacity assessment and whether assessment 
should be based one’s coherence with past selves, the ability of the present self to 
rationalise a decision, or the ability of the individual to consider future selves.   
 
Unwellness, incapacity and authenticity.  When asked to consider periods of 
diminished capacity 23 (82%) of participants opened by reflecting on episodes of 
mental unwellness, suggesting a perceived link between the two.  Five participants, all 
with psychotic or bipolar affective disorders, identified a distinct break between their 
usual selves and their unwell, potentially incompetent, selves.  Comments such as 
“normally I’m not like that” (Gabe) and “it wasn’t the real Cassandra, doing that” 
(Cassandra) allude to a sense of disconnect, with the unwell self an inauthentic other 
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with whom they had to fight for control.  This experience was not limited to people with 
psychotic disorders; Julia, who has had recurrent bouts of depression, similarly 
described a loss of control and feeling she was “fading away”: 
You know, and that same part [which wanted to self-harm] stops 
you sleeping, that stops you eating and . . . I couldn’t have any 
control over that . . . You’ve lost yourself.  You know that you’ve 
lost, so you’ve got, so you haven’t got no sense of your own power . 
. . I say it wasn’t me . . . Because it was, it was like a sense of, I was 
fading away. 
Yet while describing this ‘unwell self’ in terms implying inauthenticity, Julia also 
acknowledged it as part of her identity, and suggested that ultimately she had a choice 
over which self to ‘align’ with: 
It [the unwell self] didn’t feel separate you see, it still, oh it’s hard 
to describe, it’s not you . . . but it doesn’t feel separate either, it’s 
not like anything that’s come in at you from outside.  I’ll still take 
responsibility, I don’t how else to put it, it was still a part of me.  
Yes, it was a part of me . . . Because it’s only through, it was only 
through another aspect of myself that put its foot down and said 
‘NO’, and that’s the part of me that I’m choosing to align with, but 
it doesn’t mean that the other part isn’t as much a part of me 
either. 
Among the above 23 participants, ten were unhappy that their capacity was 
doubted solely due to their mental state.  However, three of these ten later reflected that 
unwellness could influence aspects of their capacity.  This supports the contention that 
although mental illness may affect capacity and necessitate additional support, it does 
not denote total incapacity.  Furthermore, all participants identified additional factors 
they felt should be considered and noted that each individual should be judged on a 
case-by-case basis.  Cate, a woman with bipolar affective disorder, powerfully expressed 
this: 
[Speaking about the relevance of diagnosis] It’s no different than 
having heart disease, so why should I be labelled or looked upon 
as very different, because I’ve got heart disease? . . . You know, 
that’s what I think they should [do] rather than just judging us 
because we’ve got a label. 
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While acknowledging that mental illness does not wholly impair capacity, 
respondents also reflected on aspects of unwellness that may impinge on capacity.  
These are described in subsequent sections.   
 
Emotionality, beliefs and values.   The academic debates described previously 
identify the potential effects of emotionality, unusual beliefs and value differences in 
decision-making and capacity assessment.  Respondents were invited to provide their 
views on the question, and their responses are outlined in this section.   
Emotions versus persistent affective states.  Nine participants described the 
impact of specific transient emotional states:  of these nine, seven mentioned fear and 
anxiety, three suggested anger, and three raised distress.  Respondents discussed the 
action of these emotional states on cognition, whether freezing thinking, increasing 
impulsivity or inhibiting decisiveness – “going round in your head” (Dessa).   
Sixteen participants reflected on the influence of persistent mood symptomology.  
This included 12 participants who were diagnosed with a mood or bipolar affective 
disorder and four with a psychotic disorder.  Participants identified several ways in 
which persistent mood symptomology influenced decision-making, many identifying 
more than one.  Seven participants commented that persistent affective states 
influenced cognition, whether speeding, slowing or disorganising thought processes: 
Not being able to think through a process because you’re just, 
you’re just shut off, that’s probably it.  (Anthea) 
I have had worse depressions, where I can’t, you know, where I 
can’t think, I just lose my ability to actually use my mind.  (Julia) 
Like there’s a fulla who comes here often, who just freezes, you 
can’t talk to him or nothing, he just shuts everything out . . .  Like, 
like he’s got a switch and he’s turned off.  (Rowan) 
Four commented that their mood-state narrowed their focus, inhibiting the 
generation of options or limiting their perception of these options, something potentially 
incorporated in the MacCAT category of ‘reasoning:’   
You can um, when you’re in a situation, you just, it’s almost like 
you’ve got blinkers on and you’ve got tunnel vision, you see what 
you want to see, and what you think is happening, whereas that 
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might not necessarily be the case, ‘cause you might not be 
looking at a wider scope of things, you’re just not capable of 
seeing the bigger picture.  (Damon) 
Three individuals described how a major depressive episode affected their ability 
to attach any emotional significance to identified options; not ‘caring’ enough to decide.  
This is linked to the MacCAT domain of appreciation, the ability to consider the decision 
as personally relevant: 
You just don’t care about anything, you’ve got no, you’ve got no 
um, compassion about anything, nothing seems to matter 
anymore, no matter how serious it be, nothing.  Just nothing 
matters.  (Cate) 
These persistent emotional states were often seen as ‘not who I usually am.’  
However, Grace, a 58-year-old woman with a diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder, 
disputed this, noting the subjectivity of judgements on whether emotional states are 
‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic.’  Instead, Grace identified her exuberant emotional state as 
integral to her identity and resented any implication that decisions stemming from this 
were inauthentic: 
I laugh too much and because it’s in the books that if you’re a bit 
high and laughing that’s classed as a mania, but it’s just me being 
who I am. 
Unusual beliefs and failing to believe.  Twelve participants felt that unusual 
beliefs impaired their decision-making.  Participants diagnosed with disorders with a 
psychotic component (like schizophrenia or bipolar affective disorder) were more likely 
to express this view than those with mood disorders (eight participants with a psychotic 
disorder [57%] versus four with a mood disorder [31%]).   
Where beliefs were seen to undermine decision-making, four types of 
‘interfering’ beliefs were identified; those outside of one’s control, ‘fantastical’ beliefs, a 
‘failure to believe’ and denial.  These belief systems overlapped considerably, with 
participants identifying more than one type. 
For four of these twelve participants, such as Cassandra, a 36-year-old woman 
with schizophrenia, certain beliefs were considered external and outside her control: 
And all of a sudden I got this, these delusional thoughts, that, it’s 
really crazy, you know it’s really crazy shit . . . but I started 
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getting these delusional thoughts . . . [that] somehow I had to 
become a Christian against my will, or become Jesus Christ 
against my will. 
Six participants, such as Gabe, a woman with bipolar affective disorder, 
acknowledged periods when their belief systems lost touch with reality – “in fantasy 
land.”  However, this was not limited to people with psychotic disorders, as illustrated 
by Julia, who had experienced recurrent depressive episodes: 
The other bizarre thing that happened after that was that I still 
believed that I was gunna die.  So even although, even although I 
had, had put, you know, put my foot down if you like, and said 
NO, I’m not gunna do it, I still believed that it was gunna happen 
somehow.  So I, something in me truly believed that I was gunna 
die. 
Seven participants experienced a failure to believe in options or appreciate the 
reality of their decision-making:   
So, you know if someone says well know that this would help you 
. . . sometimes it’s like okay I hear what you’re saying and I 
understand it, but I don’t believe it.  (Damon) 
Yes, it’s like as though you’re making a decision but it isn’t real.  
It’s, it’s not imaginary but you don’t know what it is either.  It is 
sort of real but it’s not.  Now that’s Chinese!  (Cate) 
Whereas the above participants seem to want to believe but can’t, several 
participants also commented that denial or lack of awareness of their deteriorating 
mental state influenced their decision-making:   
I stopped taking the medication ‘cause I actually thought I was a 
lot healthier than what I was.  (Damon) 
Value differences.  Participants had some difficulty in engaging discussion on 
the influence of unusual values, perhaps because this was inadequately explained.  The 
seven who engaged in this discussion acknowledged that people hold different values 
and a clash of values does not denote incapacity; what is important is consistency: 
Well I think, it wouldn’t necessarily be if people thought if it 
[your values] was odd or unusual, but if they thought it was odd 
or unusual for you.  (Kim) 
For two of these seven participants, the relationship between unusual values and 
unwellness was key.  For example, when discussing values in anorexia, Tracey, a 55-
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year-old woman with bipolar affective disorder, suggested that anorexic values stem 
from unwellness, and that this unwellness determined incapacity, rather than the values 
themselves.  Similarly Gabe felt that a significant change in her values from frugality to 
extravagance indicated unwellness, compromising her capacity: 
Interviewer [INT]:  
And so what’s important to you is managing and saving 
your money? 
Gabe: Yeah 
INT: But at the time of being unwell, that went out the 
window? 
Gabe: Went out the window.  Went out the window.  That’s a, 
that’s a classic . . . It’s a classic symptom, high spending 
money, yeah.  ‘Cause normally I’m not like that I’m more 
frugal. 
(Focus group discussion) 
Both Tracey and Gabe saw their unwell selves as inauthentic, suggesting that 
rather than unwellness, authenticity was the determining factor, as alluded to by Gabe in 
her final statement above.   
Four of the above seven participants felt the determining factor in capacity 
assessment was not how unusual a person’s values were, but whether the consequences 
of decisions arising from these values were ‘risky’ or ‘dangerous:’   
And also, I guess if, if there was a way that you could see that their 
decision would be potentially harmful or, really drastic or 
something [then that should come into consideration].  (Kim) 
This idea relates to the issue of risk relativity in capacity assessment, discussed 
further below. 
 
Past, present and future selves and risky decisions.  The 24 participants who 
commented on whether assessment should consider one’s coherence with past selves, 
the ability of the present self to rationalise a decision, or the ability of the individual to 
consider future selves were fairly evenly split in their preference.  This is shown in Table 
8 (overleaf). 
  




Participants’ Preferences on Relevance of Past, Present or Future Selves in Capacity 
Assessment. 
 Coherence with past 
selves 
Present ability to 
rationalise 
Ability to consider 
future selves 
n 10 12 14 
Note.  Total views expressed (36) exceeds total number of participants who expressed views (24) 
as 10 participants expressed more than one view. 
 
 Ten participants indicated a preference for more than one approach.  For 
example, Camille, a young woman with depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, 
wanted her present ability to explain her decision-making to be taken into 
consideration, balanced by an understanding of what she was “usually” like (past 
selves).  The remainder of this section explores the rationale used by participants for 
prioritising past, present or future selves in capacity assessment. 
Present selves: Decision-specificity and the MacCAT.  The participant quotes 
highlighted so far suggest that the standard to gauge capacity should be the ability of the 
present self to explain their decision-making.  This was a view expressed by 12 
participants and succinctly articulated by Daniel, a 43-year-old who has experienced 
significant depressive episodes: 
Are they changing their mind cause of what they’re going through 
and they’re not thinking properly, or are they changing their mind 
because they’ve thought of a better idea than that the doctors 
have? 
Daniel further suggests the individual be required to “rationally” and “logically” 
explain their decision-making.  He felt that assessment ought to consider the ability of 
the ‘current self’ to provide a clear rationale: 
Is the person able to think logically . . . or be rational . . . Is there is 
there some logic there that the person can actually be able to 
think enough to be able to know what’s going on with themselves 
. . . Like if they were to fall over, would they have known that? Or 
would they hold on to their leg and go ‘my knee’s sore?’  (Daniel) 
This requirement ties closely with the reasoning, understanding and 
communication domains of the MacCAT, and was a view shared by 11 other participants.    
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Changes from past selves.   Eight participants agreed than sudden changes from 
past selves should lead to their capacity being questioned.  For seven, the degree of 
change was relevant, particularly if it was ““extremist” (Jacqui) or out of character: 
Like a spontaneous, random idea, that’s just changed . . . it would 
make you think that this person has had routine of thought for all 
these years, and all of a sudden, something’s cropped up, and 
they’re saying I want this, and it’s out of their characteristic to say 
that.  (Daniel) 
Similarly, previous comments referring to unauthentic or uncharacteristic 
thoughts, feelings and experiences all referenced a ‘changed’ self.   
For three participants, sudden changes from past selves were indicators of 
unwellness.  For example, a previous quote by Gabe illustrated how she viewed changes 
from her past, frugal self to a profligate spender as an indication of diminished capacity.    
Future selves / risk-relativity.  Fourteen participants suggested that the ability 
to consider future selves was a prerequisite for capacity.  All of these participants 
considered risky decisions to be indicative of diminished capacity: 
And I mean, it, it’s kind of, I don’t know, it could get really 
borderline but I mean, you know, if you were trying to decide 
between investing your millions in a reputable company or, 
getting it all out the bank and setting it on fire, you know I mean 
there’s some decisions where you’ve pretty obviously gone off the 
rails, so from that perspective, I think you could use that as an 
indicator that maybe you’re not capable of making good decisions 
at that point.  (Kim) 
Reasons for this stance fell into two categories.  First, failure to consider the 
(potentially risky) implications for future selves was considered indicative of a lack of 
understanding or awareness, as suggested by Richard, a gentlemen with schizophrenia: 
Yeah, I would probably say that health professionals who know 
the, who can see the consequences better from their perspective, 
would, should override a, a person who kind of might have, sort 
of, not that same sort of awareness.  
Similarly, Cate, a woman with bipolar affective disorder, felt that her ability to 
consider the future implications of her decisions demonstrated her capacity, despite this 
being questioned by others:   
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[I] felt I understood the implications of what was going to be 
happening if I did or if I didn’t [do this.] . . . [I was] thinking 
through like the consequence, like if . . . you did this, this would 
be the consequences. 
Second, ‘risky’ decisions could indicate a deteriorating mental state, and 
potentially deteriorating capacity.  Again, Richard best summed up this stance:  
[Speaking about the symptoms of his first period of unwellness, 
during which he believes he lost capacity] I’d done some really 
stupid things.  That in hindsight could have landed, could have 
ended terribly.  Uh, I know, for a start my, my diet pretty much, I 
wasn’t eating properly.  And uh, yeah, I lost a lot of weight.  I was 
putting myself in situations like hitch-hiking that were a bit risky.  
This suggests that the indicator of diminished capacity is unwellness rather than 
the ‘riskiness’ of decisions. 
 
3.2.2 Determining Incapacity: An Individualised Approach 
The above comments on assessment triggers all suggest a proviso: while any of 
these could indicate incapacity, none should determine incapacity.  Two arguments were 
cited to back this contention.  First, six participants took a human nature / civil liberties 
stance; that people had a right to their views and to change their minds.  This was a 
position held strongly by Brooke, a 42-year-old woman with schizophrenia: 
It’s your own choice, everyone changes in their life . . . I don’t think 
they can use that, to, as a justify [a judgement of incapacity].  I 
mean . . . doctors change their mind all the time, why can’t we? 
Others took a contextual view, arguing that extenuating circumstances may 
justify an apparently unusual decision.  For example, when discussing a hypothetical 
scenario where a person chooses to be homeless (a risky decision), Esme and Paige 
indicate the need to look beyond the decision:   
Esme:   If it was a really clear cut decision like being homeless or 
living in a beautiful house [it should be examined]. But 
sometimes it’s not as clear cut as that.   
Paige:  Mmmmm. You may not be able to live in the beautiful 
house for some reason, there’s something going on behind 
the scenes. 
(Focus group discussion) 
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Although participants expressed multiple views on the degree to which 
assessment triggers are relevant to capacity determination, there was a consensus in 
favour of a holistic capacity assessment that considers the individual, their context, and 
the degree of control they have over decisions.  This section explores respondents’ views 
on such an assessment. 
 
Know the individual.  The idea that capacity assessment requires knowledge of 
the individual came through strongly in discussion.   
There was almost unanimous agreement that decisions about capacity be 
weighed in light of the individual’s biography and circumstances; that an assessor must 
have an understanding of the individual as somebody with a unique personal and 
historical context – knowing ‘who they are’ and evaluating the impact of other factors in 
light of this understanding: 
So yeah I would say that, um, there should be, a lot of different 
factors involved in making the decision, so things like history and 
context and stuff and, you know, how difficult the decisions are 
that you’re making, and how weird the choices are that you’re 
choosing, and how they all fit in with you and your history and 
stuff.  (Kim) 
For example, when discussing the relevance of unusual beliefs, five participants 
maintained that decisions founded prima facie on ‘patently untrue’ beliefs could still 
retain a degree of internal rationality and be considered competent if understood in 
light of one’s idiosyncrasies.  Jacqui, a 63-year-old woman with schizophrenia, revealed 
how her superstitions beliefs about the number six would, in a hypothetical scenario, 
prevent her from building on their adjoining section (which is number six).  For other 
group members this was an irrational decision based on an unusual belief, but for Jacqui 
this was a logical decision based on her personal reasoning.   Thus, apparently unusual 
beliefs can form the basis of a competent decision as long as one’s ‘personal reasoning’ is 
sound.  Similarly, Kim, a 34-year-old with generalised anxiety disorder, points out that 
‘common-sense’ requirements for capacity, such as logic, could be applied differently 
depending on the individual: 
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But then I mean I guess that could be difficult ‘cause some people 
are more illogical, especially in decision-making, some people are 
really not very logical at all, even when they’re well. 
This theme – that capacity assessment needs an intimate knowledge of the 
individual – overlaps considerably with a second theme; that others involved in capacity 
assessment or decision-making need to know the individual.  This is discussed in Section 
3.3, which examines the qualities required of those involved in capacity assessment and 
decision-making. 
Knowledge of the individual also often entailed an ability to recognise changes 
signalling incapacity; 15 referred to changes in behaviour or a deterioration in 
functioning as a potential indicator of diminished capacity.  Conversely, nine 
participants, some of whom had cited lack of functioning as evidence of diminished 
capacity, considered retained functional ability as evidence for capacity:  
[How can others tell you can make your own decisions?]: I take 
my own medication, I dress my own self, I make my own bed, I do 
me own dishes, I do me own cooking . . .  I can do pikelets, I can 
do scones.  I cook roasts, I do chickens.  (Desiree) 
However, somewhat ironically, two participants with bipolar affective disorder 
cited functioning ‘too well’ as a potential indicator of diminished capacity: 
The whole house would be, every day would be absolutely spring 
cleaned from top to bottom, you just can’t stop you’ve just got, 
you cannot sit you can’t . . . you feel you just haven’t got the 
power to sit, you can’t sit still for two minutes.  (Cate) 
 
Know their context - including barriers to capacity and interpersonal 
dynamics.  Twenty one participants felt assessors needed to understand the 
compromised individual’s context.  Two reasons were given.  First, an understanding of 
context could explain behaviours that might otherwise call capacity into question: 
It might be a religious thing, you might suddenly had like an 
epiphany or something and, God’s come to you or something and 
you might be suddenly spouting off all this religious stuff, and 
people might think you’re unwell, but really you might just be 
having a spiritual experience.  (Esme) 
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Second, understanding of context could reframe the question to prioritise 
capacity-restoring interventions, negating the need for assessment: 19 participants 
identified impediments to capacity (such as assessment environment, medication, 
physical health and interpersonal dynamics) they felt ought to be considered in 
assessment.  This was clearly expressed by Julia, who felt that others should have sought 
to understand her situation and her fears when she last became unwell with depression, 
rather than reducing the question to competence or incompetence: 
And what’s, yes and what’s going on for you. What happened, 
what’s happened, that you’ve come to this point. And it may have 
been, it may have been the history from six months back, it may 
have been three months back, but what’s been going on . . . that 
that you’ve become like this, it’s so important.  (Julia) 
Of this 19, seven participants stated the physical environment – especially the 
psychiatric hospital – exerted a detrimental impact on their mental state and their 
capacity: 
Well say, well say someone went up to [psychiatric] hospital and 
they were already feeling scared about something, they went up 
there, and there was patients worse off than them that made 
them even more scared.  Well then someone will just think that 
they’re naturally, that it’s their own paranoia.  (Daniel) 
Medication was another oft-cited influence, identified by 15 of the above 19 
participants as relevant.  Of this 15, ten participants that medication had interfered with 
their capacity: 
There’s no, there’s no two ways about it, I can talk about several 
drugs that just completely and absolutely blow you.  (David) 
However, nine participants (five of whom also raised the capacity-undermining 
effects of medication) acknowledged that the right medication could facilitate capacity: 
My doctor still won’t take me off my depression pills.  And I agree 
on that too.  I don’t want to go backwards, I’m going forward 
now.  (Sarah) 
Five participants spoke about the impact of physical health on their capacity and 
mental wellbeing.  This included the cumulative impact of extended periods of 
decreased functioning, such as the impact of poor sleep, inadequate nutrition and 
medical conditions: 
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A lot of it’s like you know you don’t get enough sleep and you’re 
eating properly, so therefore you’re, you’re not sort of thinking 
straight.  (Damon) 
I had a urine tract infection . . . it hadn’t been picked up. Um, so I 
went quite loopy.  And I didn’t know what I was doing.  (Tracey) 
Another potential influence on capacity, interpersonal dynamics, was identified 
by 12 participants.  As Cate explained, professionals’ attitudes towards the individual 
can shape one’s capacity: 
Professionals have to try and be positive, and over last three 
months, they’ve been very negative towards me, and that’s hard 
if you go there feeling positive and they’ve got negative at you, 
you come away . . . in a big question mark, like a mixed emotion, 
what do you do?  (Cate) 
In a related vein, seven of these 12 participants considered consultation with 
others a hallmark of competent decision-making.  Cate, for example, described a 
competent decision she had “discussed . . . with family or whoever” versus an 
incompetent decision where she did not consider implications for others.  The view that 
competent decision-making involves considering others was shared by five participants, 
as described by Warren, a 58-year-old man with schizophrenia who believed that 
competent decision-makers make decisions that are ‘right’ for themselves and others: 
Right, you’ve got life.  You’ve got love, you’ve got family, children, 
family, grandchildren . . . How many does [your decision] affect?  
The whole family . . . And one, one wrong decision, one decision, 
could affect six or seven people . . . it could, could affect numerous 
people. 
 
Control.  Finally, a key factor in determining capacity identified by nine 
participants was the degree of ‘control’ they felt they had over their decision-making.  
This lack of ‘control’ was evidenced in a number of arenas.  First, ‘control’ was 
alluded to when discussing the relationship between capacity and mental illness, as 
referenced in the quote by Julia in Section 3.2.1 where she speaks about having “lost 
myself” and not having “any control.”   
Second, when discussing emotionality, participants alluded to the degree of 
control they felt they had over decisions stemming from persistent emotional states.  For 
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six participants such as Faye, a woman with borderline personality disorder, this was 
about being able to handle one’s experiences or to control one’s actions: 
Because if you’re too happy you could get out of control and do 
something dangerous. 
Conversely, for three participants, a persistently depressed mood reduced their 
ability to pursue a course of action, a “block” that prevented one from acting on 
decisions.  This was eloquently depicted by Damon, a 44-year-old man who had recently 
experienced a severe depressive episode: 
It was a bit like, okay knowing what to do, okay you’ve gotta take 
your first step, and it’s like not being able to find the start line . . . 
It’s a bit like having an emergency phone call to ring or 
something or another.  Now you know, how to use the phone, and 
you’ve got the phone number, but you can’t, I couldn’t, I couldn’t 
make that connection to pick up the phone and use it and talk to 
somebody, even though I knew that that’s something that I had to 
do, I just couldn’t bring myself to do it.  For whatever reason . . . 
It’s almost like there was a block there that the brain couldn’t 
make the connection to.  And be able to sort of act on it, there was 
just something, there was a break there that, didn’t make the 
connection, although I knew the, I knew the connection, thinking 
about it, but putting it into action, there was just something there 
that *pprft* and it stopped. 
Finally, control can also relate to control over one’s beliefs.  Cassandra, discussing 
her recovery, acknowledged that although she still had occasional unusual thoughts and 
beliefs, they are no longer outside her control, and, by implication, they no longer 
influenced her decision-making.   
 
3.2.3 Summary 
The above findings paint a complicated picture of capacity assessment.  While 
respondents considered many factors potentially relevant, none was seen as 
conclusively so, and many participants identified multiple interacting dynamics.  
Capacity was not considered something that could be assessed by measuring its 
constituent parts, such as one’s ‘emotionality’ or ‘appreciation,’ against an arbitrary 
standard.  Instead, respondents felt that capacity depended on whether the individual 
felt their decision (or behaviour) was authentic, understandable in light of their 
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individuality and context, and within their control.  What emerges is a request that 
assessment consider each individual holistically, on their own merits: 
They [capacity assessors] should have a more open mind.  About 
everything, not be a closed, to me it seems still got this closed 
book thing, they go by the book of 1640 rather than look out the 
square . . . And not everything is a text book type thing, you know 
what I mean? . . .  And I think that everybody should be taken on 
their own merits, judged individually, not, you know, collectively, 
so to speak.  (Cate) 
 
 
3.3 Involving Others 
 
 
Although this project aimed to ascertain views on involving others in decision-
making during incapacity, the desire for capacity assessment to be individually 
contextualised also compelled discussion on the involvement of others in capacity 
assessment; who should be involved, the qualities of this person, and issues with 
involving others.  Participants held multiple, overlapping, and contradictory views.  The 
following section explores their preferences. 
 
3.3.1 Who Should be Involved 
Participants nominated a range of people to be involved in assessment or 
decision-making, with equal emphasis on formal and informal supports.  Informal 
supports included family/whānau (spouses/partners, parents, siblings, children or 
wider family) and friends, while formal supports could be further divided into health 
professionals (psychiatrists, general practitioners and community mental health 
clinicians) and support services (support workers or staff at drop-in centres).  
Participants often identified more than one preference; these are displayed in Table 9 
(opposite).    




Participant Preferences for Involving Others. 
Preference a  n % 
Formal supports 22 78.6 
- Medical b 10 64.3 
- CMHT c staff 7 42.9 
Informal supports 21 75.0 
- Family 19 67.9 
- Friends 7 25.0 
NGO d supports 11 39.3 
Other 10 35.7 
Note.  Items in italics indicate sub-ordinate groupings.  a Categories not mutually exclusive; several 
participants identified more than one person.  b General Practitioners and psychiatrists have been 
combined as 13 participants referred to these interchangeably or ambiguously. c CMHT = 
Community Mental Health Team.  d NGO = non-governmental organisations 
 
The figures show a clear overlap, explained by the fact that 12 participants 
explicitly endorsed the involvement of two or more people while several implied the 
same by naming more than one person in discussion.  However, some participants had 
difficulty naming someone they wished to have involved, named someone they wished 
to have involved but who was not able to do so, or named people reluctantly.  Similarly, 
as quickly as one person was named by a focus group participant, often another 
participant found reasons why a similar person would not be suitable in their case.  This 
led to a discussion on the qualities required of involved others and potential barriers to 
nominating certain people. 
 
3.3.2  Attributes of the Other 
This section describes attributes considered essential by participants when 
nominating others to be involved in capacity assessment or decision-making.  Three 
related and overlapping themes recurred time again when discussing the required 
qualities of involved others; knowledge, trustworthiness and a relationship.   
Almost all participants (27) mentioned a desire for involved others to have 
knowledge of some description, yet the knowledge required varied.  An analysis using 
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Keywords in Context (KWIC) identified 91 instances (by 20 participants) where the 
word know or its derivatives were used to describe the qualities of involved others.  
Two other terms, trust (54 instances, 16 participants) and understand (23 instances, 10 
participants) were subsequently identified and analysed using KWIC.  Four categories of 
usage were identified;  
a. Describing the knowledge they wanted the other to hold, whether 
i. Personal, 
ii. Medical, or 
iii. Practical 
b. The qualities facilitating trustworthiness,  
c. The importance of a relationship with involved others, and  
d. Describing the consequences of having the right person involved.   
These categories were further explored through an analysis of the transcripts 
identifying instances where similar themes were raised.  Again, participants often 
expressed multiple, overlapping views; these are described in detail below.   
 
“Know me inside out.”    
Personal knowledge.  For 24 participants, ‘knowing’ was about feeling that the 
nominated other knew them as individuals.  More than just abstract knowledge, it was 
about a feeling that involved others understood them, knew them inside out, and could 
empathise with their situations: 
I think they’d have to sort of, like know me inside out.  (Cate) 
’Cause he knows what I feel like.  (Faye) 
For eight of this 24, an ability to understand the individual’s reasoning was 
essential: 
And I explained to her why [I felt this way] . . . But, that was a 
realistic reason, and she knew the realistic reason, but a lot of 
other people wouldn't understand that realistic reason.  (Dessa) 
Ten of the above 24 emphasised a need for involved others to see their potential; 
not only did they want to trust this other, but they wanted the other to trust them.  This 
may be due to interpersonal dynamics as discussed in Section 3.2.2: 
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Well because they know my history, so, you know they know 
what I’m like . . . So he knows what I’m like and what I’m capable 
of.  (Tracey) 
The staff have been really forgiving, and they saw, they saw, they 
saw the potential in me . . . they are very forgiving and they saw 
the potential in me to get out of that behaviour, and I’m very, I 
forever grateful to them for doing that . . .  Believing that they 
believed in me, them believing in me, it just, it made all the 
difference.  (Cassandra) 
Nine of the above 24 participants identified the need for others to know their 
personal history, while seven raised the need for others to know and understand their 
current situation: 
. . . Who’s grown up with you all their life, and knows, knows your 
individuality . . . Well they’ve got the understanding of you . . . 
Well they've got the understanding of you, they've known you . . . 
from when you're small.  (Warren) 
Who knows your, who knows your history and everything: You.  
(Pania) 
Conversely, this sense of wanting to be known was frequently described in the 
negative by participants who expressed frustration that others did not know them. 
“Know my illness” – medical expertise versus a deeper understanding.  While 
involved others needed to know the person as an individual, 20 participants also cited 
the need for knowledge of their illness.  However, the nature of this knowledge varied.  
For 17 of this 20, knowledge of one’s illness referred specifically to knowledge of one’s 
medical history or to medical and mental health expertise, acknowledging that 
professionals have knowledge and skills that a lay person may not share: 
Well the same thing applies right throughout the, right 
throughout the human existence.  If you want a doctor, you go to 
the doctor – you don’t go to a lawyer.  If you want a lawyer, you 
don’t go to an accountant.  So the same thing applies medically.  
(David) 
However knowing one’s illness also related to ‘knowing what to look for’ (nine 
participants), while seven participants referred to a deeper understanding of their 
experience of illness.  These two usages have a broader application than just medical 
professionals and are highlighted by Cassandra when discussing involvement of her 
adoptive mother: 
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Cause she knew my sym- [symptoms], knew a lot about the ill- 
[illness], she knew about me, talking about the illness and that. . . 
She’d had an experience with me.   
Practical knowledge:  Know what to do.  Twenty participants felt that involved 
others should “know what to do.”  Again, this was sometimes linked with medical 
expertise and training (five participants).  However seven participants associated 
‘knowing what to do’ with ‘good’ decision-making, a vague concept whose usage 
included experience making decisions for another (as described by Richard) and 
someone who could be trusted to make based on ‘what I would want’ (as described by 
Cate): 
Ummm, well, I think, mum’s pretty much able to make decisions 
for, for my dad, ‘cause my dad’s starting to deteriorate because of 
onset of dementia.  (Richard) 
But they'd have to learn, I'd want to have their trust, that un-
blotched trust that whatever they did, would be, in my interests if 
I couldn't do things by myself.  (Cate) 
Esme, a woman with schizo-affective disorder, commented that involving 
someone who does not know what to do can be disempowering for both the individual 
and their support people: 
No, I didn’t [want to involve my family].  Because they, I found 
them, I just found that they, just didn’t know what to do, they 
were pretty helpless. 
This implies a need to empower nominated others, and was a view shared by 
Julia, who described others “project[ing their] powerlessness onto me.” 
Sixteen participants wanted involved others to have advocacy skills.  Participants 
differed in the roles they specified for advocates and who was best placed to fill these.  
For example, when participants wanted advocates to promote an understanding of 
themselves and their history, they considered people personally connected with them to 
best fill this role: 
Well, if it happened in the hospital, they could refer back to the 
family doctor.  And the doctor would give all the information to 
the other doctor.  (Warren) 
However, ten participants saw advocacy as providing an impartial perspective, 
checks and balances, or mediating between parties; in this case inclusion of people 
SERVICE-USER VIEWS ON INCAPACITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
87 
skilled in mediation or balancing multiple perspectives, such as lawyers, judges, or 
independent advocates was mooted: 
So that’s when you need a type of advocate to sit there and go . . . 
‘hold on, you’re not listening to what she’s saying.’ . . . Who’s 
gunna listen to you, and listen to the other person and know that 
the other person isn’t listening, and to be able to say to the other 
medical people ‘hey, you’re not taking into consideration this and 
that.’  (Daniel) 
 
Trustworthiness – what is it?  Whether the knowledge held by the involved 
other was personal or professional, participants needed to trust them.  Trust in involved 
others was specifically raised by 16 participants, whether as a positive quality in those 
they would involve, or a deficit in those who they would prefer not to involve.  Yet trust 
is an ambiguous, subjective concept.   Using KWIC, the qualities most commonly 
associated with trust were:  
 Someone who has knowledge – in the broadest sense as described previously 
(five instances, four participants), 
 A good decision-maker (six instances, five participants),  
 Someone who possesses a range of qualities associated with a respectful, 
validating relationship.   
As the first two qualities have already been discussed, the remaining section 
examines those qualities associated with a respectful, validating relationship. 
Trust was closely aligned with a perception by participants that they were heard, 
validated and taken seriously.  This view was shared by 14 participants, most of whom 
related experiences where they felt ignored, belittled or undermined: 
[Would you trust your husband?] Oh I don't know, he um he 
might not realise that I'm as crook as what I was and not worry 
about it.  (Paige) 
This desire to involve someone who will consider their views is particularly 
relevant when considering the role participants want others to take in decision-making 
when capacity is diminished, discussed further in Section 3.4.1. 
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Eleven respondents emphasised the “human qualities” that are key to trust – a 
range of attributes they saw as facilitating the establishment of a relationship such as 
empathy, kindness, compassion and a non-judgemental approach: 
 [When asked to list the desired qualities of involved others] 
Empathy . . . Understanding.  Caring, kindness . . . umm.  Patience . 
. . yeah, patience, caringness, kindness, um . . . Positive outlook on 
life, really.  (Cassandra) 
He’s a bit of a hard goer, and, um . . . you know, it’s just a bit of a 
giggle with [my brother].  But he is, he is just absolutely gorgeous 
and . . . yeah, he’s a good man.  (Marjorie) 
Actually you need tenderness and to be cared about.  (Julia) 
Finally, three participants either alluded to, or specifically mentioned, the need 
for others to be honest and transparent.  In six instances, this was in direct connection 
with the word trust: 
Yeah, I'd want them to be honest, and trustworthy, have an open 
mind, about things that are.  (Cate). 
Depends if you trust them.  Cause I thought I trusted my family.  
Trust is gone.  Majorly gone . . . Well they went behind my back, 
and talked to the [community mental health] team.  (Grace). 
 
The importance of a relationship.  Eighteen participants expressed the need for 
a relationship between them and involved others, a feeling that the other was 
emotionally invested in them: 
And that he loves me very much.  Yeah.  And he’s proud of me . . . 
which is really good, that is just wonderful.  (Marjorie) 
 [I can ask them] are you really interested in my wellbeing and my 
state of mind and my medication?  And if they say yes or no . . . 
that's the key.  Then you know, you can trust them.  (Grace) 
It's just that you know that they, they're into you, they're on your 
team.  (Julia) 
Ten participants acknowledged that this could take time; for some it was 
someone whom they had known “from when I was small” (Warren), for others it was 
about the time required to build “a pretty good rapport” (Darren).   This requirement for 
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a relationship also points to the need for others to be reliable and available – “to be there 
when I need” (Marjorie), often despite having been put “through a hell of a lot” (Damon). 
Thirteen participants acknowledged that developing a trusting relationship 
requires a degree of reciprocity; they need to share themselves and “open up” to the 
other: 
 Again I think it depends on really who knows you best, who can 
you trust and who you’ve opened up to more.  (Camille) 
Key therefore is need for a relationship, built over time and involving a degree of 
self-disclosure.  However, respondents also acknowledge that any relationship can 
fluctuate, influencing the degree of trust invested in the other:  
Well I've usually used my PDN [psychiatric district nurse], 
although . . . [lately] it's been very, very intense, very, very difficult 
because she's been so negative and I've been so positive.  (Cate) 
I don't know if I could trust [my sister] with my [EFTPOS] card.  
But I sure trusted her when I had my [broken leg] . . . But if I had 
to go into [psychiatric] hospital I don't know if I could trust her, 
she might take money out then.  (Gabe) 
 
The benefits of involving the right person.  The importance of knowing and 
being known was an unexpected finding.  Julia, a woman with a history of depression 
who had recently experienced her first psychiatric hospitalisation, poignantly described 
how feeling “known” was a transformative experience felt deep inside: 
Because you know when someone touches the real you . . . Then 
you can touch the person really at where they're at . . . they don't 
have to hold your hand physically then, ‘cause you can feel that, 
you can feel that they know . . . And then because they know you, 
something in you, goes ping.  And it calms you down . . .  And then it 
sort of gets combed out, and combed out and calmed down and 
calmed down.  And then eventually, like, it could transform right 
there in a few moments, you know, the woman [in me] starts to 
come.  Because the child [in me]’s been soothed.  
This feeling of being known and trusting another brought a sense of relief and 
calm, perhaps because it implied a sense of security and predictability – knowing what 
the other would do – facilitating help-seeking and co-operative behaviour: 
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Like, like, say with me, at the time I wasn’t really too worried 
about decision-making . . . so I was leaving things up to the 
psychiatrist and the nurse, and to make decisions, because its, I’m 
kind of like ‘I’m in your hands now, I don’t know what to do.’ . . . It 
was real helpful, because . . . that gave me some sort of security in 
knowing that things aren’t weren’t going to get worse and worse 
and worse.  (Daniel) 
I trust [my psychiatrists].  And if they were to make decisions 
then I’d go along with them.  But I didn’t know who the judge 
was, and who, whom was representing me and, I didn’t know 
those people so I didn’t trust those people.  (Tracey) 
 
3.3.3  Barriers to Involving Others 
Many participants identified reasons why they would not involve certain people.  
Four potential barriers were identified; problems identifying specific individuals, 
complications within the relationship, participants’ personal difficulties involving 
others, and others’ unavailability. 
 
Difficulties related to specific individuals.  Suggestions by focus group 
participants to involve specific individuals were regularly ‘voted down’ by others due to 
a perception that the named person lacked the necessary qualities.  At least 13 
participants voiced this concern, although vocalisations and non-verbal body language 
suggested that most had someone they did not want involved for the similar reasons.  
For example, Brooke, a woman with schizophrenia who had experienced others deciding 
for her despite her belief that she retained capacity, argued that no one knew her well 
enough:   
Well the psychiatrist, you know, they’ve studied med and they’ve 
studied psychology and psychiatry.  But that doesn’t mean to say 
they know you inside out . . . You go to a hairdresser once a month, 
and they can do your hair but they can’t run your whole life. Well, 
same with the psychiatrist – they can’t, they haven’t seen you for 
your whole life, and suddenly you’re in [psychiatric hospital] for 
five minutes and they think they know all about you and they can 
make decisions!  And I know a lot more about me than they ever 
will, and they may never see me again, so why should they have 
all that power? 
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Similarly, at least four participants expressed a concern that others may not fully 
understand their circumstances: 
[Speaking of a staff member at her support centre] He reckons, 
reckons we should just be here for a short time . . . and he doesn’t 
understand anything like that ‘cause he’s never had any illness or 
anything like that himself.  (Dessa) 
Eight participants expressed concern that others may have ulterior motives or 
personal agendas.  This included professional or institutional agendas: 
It was just ‘well you’ve been in hospital too long, we want you out 
of here, we’re gunna give you ECT [electroconvulsive therapy].’  
(Tracey) 
Esme: But the judge seems to agree with the doctors most of 
the time anyway. 
Paige: See the judge isn’t a doctor is he? 
Esme: And he thinks to himself, ‘oh well the doctors know best.’ 
(Focus group discussion) 
Nor were family and friends considered immune, although participants 
acknowledged that this may be due to family members’ desire to be seen positively or a 
tendency to deny cause for concern: 
But some parents, some family people, don’t wanna believe.  
They think that they’ve brought you up badly so you’ve got a 
mental illness.  But the family don’t wanna think it’s their problem 
. . . [so] the family want you to go to hospital so they get away with 
blame for badly raising you badly and making you mental.  
(Brooke) 
Well [my husband] might do, he jus- he just doesn’t think there’s 
anything wrong with me.  Yeah. Yeah.  Or he doesn’t want there to 
be anything wr- anything wrong maybe . . . So it’s sorta, shove it 
under the mat.  (Anthea) 
Eight participants identified that others may not be best placed to assist with 
capacity assessment or decision-making due to youth or their own issues.  Others 
acknowledged the immense challenge associated with capacity assessment and 
decision-making, with four participants specifically identifying the potential for burnout: 
Um, my youngest daughter, she loves me to bits . . . She didn’t 
want to come home when I was cutting.  She did catch me at one 
stage . . . and she was horrified, and then she was worried that 
she would come home and one day I’d just, I wouldn’t be alive 
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sort of thing, so she actually, she didn’t want to come home . . . So 
that affected her.  (Damon) 
And I think that’s why my marriage split up now that I think 
about it, ‘cause my husband couldn’t cope with it, he didn’t know 
how to cope with it . . .  ‘Cause it was, I’m not easy to live with 
when it’s like that.  No one is.  (Cate) 
 
Issues arising from interpersonal relationships.  The desire for a relationship 
with involved others was a key finding.  Yet relationships are dynamic and participants 
identified unhelpful – even toxic – elements undermining their ability to call on certain 
individuals.   
Three participants simply described a lack of a relationship or personality 
conflict as a barrier to involving others: 
My parents are both dead and I don’t get on with my family, or 
they don’t get on with me.  (Paige) 
Four participants cited abuse, whether physical, financial or psychological;  
I don’t trust my mum, cause sometimes she’s nasty to me . . . Mum 
knewed [my sister] was beating me up and stuff like that, hitting 
me and stuff like that.  And my mum used to do that to me a long 
time ago too . . .  My mother took to me and stuff like that, ‘cause 
when she gets nasty and stuff like that she does that, that’s why I 
don’t trust my mum sometimes.  (Desiree). 
However, six participants mentioned more insidious power imbalances, a feeling 
of being pressured into certain decision: 
I don’t know, ‘cause I’ve, every time I have a decision, especially 
with my family, they seem to talk over me . . . And they, they tell 
me, this decision, and I just agree with it, and um, so it just keeps 
the peace, so yeah.  (Pania) 
On the other hand, seven participants expressed concern that being ‘too close’ 
could affect a person’s ability to be impartial or provide the required support: 
Yeah, so it’s a bit like, this is what I want; let’s just say my mum 
wants to sort of be more on my side sort of thing, so she’s more 
inclined to sort of go with me, even though it wouldn’t really be 
in my best interests.  (Damon) 
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Personal barriers to involving others.  Fourteen participants acknowledged 
personal reasons for their reluctance to involve others, whether due to an inability to 
trust others, concern about being a burden, or fear of dependence. 
Just as ‘trust’ can vary depending on the decision, the context and the person 
involved, six participants reflected that their ability to trust others had been 
compromised by their experiences.  This was true for Grace, a woman with bipolar 
affective disorder, who felt her fragile ability to trust (something she felt she was never 
taught) had been betrayed: 
It’s sad, I thought I trusted people, I trusted people too much.  
Now I’m backing off. 
Conversely, recognition of the gravity of capacity assessment and decision-
making, combined with a fear of being a burden, prevented five participants from asking 
others to be involved: 
Yeah but friends aren’t, no, I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t want to put that 
on to anybody ever, that situation.  (Dessa) 
Finally, five participants acknowledged that certain mental states allowed them 
to be more easily led by, or dependent upon, others.  Although not necessarily a barrier 
to involving others, this has implications for the role others should take if the goal is to 
facilitate capacity: 
Yeah well, I know that when I’m unwell, I can get very susceptible 
to what people say, so if some people tell me to go do it, I won’t 
take two thoughts to it, I’ll just go and do it.  Which normally I 
don’t, I actually think about things.  (Camille) 
 
Availability.  Availability was cited by 12 participants as a barrier to involving 
others, whether geographical distance or availability in a crisis situation: 
That’s a bit hard on you though, if, if they [the nominated support 
person] were uncontactable for a period of time, and you were 
sort of stuck in hospital or [the emergency psychiatric service] or 
wherever until they came.  (Esme) 
Even when people were readily accessible, infrequent contact, feeling rushed, or 
frequent changes in (professional) support people limited the opportunity to form 
trusting relationships.  Anthea, a woman with a diagnosis of anxiety and depression, felt 
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strongly about this.  She was discharged from the mental health team as soon as she 
became well, only to be re-referred when her mental state deteriorated.  Due to 
discontinuity of service, she felt she was not supported when she needed it most: 
I’ve been through mental health and I’ve become well, so they’ve 
discharged me . . .  I was signed off, and meanwhile that I was 
signed off I had no one to talk to – this is the thing, I want 
someone to talk to when I need to.  In the meanwhile I had no 
one to talk to, everything’s getting built up and built up and built 
up . . . the doctor I saw recently said ‘oh yes, we’ll send a nurse 
out to you once a week cause you really need help at the moment 
you’ve got a lotta things going on,’ and I says ‘well of course I 
have when you sign me off and put me back in the files all the 
time.’  
Unexpectedly, two participants felt contact with preferred others was limited by 
their care team.  Both felt disconnected and isolated from people they felt should have 
some involvement: 
Yeah I would like my mum involved, but . . . the . . . organisation 
that I’m under, mum thinks that, my organisation doesn’t want, 
that I’m saying that I don’t want my mum involved, but I do.  
(Faye) 
Because sometimes they won’t let you have . . . psychiatric 
lawyers, free lawyers, to go to the judge.  And sometimes they 
won’t let you see the judge for a year, and the judge is going to let 
you out of [psychiatric hospital], and they only let you see the 
judge every two years – well that’s two years lumped in 
[psychiatric hospital] waiting for a judge and a lawyer.  (Brooke) 
 
Stigma and social isolation.  Combined, these barriers culminated in an 
experience of stigma and social isolation.  This was felt several ways.  Six participants 
felt their contributions were ignored due to the stigma associated with their diagnosis: 
Well some, some people will, some people too don’t believe you 
because you’ve your illness.  Depending on your illness they can 
say they don’t believe you.  (Dessa) 
Warren and Richard, two men diagnosed with schizophrenia, spoke poignantly 
about potential support people ‘stepping back’ once they became unwell: 
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Well, a lot of people, you might make, might meet friends, say 
about thirty friends.  Then you have, get a mental illness, only ten 
of those might come round and see you.  The others step back, 
and they don’t want to have anything to do with you.  (Warren) 
I mean, yes, if you broke your leg, then, then sort of, I think then 
there’s people coming to help.  But if it’s mental illness, I dunno I 
think, people might just, stand off.  (Richard) 
The direct consequence of this stigma was social isolation, with few people 
participants could call on, let alone people who had the desired qualities:  
It would be good to have a few people, but there’s not all that 
many people who can actually, um, do that [be involved], you 
know.  (Paige) 
It’s a bit different when you’re on your own because you’ve got 
nobody.  (Cate) 
The interconnectedness of these barriers can become a self-fulfilling prophecy; 
experiences of stigma make it more difficult for participants to trust others, in turn 
limiting the network they can call upon.  This is demonstrated in Figure 1 (overleaf). 
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Figure 1. Interconnectedness of Reasons for Reluctance to Involve Others 
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3.3.4  Deciding Who to Involve: A Personal Choice 
Participants felt they should control who was involved in capacity assessment 
and decision-making on their behalf.  Twelve spoke about their desire to involve more 
than one person, feeling this would overcome individual shortcomings and ensure 
holistic assessment and decision-making: 
I don’t know, I feel like for me personally the more people that 
are involved in making the decisions the more likely it is that 
they’d make good decisions. Or that they’ll make decisions that I 
would want made.  ‘Cause if you had just one person, then maybe, 
like, I don’t know, maybe there’ll be certain areas where they 
have like a pet issue, or they think you should do things 
differently or you know, and um I guess, the other thing is my 
sister’s a nurse and she’s doing psych nursing at the moment so 
that would be quite helpful.  (Kim) 
Involving more than one person also promoted mutual support.  Pania, a Māori 
woman closely connected with her whānau, described the support provided by her 
extended family: 
Yeah my family, they’re pretty good, they’re pretty cool people . . . 
Some of them have got more or less problems as well, so we’re 
all, we’re all together, and we all sort of help.  It’s like a big 
whānau, and you know, so we sort of each help one another, and, 
yeah.  (Pania) 
However, David, a 67-year-old man with Tourette’s Disorder, disagreed, stating 
that “too many cooks spoil the broth,” while a second person, on receiving feedback on 
the research findings, specifically disagreed with involving more than one person. 
There was significant debate on whose opinion should hold sway in case of 
disagreement.  The majority of the 17 respondents who commented on this topic felt 
final authority should rest whomever they nominated to hold this role, followed by 
whoever knew them best.  Others felt it should be a majority decision or that there 
should be a hierarchy of decision-makers.  These views are summarised in Table 10 
(overleaf).  
  




Preferences for Prioritising when Involving More Than One Other. 
 
 
Participant view a 
Number of 
participants 
(n = 17) 
Percentage of total 
respondents on this 
topic 
Participants’ nominee 8 47.1 
Person who has best 
knowledge of participant 
7 41.2 
Person who has greatest 
expertise 
5 29.4 
Participants’ own view 5 29.4 




Note.  a Categories not mutually exclusive; five participants shared two views 
each, three participants expressed three views each.  
 
3.3.5  Summary 
Respondents varied widely in whom they wanted involved in capacity 
assessment and decision-making during periods of diminished capacity, and the 
appropriate balance of personal, medical and practical knowledge.  Yet most agreed that 
they wanted to be able to trust and have a relationship with involved others.  Developing 
this relationship takes time, yet the benefits are vast, resulting in a sense of security and 
facilitating help-seeking behaviour.  Despite these benefits, participants were often 
reluctant to involve certain people.  Stigma and isolation played an underlying role, and 
some participants were unsure whom to call on in times of need.  Participants wanted 
authority over whom to involve and who should have final say if decisions are disputed.  
Ultimately, rather than generating a specific list of who should or should not be involved, 
respondents emphasised the desire to decide for themselves: 
You have to be very careful about who that person was, making 
those decisions, because you see . . . some people are listeners 
and some people aren’t . . . And some people who on the surface 
may appear big and strong are actually being driven by their own 
fears and perceptions about things . . . just because they’ve got 
the loudest voice and seem . . . the most capable, [they] are not 
necessarily the person to be listened to.  So they make out they 
are, ‘cause they come across so well, but actually, in this 
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experience for me it’s more likely to be someone far quieter.  And 
who actually listens.  And has a, a feeling about what’s going on.  
You know.  For me, that’s far more suitable.  (Julia) 
 
 
3.4 Decision-Making During Incapacity 
 
 
The previous section explored participants’ views on selection of who should be 
involved, whether in capacity assessment or decision-making.  This section examines 
how participants want these people to be involved and what principles they feel should 
guide decision-making if capacity is diminished. 
Attempts to quantify respondents’ preferences for decision-making during 
incapacity were unsuccessful; preferences were vague and many participants expressed 
more than one view; an initial partiality to a certain approach, followed by a secondary 
preference if the first was unworkable, with a final overriding imperative.  Experience of 
making decisions alone and with the involvement of others seemed to play a part in the 
development of preferences; for example, Faye, who lived in supported accommodation 
where others presumably exerted a greater degree of involvement, more readily 
devolved decision-making than Julie, who had lived a ‘normal’ life raising her son and 
did not have contact with mental health services until her 60s.  Three examples illustrate 
the complexity of participant views: 
 Gabe, a woman with bipolar affective disorder, initially expressed a desire to 
remain involved in and be supported with decision-making should her 
capacity be diminished (wishes principle, current self, supported decision-
making).  She later acknowledged that perhaps some decisions should be 
withheld when she was unwell.  Subsequently, she decided to set up an 
advance directive (wishes principle, past self) to specify what decision-
making authority she wished to retain (wishes principle, current self) versus 
that which she wished to devolve to nominated others – who she hoped 
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would balance her future wellbeing with her past and current wishes (a form 
of surrogate decision-making balancing a wishes and a best interests 
component).   
 Kim, a woman with a history of anxiety, also wanted to be supported in her 
decision-making should her capacity be diminished (wishes principle, current 
self, supported decision-making).  However, she wished to nominate a 
‘committee’ who could make decisions on her behalf should her decision-
making put her at risk (advance directive nominating a surrogate).  While this 
implies a best interests, future-oriented stance, her requirement that this 
committee consist of people who know her implies that best interests 
consider her how her past selves define best interests.   
 Like her co-participants, Brooke felt that she should be involved in all 
decision-making.  However, her experience of bullying and discrimination and 
her distrust of mental health services meant she did not wish to share 
decision-making at all and saw any veto of her decisions as a violation of her 
rights (strong wishes principle, current self).  Should she not be able to make 
decisions unassisted, she wanted only nominated others who were well-
schooled in her wishes to act as advocates and ensure her (past) wishes were 
respected (strong wishes principle, past self).   
To make sense of this diversity in preference, the following section explores 
participants’ usual preferences for others’ role in decision-making and how this might 
change if capacity is diminished, before outlining participants’ preferences for principles 
to guide decision-making.   It concludes by exploring difficulties associated with 
supported decision-making identified by participants. 
 
3.4.1 Preferences for Own and Others’ Involvement in Decision-Making 
Participants differed extensively in their preferences for involvement in decision-
making.  To make sense of responses, a preliminary examination of transcripts using 
constant comparison analysis (CCA) identified participants’ preferences for involvement 
and support, irrespective of their capacity.  Keywords in context (KWIC) was then used 
to further explore participant preferences when capacity was diminished, using ten 
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terms and their derivatives identified through CCA.  In total, 120 quotes were identified 
from 25 participants.  The terms and their usage are shown in Table 11: 
Table 11. 
 
KWIC Terms and their Usage when Describing Own or Others’ Involvement in Decision-
Making when Capacity Intact or Diminished.  
Term 
Usage 
n = 120 % 
Ask a 6 4.8 
Communicate b 3 2.4 
Discuss c 8 6.5 
Input d 5 4.0 
Involve e 8 6.5 
Listen f 10 8.1 
Respect g 3 2.4 
Say h 46 37.1 
Talk i 17 13.7 
Tell / told j 14 11.3 
Note.  a Ask, asked.  b Communicate, communication.  c Discuss, discussed, discussion, 
discussions.  d  Input.  e  Involve, involved.  f  Listen, listened, listeners, listening, listens.  
g Respect, respected. h Say, said, saying, says.  I Talk, talked, talking.  j Tell, telling, told. 
 
This KWIC analysis was fed back into the CCA, seven themes identified, and 
numbers of participants who expressed each theme were counted and categorised 
according to whether they referred to times when capacity was intact or diminished.  
The results are summarised in Table 12. 
Table 12. 
 
Themes Discussed when Describing Own or Other’s Involvement in Decision-Making: 
Capacity Intact vs. Diminished. 
 
Capacity intact Capacity diminished 
n  % a n % a 
Emotional support 12 42.9 10 35.7 
Informal support 14 50.0 6 21.4 
Advice / problem-solving 9 32.1 10 35.7 
Compromised individual’s views 
elicited / shared 
3 10.7 14 50.0 
Views Considered / negotiated 9 32.1 21 75.0 
Support person’s views shared / 
individual challenged 
2 7.1 9 32.1 
Devolve some decision-making 8 28.6 15 53.6 
Note.  Categories not mutually exclusive.  a Percentage of total participants (N=28)  
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These results indicate the theme of ‘informal support’ decreased when discussing 
involvement when capacity is diminished compared with when capacity is intact.  When 
capacity was diminished, more participants expressed a preference for their views to be 
elicited / shared, for these views to be considered, and for support people to share their 
own views and / or challenge the compromised individual.  This could possibly be 
because this was a time when their views were more likely to be ignored.     
 
Preferences when capacity is intact.  Of the 22 participants who commented on 
usual preferences for decision-making when capacity was intact, all expressed a desire 
for involvement.  However, the preferred degree of involvement varied, from six 
participants who felt they should, or do, retain one hundred percent of decision-making 
authority, to five who chose to devolve certain aspects to others, citing their own lack of 
expertise (eight participants). 
I like to, with anything now . . . I like to be my own, my own boss, 
so to speak, and make decisions, whether they be in your eyes or 
whoever’s eyes right or wrong, I think that, that is irrelevant.  I 
have to be given, I feel as though that I should be given the 
choice.  That’s the thing.  (Cate) 
While all wanted to be involved in decision-making, most did not want to do this 
alone.  Fourteen participants spoke about the importance of informal support people; 
someone to talk things through and share difficulties with: 
I find that . . . even if you can’t talk to your family, there is places 
like the club here, that you can . . . It’s like one big family, and 
there’s a lot of people that you can talk to, you know, one on one. 
You know even if it’s just having a cuppa.  (Pania) 
This informal support – talking things through – overlapped but differed slightly 
from the emotional support offered by others; 12 participants (of whom ten had 
commented on the importance of informal support) spoke of having someone who 
backed them, understood them, and was truly there with them.  Rather than just being 
able to talk things through, these people were important in providing the emotional 
backing so respondents could make their own decisions. 
Nine participants wanted someone to give advice or help with problem-solving; 
to give ideas, another perspective, or feedback: 
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Well um, get on to the right track, you know get on to the right 
track and uh, then uh, get things sorted out.  (Ruben). 
They advise you, you know. (Sarah) 
 
Preferences when capacity is diminished.   In analysing the KWIC terms and 
themes relating to involvement in decision-making during periods of diminished 
capacity, five participant preferences could be placed on a continuum: 
1. Retain complete decision-making authority, 
2. Retain most decision-making authority, but to delegate specific tasks, 
3. Forms of negotiated, shared or supported decision-making, 
4. Complete delegation of decision-making authority, and 
5. Being informed of decisions made by others. 
Again, participants often expressed multiple, overlapping views, and these 
categories are not mutually exclusive.  This section explores where participants believed 
the balance should be struck between their own involvement and that of others.   
“I’m the one affected . . . let me do me for me.”  All of the 25 participants who 
commented on decision-making preferences during incapacity wished to retain input 
into decision-making.  This view was held by Cate, a woman with bipolar affective 
disorder whose decision-making capacity had recently been questioned: 
Well, I think I should have the final say because after all I’m the 
one that’s affected . . .  I feel that I’m usually when I’m like that I 
know the signs [of becoming unwell] enough to be able to say, 
‘well look this is what has to be done or I need to go to hospital or 
I need this.’  . . .  With consultation with the psychiatrist.  (Cate) 
“Maybe I should have that decision taken away from me really .”  Although 
all aspired to retain decision-making authority, later discussion tempered this with a 
desire for input from others.  This is clear in the above quote by Cate, who qualified her 
desire to retain decision-making autonomy by seeking consultation with the 
psychiatrist.  Further discussion identified a tension between wanting to retain decision-
making autonomy and acknowledging that occasionally some decision-making should be 
devolved.  For example, Cate had arranged for her finances to be managed by a third 
party organisation yet wished to retain control over medication. 
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In Cate’s situation we see a desire to retain authority over what to devolve.  This 
was a view shared by Gabe, another woman with bipolar affective disorder, and 
Cassandra, a young woman with schizophrenia.  All three acknowledged there were 
times when their capacity was diminished, yet all believed they ought to retain input in 
some areas.  They sought authority over the demarcation of decisions to be devolved, 
expressing a sense that ‘I know what I need.’   
Supported decision-making.  Almost all participants advocated forms of shared 
or supported decision-making when capacity was diminished; however they differed on 
how this should occur.  The CCA and KWIC analysis identified three forms of supported 
decision-making: 
 Listening, consideration and negotiation 
 The illusion of choice 
 Practical and emotional decision-making support;  
 “I like them to maybe listen and have a conversation”:  Listening, 
consideration and negotiation.   Participants wanted their views to be elicited and 
considered, and for decisions to be negotiated.  Fourteen wanted others to ask their 
opinion; over half of these described experiences where this hadn’t occurred: 
Especially the last admission, they should’ve actually 
communicated with my family, or at least talked to me properly, 
instead of just talking at me . . . They did [listen] to begin with, 
and then they kind of went all no, this doesn’t make sense . . .  
we’re getting a doctor in, um, now we’re getting you put under 
the act, here’s a piece of paper saying you’re under the act, and 
that’s it, yeah.  (Camille) 
21 participants wanted their views to be considered and decisions negotiated.  
For example, in discussing the hypothetical scenario of the woman with dementia, 
Daniel spoke about wanting involved others to consider his point of view and 
incorporate it to the greatest extent possible: 
Um, I feel like, if there’s a person that’s going to kind of run 
through things, that lets you know what’s going on, and then 
they’re going to be explaining things, so that they bring you in 
with the decision, then you can go, ‘oh yeah.’  You can agree, or 
you can go ‘well, that bit there, I don’t mind but, you know, you 
can keep me in hospital but at some time I wanna go outside and 
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have a smoke, so if you expect me to be in there for ten hours, I’m 
just gunna get real crappy.’  You know, you know, or something 
like that.  So, having it that way, you get to have an opinion and say 
something, you know, but also being involved in the decision.  
(Daniel). 
However again an alarming number (14) described experiences where they felt 
their views were not considered: 
Well they should actually say, to, if I’m able to make the decision, 
Faye, would you really wanna do this, how we gunna achieve this, 
but instead they’re saying, no Faye can’t live on her own she’s 
gotta have an organisation for the rest of her life.  (Faye) 
Nine participants wanted involved others to provide feedback; for example on 
their mental state.  Of these, seven acknowledged that this may require challenges to 
their decision-making; an experience both helpful and intrusive: 
They actually did . . . make the conversation, make sure that, I 
was, you know, why I had done made the decision, they actually 
talked me through that so that was good.  But they did make it, 
make me feel small.  (Anthea) 
Even when acknowledging some choice may need to be removed, participants 
wanted to retain a role in implementation.  For example, Tracey felt that although she 
needed to be placed somewhere safe whilst unwell, she should have choice regarding 
the location: 
Well, I was in that scenario. I couldn’t be left at home . . .  And um, 
I needed to be, under supervised care.  Which, that was fine, but, 
the facilities were really horrible.  [Psychiatric] hospital’s the 
pits.  It’s cold. 
“I had a choice, but I didn’t” – (the illusion of) choice.  Although participants 
wanted their views to be elicited, listened to, and incorporated in decision-making, many 
included the proviso that their wishes be overridden if their choices placed themselves 
or others at risk; of the 21 participants who wished to be involved in decision-making, 
14 gave some form of risk proviso: 
[Discussing the hypothetical scenario of a woman with dementia] 
Um, I think if she was to stay at home, and she really wanted to, 
you would have like a, she would have to have a checklist, she 
would have to understand that there would be a checklist for her, 
and if she didn’t basically abide by the checklist, then it’s like um, 
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she’s not capable of looking after herself at home . . . [And] you 
say ‘well these are the rules, we understand that you want to stay 
at home, and that sort of thing, but we have to put rules in place, 
because you’re forgetful or you’ve got Alzheimer’s or something 
or another.’  So we are looking out for, for her, and this is the only 
way we can keep her at home, as long as she does these things.  
(Damon) 
Thus, participants seemed to be condoning a degree of protection; steps taken to 
facilitate their decision-making but with the condition that final consequences dictate 
whether or not these wishes are respected.  For some, such as Darren, a young man who 
had experienced a depressive episode during which he was acutely suicidal, there was a 
clear illusion of choice: 
She [my therapist] decided that it would be, I should go into 
hospital.  And um you know, she asked me if I would go in 
voluntarily, and initially I leaned very much no . . . And she kind 
of mentioned, you know, ‘if you don’t go to hospital I’m going to 
put you under the Act,’ so I was like, I had a choice but I didn’t, 
sort of thing.  And she gave me an easier out so it wouldn’t, it 
wouldn’t go as hard on me if I chose to cooperate, and I think that 
was, that was all right for me.  I mean at the time I was very angry 
at her . . . [but] I think that it worked out all right in the end. 
However, while nine participants, like Darren, condoned this illusion of choice, 
even he did not feel comfortable with it at the time, and similarly three felt powerless 
and undermined: 
Well because I’ve had another experience when they’ve said go in 
to hospital or we’ll put you under the act as well, like, I actually 
find they quite often will say that.  (Camille) 
“They could help you make the decision .”  Thirteen participants wanted 
support with decision-making should their capacity be diminished.  Support took 
multiple, overlapping forms; for ten participants it was about assistance with problem-
solving such as prioritising, advice-giving or help identifying options.  For example, Cate 
spoke about how a friend helped her to prioritise and focus when she felt overwhelmed: 
[He] kept saying to me these positive things, ‘you’re going to do it 
Cate.  Cate, what have you got today and we’ll just do, we’ll just 
do two things today and then that’s enough off your list, and be 
positive, be calm.’  And it was him that got me through it.  
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Similarly, Damon stated that being presented with options facilitated his 
decision-making, including his resolve not to suicide: 
Um, for myself, um there was options put forward, and I could sort 
of see a way out . . . ‘You might find this beneficial sort of thing 
would you give it a go?’   And then it was ‘yes I would.’  So okay I 
can make a decision ‘yeah I don’t really wanna kill myself sort of 
thing’ at that stage (Damon) 
Support could involve helping someone to help themselves; equipping them with 
the skills to facilitate their decision-making and their recovery: 
Medication helped a, and b I helped myself, I had psychology, and 
psychologists that helped.  And I helped myself too, it’s been a 
combination.  I’ve been having the right medication, b I’ve been 
helping myself, c the psychology.  (Cassandra) 
While problem-solving support is useful, 11 participants still identified emotional 
and informal support as important, as powerfully described by Julia: 
I remember [my friend] came out to help me [move house] . . . 
and when she came out, I just, tears just streamed down my face 
‘cause it was just like, ‘thank you so much, for being here and to 
come and help me.’  And then we just, talked gently to each other 
and we just carried on doing what we were doing. 
“I’m in your hands now” – Devolving decision-making responsibility.  Seven 
participants - four of whom had suffered severe depressive episodes, one with bipolar 
affective disorder, and two with schizophrenia – wished to abdicate all decision-making 
responsibility to another during times of diminished capacity.  Their rationale depended 
on their diagnosis; for those who had experienced a depressive episode – like Daniel – 
this delegation of responsibility seemed a relief, a relinquishment to someone else in a 
time when they felt overwhelmed.  However, for those with an experience of 
schizophrenia or bipolar affective disorder, the rationale for conferring decision-making 
wholly to another reflected the belief that they lacked capacity. 
“But at least they still could have talked to me and told me why” – Being 
informed.  Irrespective of individuals’ preferences for involvement, five participants 
expressed a desire to be kept informed of decisions made, with two describing lack of 
information as a disempowering and frightening experience: 
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I said ‘well, no one told me . . . they never discussed it with me.’  
Made me really angry, in a rage more than angry . . . At least they 
still could have talked to me and told me why.  Rather than just 
do it and then find out later. Cause I think the worst thing was, 
being told, not being told, just being given ECT and you didn’t 
even know 1. What it was and 2. What will be the long term 
effects . . . After two years they tell you, but I mean they don’t tell 
you. And not being told or shown what actually happens.  (Cate) 
 
Summary.  While participants appreciated decision-making support to some 
extent regardless of their level of capacity, the preferred form of this involvement 
varied.  When capacity was intact, participants appreciated informal, practical and 
emotional support – someone to talk things through and share understandings.  When 
capacity was diminished, the emphasis shifted to listening, negotiation and 
collaboration; a joint endeavour to facilitate the individual’s wishes to the greatest 
extent possible while allowing (for some) the scope for these to be overridden.  
 
3.4.2 Principles to Guide Decision-Making 
Participants were asked to consider whether they preferred decision-making 
during periods of diminished capacity be guided by their best interests or their wishes, 
and whether decisions should favour past, present, or future selves.  In theory, these 
concepts can only be combined in four ways; a best interests decision usually prioritises 
best outcomes for one’s future self, although could endeavour to restore a person’s past 
self.  Similarly, an individual wishes decision can only privilege past or current wishes – 
any decision couched in language of “this is what John would want in the future” must 
take as its reference either his past wishes or a judgement of his future interests.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 2 (opposite). 




Participants’ preferences for these approaches varied widely, often changing in 
response to new scenarios or considerations; this section explores participants’ complex 
views of this topic. 
 
Individual wishes: “I’d be very interested in being part of my own decision -
making.”  Twenty-six participants expressed a preference for decision-making to 
incorporate their wishes to some extent, from complete autonomy, to supported 
decision-making or models incorporating advance directives or substituted judgement.  
This section explores the rationale for their preferences before exploring whether past 
or present wishes should be prioritised. 
Rationale for wishes being followed.  Three rationales were used to justify a 
wishes approach: A rights-based argument; decision-making involvement as facilitating 
recovery; and as a defence against subjectivity. 
The rights-based argument, supported by five participants, starts from a respect 
for autonomy and self-determination, and a contention that removing one’s decision-
making authority undermines his or her rights:    
Surrogate decision-
making to facilitate 
return to past self 
Decision based on 




Past wishes honoured 









Figure 2: Possible Preferences to Guide Decision-Making during Incapacity 
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David: Well it comes down to an independence I think . . . It 
gives you more, it gives you that authority – not so 
much authority – it gives you the opportunity 
Brooke: Autonomy 
Daniel: The power 
(Focus group discussion) 
The second argument, that involvement in decision-making is important for 
recovery, was raised by six participants, such as David: 
But if you’re consciously aware, quite honestly, of what was going 
on, I’d be very interested in in being part of my own decision-
making, because that also helps to bring you back into society. 
Linked with these two arguments is the idea, raised by five participants, that 
decision-making is a precursor, indicator, and responsibility of adulthood.  Conversely, 
lack of autonomy over decision-making is considered ‘child-like:’   
And I said ‘well after all I’m 61 years of age, I’m not being told, I’m 
not a five-year-old.’  And sure you’ve gotta make some mistakes . . 
. I think it’s time now that I just sit back and do, let everybody just 
leave me alone let me do for me.  (Cate) 
Yes because you see what six-year-old child is going to take on, is 
going to manage responsibilities?   If anything took me over it 
was that [child-like state] . . . Because you believe you can’t 
manage what’s going on, you take yourself to a time when you 
didn’t have to manage things . . . And you need looked after . . . and 
you need someone to hold your hand, you need someone to do 
things for you.  You become so needy, because you-, you don’t, 
you’ve lost your own power, you don’t feel that you’re capable of 
doing anything to help yourself.  (Julia) 
Finally, four participants pointed out that because decisions are subjective, it is 
important their voices are heard: 
You know, someone might say it’s good for you to hang glide out 
of a plane, whatever, bungee jump out of a plane ‘cause it gives 
you a rush.  But other people like a doctor or, chiropractor might 
say ‘don’t do it it’s not good for you ‘cause you’ll hurt your back’.  
It depends - what you think is good for you may not be what 
another person thinks is good for you.  (Brooke) 
Past versus current wishes.  Most participants preferred to be involved in 
decision-making via models of supported decision-making, indicating a preference for 
current wishes to be heeded in the first instance.  However, two qualifications were 
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made.  First, as discussed, 14 participants identified a risk proviso, implying a ‘best 
interests, future selves’ standard.  Second, ten participants placed capacity-dependent 
constraints on involvement in decision-making, acknowledging the paradox of asking 
someone assessed as lacking capacity to be involved in making decisions: 
And if you could ask them, if they weren’t sort of too out to it, that 
could be a good thing too.  Although they might not be in the right 
frame of mind to be making a critical decision.  (Esme) 
Through discussing instances where current wishes may need to be overridden 
alternatives were identified.  Participants expressed a preference for past wishes to 
inform decision-making via advance directives or substituted judgement models, 
discussed by 20 participants each.  Twelve of those supporting advance directives 
intended to use these to nominate whom they wanted involved in decision-making, 
suggesting advance directives can facilitate substituted judgement.   
Support for advance directives and substituted judgement was driven by 
participants’ desire to guarantee their voices were heard, particularly if their 
compromised self was not capable of expressing a view: 
But the trouble is you might, think you want medication and then 
when it comes down to it, you don’t.  But I suppose you’d be 
overridden by what you’ve written in the past . . . I think I’d want 
it [my compromised wish] to be overridden really because you 
might not, you know, you might, be not in a fit state to make that 
change of your plan.  (Esme) 
However, despite her endorsement of advance directives, Brooke, who was 
acutely aware of mental health discrimination, was adamant that an advance directive 
should not be an automatic requirement for all consumers of mental health services: 
It should be your own choice.  You don’t go around saying 
someone has to, has to have, have a gun licence and if they don’t 
have a gun.  They don’t carry a gun licence but no guns!  You 
don’t have to carry it, have it, have it in your purse. 
Conversely, six participants considered that because the future is unknowable 
and circumstances change, attempts should always be made to follow current wishes as 
a first preference.   
I don’t know, I’m always very hesitant to, have, things set in 
concrete, I guess, ‘cause you just don’t know, what’s gunna 
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happen, and I would hate to make an advance directive and be all 
like yes this is the thing I really want and then have it be 
something that was in the end a really terrible idea.  (Kim) 
Consequently, although there was support for advance directives, there was also 
recognition that they need to be reviewed and should not replace attempts to facilitate 
involvement in decision-making. 
 
“It comes down to the best interests of the patient .”  As discussed, although 
most participants endorsed wishes-based decision-making in the first instance, not all 
shared this preference and others qualified their endorsement with a risk proviso.  For 
these participants, the bottom line remained their ‘best interests,’ albeit often implicitly.  
This section examines participants’ rationale and preferences on how this be applied.  
Best interests and future selves:  “It’s for my own good.”  Four overlapping 
rationales were used to justify a future-oriented best interests approach; safety, one’s 
own good, incapacity, and others care.   
Eleven participants expressly identified risk and safety as paramount 
considerations when making decisions for another.  For example when considering 
whether decisions should be overridden, Cate suggested this occur if she posed “a risk to 
myself,” while Kim extended these grounds to include “also for others.”   
Although risk was the main justification for a future-oriented best interests 
approach, other rationales were also used.  Key among these was the idea that others 
know best and that should decisions be made “for your own good” (Daniel) – the ends 
justified the means. 
The treatment was very horrible.  It’s quite barbaric.  Admittedly 
I’ve come out the other side now, and I’ve got all my faculties 
with me.  (Tracey) 
Just as participants justified substituted judgement or advance directives as 
necessary due to their own incapacity, so eight of them cited their own incapacity or a 
belief that they would be so incapacitated that they “wouldn’t care” (Pania) as a reason 
why others might know better.  Damon made reference to this several times throughout 
our interview. 
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And just, you’re not in the state of mind, and regardless of, I 
might not accept it or something or another but that is the case. . . 
Regardless of what you think you are not right . . . so somebody 
else has to step in and basically say ‘well, that’s not the way to 
go.’  
I would like to think that what I would want would be taken into 
consideration.  But then again, with talking with other people, 
they’ll know better, because they’re not in the mental state that I 
would be in. 
Finally, there was a view, held by eight participants, that best interests decisions 
are made from a place of caring and that people are making these decisions to look after 
them; “they’d be wanting to help her by taking her card off her” (Dessa). 
This approach is predicated on the idea that patients will eventually appreciate 
decisions made for them, best summarised by Cassandra, transitioning out of psychiatric 
hospital after an inpatient stay of more than eight years: 
I wouldn’t be the way I am today without that [the appropriation 
of decision-making authority] happening.  I mean I had to go 
through the process of learning . . . I actually think that’s the main 
reason I ended up in hospital, was to learn that.  It’s the main 
reason I ended up in there. 
Best interests and past selves.  Although the above rationale for best interests 
defines it in terms of future selves, five participants tied their best interests to past 
selves, believing that they would be best served by respecting the wishes of, or 
facilitating a return to, past selves: 
[What principle should guide decision-making?] 
Jacqui: What’s good for me. 
INT: What’s good for you? 
Jacqui: Yeah.  My husband’s a saviour like that.  He wouldn’t let 
me go to a home without extreme need.  There needs to 
be. 
Anthea: I think that’s good; what is good for you. 
Dessa: . . . ‘Cause if I got chucked into [a rest home] then that 
wouldn’t be good for me, I’d hate it.  
(Focus group discussion) 
For this focus group a decision that did not respect their past wishes on going 
into care could not be in their best interests.  Likewise, for Warren, best interests 
decisions in one’s own good must facilitate a return to past (well) selves: 
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I had no big decisions to make or anything.  If I had, I would have 
left it to the family . . .  For the best to get well.  They’re do-, in 
other words, they’re doing the right thing.  (Warren). 
Reversibility.  For one focus group, best interests decisions were those with 
fewest irreversible consequences.  Depending on who makes the decision, reversibility 
could relate to either future or past selves:  If the decision is made by the patient and is 
considered risky and irreversible, the concept of reversibility asserts “don’t let me do 
something that may cause me future harm.”  However, if the decision is made by 
another, reversibility requests “don’t you do something that I cannot change back” – 
tying it to past selves.  This idea of reversibility was discussed extensively by one focus 
group: 
INT: How do you guys define best interests?  Because that 
becomes a very contentious thing, for some people. 
Darren: I think just something that results in a consequence 
that isn’t extremely harmful, that isn’t irreparable . . . 
Minimising, permanent kind of consequences. 
 . . . 
Kim: Say something like um, electro convulsive therapy or 
whatever it is.  Like that’s potentially something that 
can be helpful but it’s also potentially something that 
can be really terrible.  So, I guess, from that view it 
wouldn’t necessarily be in someone’s best interests to 
have it, unless it was, unless all the other options were 
worse than that, ‘cause otherwise you just end up 
getting screwed over. 
 . . . 
Darren: Yeah . . . It doesn’t need to be like the absolute best 
interests it’s just an interest that is gunna get us 
through it with the least bad. 
Kim: Yeah . . . I mean I guess the theory is eventually you will 
once again be capable of making your own decisions, so 
the decisions that people make for you or on your 
behalf should be the ones with the fewest permanent 
consequences 
INT: . . . What happens if there wasn’t a certainty that you 
would get your decision-making back? . . .  
Kim: Well again I would probably try the things that were 
the less likely to have bad outcomes first, ‘cause if they 
work, then you’re not risking a bad outcome.   
 . . . 
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Darren: I think, stick with the emotional wellbeing, until 
something bad happens.  Like you know that could be, 
the degree of bad could be potentially horrible, but I 
think that if that risk of the horrible thing isn’t 
incredibly immediate, like maybe, if you think that 
you’re gunna get some kind of a warning . . . you could 
use that as the point where you say, ‘right now you 
need the care,’ and sort of go through that with the 
person beforehand.  So I think stick with emotional 
[wellbeing] until horrible things happen or something 
bad happens. 
Kim: I think it depends how bad the potential bad things are, 
‘cause like if there’s a possibility that you know, she’s 
gunna set her house on fire or was [going to] die or 
something – I  mean once you’re dead your emotional 
wellbeing’s really not going to be an issue either.  So I 
mean if the potential physical consequences were 
something that you could either see coming and avoid 
or something that you could recover from, then maybe 
mental or emotional wellbeing is more important, but if 
there, if there’s a possibility of serious physical 
consequences, that’s probably not going to do a hell of a 
lot for your emotional wellbeing either.  So, at that 
point, I guess, it would be better to move to a situation 
where you were less happy emotionally but at least you 
were still physically functional. 
(Focus group discussion) 
Summary.  Participants’ preferences for decision-making during periods of 
diminished capacity varied widely, often changing in response to new scenarios or 
considerations.  In the first instance, most participants preferred decision-making a 
current, wishes-oriented approach maximising their involvement irrespective of 
capacity.  However, when confronted with issues such as risk, ability and reversibility, 
participants’ initial partiality for supported decision-making often gave way to 
secondary preferences, such as an advance directive, or an overriding imperative for a 
future-oriented, best interests model.  Participant preferences were not readily 
reducible to a simple hierarchy of preferred models, indicating a need for individualised 
decision-making approaches during diminished capacity.  
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3.4.3 Issues with Supported Decision-Making 
Participants demonstrated a complex understanding of the issues around 
decision-making during periods of diminished capacity.  Barriers to involving others 
such as trusting the right person, availability and access, and issues around abuse and 
power have been discussed.  Similarly, the potentially transient nature of one’s wishes, 
difficulties in foreseeing one’s future wishes and the paradox of deeming a person 
incompetent yet still seeking their involvement were acknowledged and contrasted with 
subjectivity in asking another to ascertain one’s best interests.  However participants 
also alluded to more subtle issues with supported decision-making, such as 
assertiveness, insight, dependence and interpersonal dynamics. 
Involvement in decision-making requires a degree of assertiveness, particularly if 
systems or the individuals within systems do not seek to include them.  Yet nine 
participants described difficulties speaking out, especially when they were already 
feeling vulnerable: 
Yeah well I’m not, I’m not one of those people that like to push 
myself to be out there, I like to be sitting in the background, and 
you know, if I have to answer, I’ll answer.  (Pania) 
Fifteen participants feel their views were disregarded or overridden by others, an 
acutely disempowering experience: 
I just felt, completely out of control of the whole situation, and I 
had no control. And I just felt, I was in a pit, I was just suicidal, 
you know, I was just really, god, couldn’t get my head around 
what they were doing, their treatment of me.  (Tracey) 
And sometimes people don’t listen to you and it makes you feel 
irrelevant.  (Rowan) 
Ten participants identified that although they wanted others to be involved in 
decision-making should they lack capacity, a concurrent lack of insight meant that they 
might not acknowledge this.  This was particularly so for those with bipolar or psychotic 
disorders over those with affective disorders (six participants versus four), although it 
was often only with hindsight that they acknowledged their decision-making was 
compromised: 
It wasn’t the right, it didn’t feel right [having others make 
decisions], but I know it was now.  (Cassandra) 
SERVICE-USER VIEWS ON INCAPACITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
117 
But looking back, I knew it had to be done.   And I, I did fight it, I 
got a lawyer and everything, got my cousin to fight it, and we had 
the hearings at [the tribunal], but I was unwell.  (Gabe) 
Finally, although mandating the involvement of others in decision-making to 
some extent, two participants identified the potential to become reliant on their support 
people.  For example, Marjorie acknowledged that her low self-confidence underlies a 
tendency to rely on others: 
They do support me sometimes, and I don’t want to get too used 
to it, ‘cause I’m meant to be making these decisions for myself, 
and I yeah I can do it.  Other times I just feel a bit vulnerable and I 
just don’t feel okay with it . . . Like I just say ‘oh well you do it,’ 
you know.  And there’s no need to . . . I can do it if I have to 




Clearly there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to decision-making during periods 
of diminished capacity; participants varied in the degree of involvement they wanted for 
themselves and others, the extent to which they wanted decisions to honour their 
interests versus their wishes; and whether they wanted past, present or future selves 
prioritised.  Instead, an exhortation to ‘let me choose how and whether to choose’ seems 
to underpin participant views.  Several informally commented how helpful it was to 
formulate their views in more abstract ways.  This suggests that people appreciate 
advance treatment planning discussions which allow the opportunity to determine 
guiding principles to govern decision-making during periods of incapacity, rather than 
focussing on specific decisions. 
Respondents also shared a desire to be viewed and treated as individuals – for 
decision-making to respect their values and preferences, even if that means overriding 
what they have specified.  As stated most clearly by Kim: 
I don’t know, we’re still people.  Just ‘cause we can’t make a 
decision right now doesn’t mean that you, like, that you shouldn’t 
still consider our humanity. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 
 
Read as a whole, this study’s findings paint a complex picture of participant 
preferences for capacity assessment, involving others, and decision-making during 
periods of diminished capacity.  While broad conclusions can be drawn, none is without 
nuance and qualifications.  This section outlines the study’s broad findings, introducing 
an overarching theme: relational autonomy.  Limitations of the current study are 
identified, and implications for policy, practice and future research are discussed. 
 
 
4.1  Research Findings 
 
 
Participants held a range of views in response to the research questions, differing 
not only amongst themselves as to the factors considered relevant to capacity 
assessment, who they wished to have involved, and their preferences for decision-
making should capacity be diminished, but also changing their mind over the course of 
discussion.   
The fluidity of participants’ views, often shifting in response to questions or 
group discussion, was a key finding, and has significant implications for policy and 
practice.  While some participants had fixed ideas, for many life experiences, social 
interactions and new information will continue to influence their preferences; the views 
they expressed as part of this research project are unlikely to be the same views they 
would endorse one month or one year later.  This is true of anyone, regardless of 
whether or not they have a mental illness, and simply reflects the dynamic and fluid 
nature of human preference. 
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Despite this, some overarching themes could be identified.  This section will 
explore the research findings, beginning by exploring participant preferences in 
response to each research topic and concluding with a comment on an overarching 
theme: relational autonomy. 
 
4.1.1 Capacity Assessment: Triggers versus Determinants 
Participants, like academics, held diverse views as to what considerations should 
govern capacity assessment, with no single factor, including those enshrined in the 
MacCAT (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Appelbaum & Roth, 1982; Grisso & Appelbaum, 
1998, 2007; Grisso et al., 1997, 1995), deemed conclusive.  Instead, participants 
distinguished between the degree to which elements, such as emotionality, should 
trigger assessment or determine its result, with the degree of influence assessed 
according to three questions: 
1. Is this understandable for me?  
2. Is this understandable in light of my context? 
3. Am I in control of my decision-making? 
The first relates to authenticity; the notion of a stable self that is disrupted during 
incapacity (van Willigenburg & Delaere, 2005, in Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008, p. 116; 
Brudney, 2009; Sjöstrand, 2013).    This disrupted self seems to underpin the connection 
between mental illness and capacity – the unwell self is not the true self, and therefore 
any decisions originating from this unwell self are not a true reflection of one’s goals, 
aspirations or priorities.  Thus, what is important is not one’s emotions, beliefs or values, 
the degree of risk inherent in a specific choice, or whether someone suddenly changes 
their minds, but whether the decision makes sense to the individual with mental illness.  
This requirement for competent decisions to demonstrate internal rationality supports 
the proposal by some authors that capacity assessment incorporate a value assessment 
to scrutinise the consistency between one’s value system and the decision being made 
(Banner, 2012; Berghmans, 2001; Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Charland, 1998; Donnelly, 
2009; Sjöstrand, 2013; Sjöstrand & Helgesson, 2008).   
The second question for capacity assessment asks ‘is this decision 
understandable in light of my circumstances?’  Participants felt strongly that context is 
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important; that a decision prima facie driven by factors undermining capacity can be 
understandable in light of one’s context, whereas the same decision in another context 
could indicate incapacity.  One focus group’s discussion on burial versus cremation 
illustrates this point: for one participant a change in preference (coinciding with a time 
she was acutely unwell) reflected a reconsideration of her views brought about by her 
experiences; for another, a similar change was unthinkable in light of his personal 
commitments.  Participants felt capacity assessors needed to understand the decision 
from their point of view and circumstances.   
Participants also emphasised that incapacity can be created and perpetuated by 
factors such as medication, surroundings, or interpersonal dynamics.  This finding is 
similar to that reported by people with mental illness in the study by Amnesty 
International (2009), and provides evidence for the social construction of incapacity.  
This stance, aligned with a Social Model of Disability, asks the assessor to consider 
factors influencing one’s capacity and to address these, rather than focussing solely on 
capacity assessment.  As put succinctly by Julia: 
‘Cause it’s almost like saying well you either have to be perfect or 
you’re imperfect, and there’s nothing in between.  And it’s not 
taking into consideration, what’s going on in your life at that time 
. . . Because if you’re full of fear . . . then clearly it would be, to me, 
clearly that’s the place to start. 
The final question participants felt should be considered in capacity assessment 
asks, ‘am I in control?’  Lack of control relates to first order versus second order desires 
(Appelbaum, 1998; Hope et al., 2011; Sjöstrand, 2013); a person may act on one set of 
desires although the ‘real self’ wants something different.  Although participants 
acknowledged that both first order and second order desires form part of their identity, 
Julia alluded to control over second order desires when she chose which ‘self’ to align 
with, while her comment that “you haven’t got no sense of your own power . . . I was 
fading away” similarly speaks to one’s sense of command over one’s self.  Equally, 
control over first order versus second order selves underpins uncharacteristic 
behaviour such as Gabe’s prolific spending and Damon’s inability to act on a chosen 
course of action.  Lack of control also explains the role of persistent emotional states in 
capacity; one can regain command over transient emotions, but a persistent inability to 
control one’s emotional state may indicate subsequent decisions are inauthentic.   
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‘Control’ also supplements Parfit’s ‘psychological continuity’ (1983 & 1984, cited 
in Craigie, 2013, p. 9), suggesting assessors should consider whether the individual feels 
in command of their actions.   Comparing Gabe, whose change in self was brought about 
by a discrete episode of mania, with Damon, where the change was more gradual, 
psychological continuity would consider Gabe incompetent due to inconsistency with 
her past self, but Damon competent.  Yet Gabe and Damon’s lack of ‘control’ indicates 
both lack capacity, an assessment both would agree with.   
In sum, capacity (or incapacity) is not only socially constructed, but personally 
constructed, and participants believe capacity assessment cannot be applied in a 
formulaic way a la MacCAT.  Rather than objective judgements as to whether one is ‘too 
emotional’ or ‘not logical enough,’ participants feel the weight given to these 
assessments must be mediated through the individual’s authenticity, context and 
control, with capacity determinations based on the individual’s, not the assessor’s, 
filters.  This is demonstrated in Figure 3. 
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4.1.2 Involving Others: A Complex Balancing Act 
Participants held strong views on whom they wished to have involved in capacity 
assessment and decision-making.  Furthermore, choosing who to involve was deeply 
personal, not readily reducible to a hierarchy of family members or professionals.  
Instead, participants held clear views on the qualities required of involved others; 
namely appropriate knowledge, trustworthiness and a relationship.  Participants also 
identified a number of benefits and barriers to involving others.  This section 
summarises these views. 
A key requirement of involved others was that they held appropriate knowledge.  
However, what was considered ‘appropriate’ varied among participants; while many 
preferred someone with personal knowledge, others also considered professional 
expertise or practical skills essential.  These findings complement the conflicting 
findings of Swartz et al. (2006) and Perreault et al. (1999), which reported that people 
with mental illness preferred involvement of doctors versus relatives respectively, and 
suggests that a reason for this conflicting finding could be related to the type of 
knowledge valued by the individual. 
 The type of decision influenced the knowledge considered important; just as 
research found that people preferred to leave everyday decisions to someone trusted 
and close (Carter, 2009, in Pathare & Shields, 2012) while delegating legal decisions to a 
lawyer (Amnesty International Ireland, 2009), so participants more readily endorsed 
the involvement of medical professionals in decisions about medication.  Experience 
also played a role in determining whom to involve and the weight given to different 
forms of knowledge; some, such as Daniel, had experienced good care at the hands of 
mental health professionals and implicitly trusted them, others, such has Grace, had 
difficulty identifying even one person due to her negative experiences.   
More than knowledge however, participants emphasised the need for trust and 
for those involved in capacity assessment and decision-making to exhibit “human” 
qualities such as empathy, kindness, listening skills, transparency and an open mind.  By 
and large participants wanted the involvement of others to be built upon a relationship, 
developed over time and fostered on mutual respect and consideration.   
Most participants wished to involve more than one person.  Often this was a 
combination of someone with medical expertise and someone else with personal 
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knowledge.  This was driven by a hope that it would facilitate a balanced understanding 
of the participant and their situation, leading, presumably, to more balanced decisions.  
Mutual support for themselves and each other was also cited, perhaps to balance the 
fear of being a burden.   
While the inclusion of a professional was considered beneficial by many 
participants, this was not endorsed by all.  The traditional reliance on legal, medical or 
psychological professions to determine capacity privileges the forms of rationality 
valued by these professions; objective, impartial, and empirically-driven.  This is not to 
say this approach is “wrong” – it is simply not shared by all participants.  The depth of 
participant discussion on the qualities, capabilities and selection of those to be involved 
suggests a belief that if this is done ‘right,’ ‘right’ decisions will follow.  Participants 
reference this when they speak about how ‘being known’ by others leads to help-seeking 
behaviour; although they may not like the decision, they have faith that the other has 
incorporated their dislike into decision-making. 
Stigma, social isolation, and a feeling of having “no one to rely on” was evidently a 
fairly common occurrence among participants, who provided numerous reasons as to 
why they would not involve certain people.   Many of these reasons arose from past 
negative experiences; disconnection from services, feeling betrayed by those previously 
trusted, abuse, or simply feeling there was no one available who met all the required 
qualities.  Conversely, there was a concern that others could be “too close,” feel 
burdened or overwhelmed by the responsibility, or that the individual would become 
dependent on the other person.  These experiences likely influenced the number of 
participants who cited the need for advocates or safeguards. 
In sum, participants felt they should dictate who to involve, at what stage 
(assessment or decision-making), and with what decisions.  Participants wanted those 
involved to know them, their illness and their situation, to be trustworthy, and someone 
with whom they had a relationship.  Often, participants wanted to involve more than one 
person.  Yet barriers to involving others also suggest a need to focus on relationship 
building and rigorous safeguards. 
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4.1.3 Decision-Making during Diminished Capacity: Intricate and Idiosyncratic 
Three observations are drawn from participant preferences for decision-making 
during periods of diminished capacity.  First, most participants appreciated some 
support with decision-making, irrespective of capacity.  Second, although most 
participants wanted their wishes to be accommodated, a large proportion wanted these 
overridden should they prove ’risky’.  Finally, participant preferences for principles and 
models guiding decision-making during diminished capacity were highly individualised 
and multifaceted.   
Participants expressed a clear preference for involvement in, and authority over, 
decision-making at all levels of capacity.  However, like the findings of Adams et al. 
(2007), Hamann et al. (2005) and Mahone (2008), many preferred a collaborative 
decision-making style over complete autonomy.  Participants expressed appreciation for 
every-day, informal support; someone to talk to, “share a cuppa with,” and to a lesser 
extent, seek advice from.  This informal social and emotional support may form the 
backbone for relationship-building with involved others.  Conversely, more participants 
endorsed an advice-giving role and shifted emphasis from sole decision-making to a 
negotiated process when discussing preferences when capacity is diminished.    
Despite their preference for involvement and the negative experience of 
exclusion, several participants wanted their decisions to be overridden if they proved 
risky.  This stance echoes the risk-relative model advocated by Buchanan and Brock 
(1989; 1991), a controversial finding in light of the debates over this approach, but 
perhaps in line with case law (Oliver, 1997) and clinical practice (Kim et al., 2011; Wilks, 
1999).  Why is this?  Three explanations are possible: 
1. Respondents have internalised the rhetoric of “dangerousness” pervading the 
MH(CAT) Act.  The language employed by some participants suggested this; Cate 
requested her decisions be overridden if she posed “a risk to myself,” while Kim 
extended these grounds to include risk “to others.”   
2. Participants have co-opted paternalistic models of care, referenced by their 
assertions that it was “for my own good,” “they know better” and they “care.” 
3. Participants believe they would have anticipated and managed risks if 
competent; conversely incapacity was characterised by an inability to do so, 
requiring external intervention. 
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Regardless of the underlying reason, not all participants sanctioned this 
overriding of their wishes; those who had experienced this often found it a 
disempowering and demeaning experience. 
Finally, participants expressed highly individualised, contextualised preferences 
for how they would want decisions to be made should they lack capacity – so much so 
that finding patterns or trends proved impossible.  Similar to the studies reported by 
Amnesty International (2009; McDaid & Delaney, 2011) and Myron et al. (2008) all 
participants wanted support with decision-making – whether practical, emotional or 
problem-solving – and for current wishes to be heeded in the first instance, perhaps 
through the application of supported decision-making.  However, participant 
preferences beyond this were individualised to the nth degree.  Participants differed on 
who should make decisions, what principles should guide decision-making, whether all 
decisions should be made in the same way and by the same person(s), and whether 
there should there be an ‘override clause.’    While some wanted decisions to be made 
based on their (future) best interests, others felt best interests could only be assessed 
through an understanding of past views.  Some wanted to retain control by having the 
‘final say’ or via advance directives stipulating decisions, others hoped to nominate 
surrogates to undertake a form of substituted judgement, while yet others wanted to 
leave all decision-making to “experts.”  
Personality and experience played a major role in participant preferences.  
Cassandra’s experience of unwellness was such that she wanted an advance directive 
(past wishes) to stipulate which wishes to be heeded and which to be overridden should 
she become unwell.  Daniel’s relief at abdicating decision-making to ‘experts’ when 
unwell meant he felt comfortable deferring to them again in the future, whereas 
Brooke’s negative experience of others deciding for her meant she would only devolve 
decision-making to someone who would advocate for her wishes. 
In conclusion, although supported decision-making was endorsed by most 
participants, no single model or principle guiding decision-making beyond this was 
promoted.  Instead, participants had highly personalised preferences based on their own 
values and past experiences.  Preferences were not static, often changing as new lines of 
enquiry were pursued or new viewpoints considered.  Models for decision-making 
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during periods of diminished capacity therefore need to allow not only for differences 
between individuals, but also for a high degree of fluidity as people change. 
 
4.1.4 Relational Autonomy  
The importance of relational autonomy in both assessment and decision-making 
was an unexpected finding.   
As discussed in Section 1.1.2 and 1.4, relational autonomy draws attention to 
Western medicine’s failure to account for social influences and collaborative decision-
making in its focus on individual autonomy (Kontos et al., 2013; Martin & Hickerson, 
2013; Pellegrino, 1994; Sjöstrand, 2013; Tauber, 2003).  Proponents of relational 
autonomy argue that focussing on individual decision-making can be “isolating and 
burdensome” (Blackhall et al., 1995, p. 824; Gostin, 1995), instead arguing for a stance in 
which decisions are placed “in a broader context where social influences are important 
in value formation, decision-making, and consideration of the impact of one’s decisions 
on others” (Kontos et al., 2013, p. 107; Sjöstrand et al., 2013) and where the involvement 
of others is considered integral to autonomy (Ho, 2008).    
Several findings from this study support the importance of relational autonomy:   
 Positive regard by others facilitated participants’ sense of capacity whereas 
doubt undermined it; just as Marjorie and Cassandra spoke about the benefits 
of positive regard, so Cate and Anthea described how examination of their 
decision-making undermined their confidence.   Transference between the 
compromised individual and their support people could also facilitate or 
undermine one’s capacity; Julia described how the powerlessness of those 
supporting her destabilised her own competence. 
 Some participants, such as Warren, felt that consideration of a decision’s 
impact on others indicated competent decision-making; conversely, failing to 
consider these impacts indicated possible incapacity.  Alternatively, this could 
reference a distinction between competent versus mature decision-making; 
some participants alluded to this higher, pro-social standard when 
pronouncing that decision-making involved an element of ‘adulthood.’ 
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 Few participants wanted to make decisions alone even when they had full 
capacity.  In fact, Cate expressed a view that having “discussed [my decision], 
with family or whoever” was an indication of retained capacity. 
 Although participants considered interpersonal dynamics generally beneficial 
to decision-making, some spoke of “being led” or bullied by others. This 
suggests gradations in the influence exerted by others and the potential for 
considering another’s viewpoint to shade into manipulation and control. 
 Finally, participants acknowledged that interpersonal relationships can also 
influence involved others.  In particular, people can be “too close” or “don’t 
wanna believe.”  For example, Damon spoke about how, in order to preserve 
their relationship, his mother would likely acquiesce with his (compromised) 
decisions even if they are not in his interests or what he (in hindsight) feels 
should be done.   
This highlights an important but often unacknowledged consideration; that 
decision-making capacity could be at least partially relational in nature and, therefore, in 
capacity assessment and decision-making, attention needs to be paid to the impact of 
relationships, both on the compromised individual and on involved others. 
 
 
4.2 Research Limitations 
 
 
Interpretation of the findings of this study should take into account the following 
research limitations:  sampling methodology and size, group effects and the possibility 
of bias. 
4.2.1 Sampling Limitations 
The use of pre-existing groups as recruiting grounds has limitations.  This is a 
very small subset of the wider group of people with a diagnosis of mental illness and 
those who attend groups may differ significantly from the greater population of people 
with a mental illness.  For example, because all groups met during working hours, those 
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employed fulltime were inadvertently excluded.  Group attendees may also hold 
different views on collaborative decision-making than those who do not participate in 
groups.  Further, among those approached, a smaller subset chose to participate in the 
research project.  They too could differ significantly from the wider population of people 
with mental illness; Rauktis et al. (1998) comment that the same group of mental health 
consumers attend the majority of mental health committees and research activities, 
limiting the breadth of information and participation achieved.   
The decision to exclude current psychiatric inpatient facilities as recruitment 
sites may seem counterintuitive; a key premise of this research was that people do not 
lack capacity simply by virtue of mental illness or psychiatric hospital admission.  
Research invitations could have been extended to everyone accessing mental health 
services, however, this would have required “weeding out” those who lack capacity, 
usually by other health practitioners on behalf of the researcher (Warren & Allen, 1997, 
cited in Peterson, 1999), introducing further sampling bias. 
The current sample only recruited two participants who identified as Māori 
(7.1%), despite attempts made through a Māori cultural group.  While this reflects the 
population makeup of Dunedin, it does not reflect that of Aotearoa New Zealand.  Nor 
did any participants identify as Pasifika or any other ethnicity.  Although it is expected 
that culture influences one’s views, the current research did not allow for comparison of 
cultural groupings.   
Diagnosis was furnished by participants and was not formally confirmed.  Nor 
were several diagnoses represented (such as eating disorders or substance misuse 
disorders).  This could have implications as to the validity of diagnostic comparisons. 
The small sample size of only 28 participants and sampling biases identified 
above makes inferences as to the generalisability of these findings to wider populations 
untenable.  This is not a major shortcoming of this project, which aimed to ascertain the 
range of views of people with mental illness, however sampling limitations allow the 
possibility some views were not included. 
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4.2.2 Group Effects 
The use of pre-existing groups for focus groups could have contributed to group 
effects, such as social influence, free riding and the influence of information. 
Social influence refers to factors such as evaluation apprehension (reluctance to 
share ideas due to fear of negative appraisal), group normativity or polarisation, and the 
effect of dominant participants on others’ contributions.  The use of pre-existing groups 
also increased the risk that participants may feel uncomfortable sharing views due to 
established social hierarchies (Fern, 2001).  Conversely, in their research on focus 
groups with people with mental illness, Rauktis et al. (1998) observed that participants 
were largely supportive and accepting of difference; a similar effect was found in this 
research project.  Free riding – a decrease in productivity due to a diffusion of 
responsibility (Fern, 2001) – was minimised by small group size and by facilitator 
strategies to ensure all contributed.  However there were always quieter individuals or 
those who tended to agree with statements made by previous members, sometimes 
contradicting their own prior statements.  Finally, persuasive arguments, social 
influence, and discussion content may have had a bearing on individual attitudes and 
which ideas were raised (Fern, 2001).  Thus, while individual views were extrapolated 
from focus groups, it was often difficult to separate individual from group data, with 
participants frequently shifting their positions over the course of discussion.  
 
4.2.3 Limitations Related to Research Questions, Data Collection and Data Analysis 
Discussion centred on participant recall or visualisation of scenarios where their 
capacity may be diminished.  However, there is evidence that one’s recall is not always 
accurate (Bryman, 2012) and that people tend to be more accepting of ‘unpleasant’ 
experiences in their past than in their present or future (Doherty, 2011, in Craigie, 
2013).  Thus, participants may have endorsed interventions not necessarily reflective of 
their views when confronted with reality, a paradox acknowledged by some participants 
such as Gabe.  This is an unavoidable outcome while people with diminished capacity 
are excluded from research participation and means this research itself privileges past 
selves over other (potentially compromised) selves. 
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When counting instances of themes raised by individual and group members, 
only those instances where a theme was raised or qualitatively commented on by a 
participant were counted.  Non-verbal and short, one word indications of agreement or 
disagreement (such as “mmmhmmm”) were not counted.  This was done for two 
reasons: 
1. As only audio recordings of discussion were taken, non-verbal cues were lost, 
2. While some short utterances clearly indicated assent or dissent, most could not 
be so easily defined.   
However, counting the number of participants who contribute to discussion on a 
view cannot accurately indicate the degree to which this idea was shared by participants 
as a whole.  This is because it excludes instances where an individual shares an idea but 
does not raise it, where people agree or disagree but maintain silence, where people 
may hold a specific view but do not think of it at the time or have an opportunity to raise 
it, and participants who are naturally more reticent.  Similarly, the observation that 
participants often held multiple views, shifting in response to discussion content, 
resulted in complex, overlapping themes and subthemes.   
These limitations in data collection, combined with the sampling limitations 
described above, also affected data analysis; statistical analysis to assess the depth of 
participant views could not be conducted to the extent hoped.  Again, as this research 
sought to explore the range of views held this is not a significant shortcoming.  Future 
research could quantitatively explore the depth of these views. 
 
 
4.3 Implications for Policy and Practice 
 
 
Despite the research limitations some implications for policy and practice can be 
identified.  Two types of recommendations can be made: those relating to the “coal face” 
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tasks of capacity assessment and decision-making, and those relating to preparatory 
work planning for the possibility of diminished capacity.  
 
4.3.1  Recommendations for Legislation and Policy 
Recommendations at the “coal face” of capacity relate to policy and legislation 
directing capacity assessment and decision-making during periods of diminished 
capacity. 
 
Capacity assessment.  First, this research supports the proposition that capacity 
assessment is not a neutral, value-free exercise that can be undertaken in a standardised 
way by an objective other.  Each individual in this study had a slightly different view on 
what it meant to have decision-making capacity and how to determine whether this was 
diminished.  These findings reject the notion that a person lacks capacity by virtue of 
being subject to compulsory mental health treatment, as seems to be implied by the 
MH(CAT) Act, or that capacity is all-or-nothing as suggested by provisions of the PPPR 
Act.  
Instead, the conclusion that capacity is not just socially, but also individually 
constructed suggests that capacity assessment should include a comprehensive 
understanding of the individual and their context.   Ideally, this understanding is 
grounded in close interaction with the individual, suggesting that this cannot be 
conducted by someone simply by virtue of their professional membership (i.e. a medical 
professional).  While some expert knowledge is considered important, this is tempered 
by participants’ desire for a collaborative engagement between assessors, themselves, 
and those networks with whom they are connected.  Rather than a dichotomous ‘yes/no’ 
answer to the question, “does this individual have capacity?”, respondents point to a 
different question:  “Why are there doubts about this person’s capacity?  Is it because I 
don’t understand them or are barriers limiting the exercise of capacity?”  Respondents 
preferred that all involved work together to develop an understanding of them in their 
context, and to facilitate the building of capacity.   
Pragmatists will undoubtedly roll their eyes at this finding; ultimately there are 
times when a ‘yes/no’ answer is required.  However, opening with this approach is 
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ultimately more empowering, more respectful, and more in keeping with the notion of 
partial incapacity. 
 
Involving others.  Legislative approaches must respect the possibility that the 
compromised individual may want more than one person involved, that these people 
may not necessarily be family members or professionals, and that who is involved may 
change depending on the situation or decision.  Thus, the deferral to medical 
professionals for capacity assessment, the appointment of a single welfare guardian 
under the PPPR Act and the requirement under the MH(CAT) Act for consultation with 
family members does not accurately reflect the range of participant preferences.  
Legislation also needs to consider accessible procedures for review as people’s 
circumstances and preferences change and for dispute resolution processes in the event 
that support networks disagree, ideally permitting individuals to decide in advance how 
disputes will be settled.  
 
Decision-making.  Participants’ overwhelming preference for some degree of 
involvement in decision-making, irrespective of capacity, suggest that models of 
supported decision-making should be further explored, strengthened, and ultimately 
enshrined in legislation.   
However, respondents’ rejection of a “one-size fits all” approach for decision-
making and their fluid and highly individualised preferences suggests that an 
understanding of the individual is essential for decision-making when capacity is 
diminished.  Although the risk-aversive, best interests approach favoured by the 
MH(CAT) Act, the PPPR Act and current practice was endorsed by many participants, 
this was often seen as a “last resort,” with participants identifying a range of approaches 
they preferred in the first instance.   
Accordingly, legislation needs flexibility to incorporate differences in preferences 
for decision-making when capacity is diminished.  This flexibility needs to allow not only 
for differences between individuals, but also individual changes in preference.  At the 
same time, legislation must also provide safeguards for those whose preferences are 
unknown and those who want to block any attempts by their unwell selves to change 
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their instructions.  The method mandated by the H&DC Act, which provides for a menu 
of options, seems to fit most closely with this approach, while advance directives seem 
best placed to allow people to plan for incapacity.  However, neither of these is well-
placed to allow for fluidity in participant preference, and more needs to be done to 
strengthen the powers of advance directives so that these can be legally binding for 
those that want them to be, while allowing others to specify when they would want them 
overridden. 
 
4.3.2 The Importance of Process: Recommendations for Preparatory Practice 
Viewing capacity assessment, involving others, and decision-making during 
diminished capacity as processes rather than tasks allows for consideration of the work 
required “behind the scenes” to facilitate best outcomes.  This work needs to occur on 
two fronts: a. working with individuals to develop an understanding of what capacity 
means to them and what principles they feel should guide decision-making, and b. 
facilitating optimum relationships with involved others. 
 
Planning for incapacity.  Findings of this research underscore the importance of 
planning and regular in-depth discussion with people with mental illness on how they 
define incapacity, who they would want involved, and how they would want decisions to 
be made.  These discussions need to go beyond simple, concrete statements of 
preference (such as what medication they would or would not like prescribed), to 
incorporate an understanding of the values they feel should underpin assessment and 
decision-making.  Do they want their wishes or interests to be considered in the first 
instance?  What role should “risk” play in assessment or decision-making – for that 
matter, how do they define risk?  Who would they want involved, in what decisions, and 
how?  What if there is conflict; how would they want this resolved?  What if in future 
they disagree with what they have set down now?  What if what they decide now is not 
deemed in their best interests?  Would they want these wishes overridden by another?  
Who?  How much input do they want their “compromised” selves to have in decision-
making?  How might this change?  Are there foreseeable dilemmas?  What about 
unforeseeable dilemmas?   
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Addressing this may involve developing a form of advance directive.  By going 
beyond simple statements of preference to explore underlying principles, these 
discussions may provide guidance on not just one’s past wishes, but on how much these 
past wishes should be heeded (ultimately, this remains a person’s past wishes on the 
applicability of their past wishes, but perhaps this is unavoidable).  These discussions 
need to be regularly reviewed and offered to everybody, irrespective of their mental 
health status.  While a mental health professional may facilitate them, this does not need 
to be the case; it is more important that nominated support people be involved.  It could 
also be useful to develop a prompt sheet to facilitate and record conversations. 
 
Facilitating relationships.  Participants’ desire to involve wider support 
networks in capacity assessment and decision-making, the plethora of challenges 
identified in doing so, and the importance of considering relational autonomy, all 
highlight the work that must occur to ensure involved others can fulfil the roles 
envisaged for them by people with mental illness.   
First, mental health services need to recognise that models of service delivery 
may not allow for the formation, maintenance and availability of important relationships 
at key moments of crisis.  This highlights the importance of continuity of care, both 
within services and between episodes of unwellness.   Transfer of care at key moments, 
such as the transfer to the ward psychiatrist when a person becomes an inpatient, may 
deprive a person of access to those professionals who know them best, leaving them 
feeling isolated, alone, and unknown.  And while discharge from the Community Mental 
Health Team may be appropriate, consideration needs to be given to the gap that is 
created, as recounted by Anthea. 
Second, attention should be paid to relationship formation and maintenance, 
particularly between individuals and their wider support networks.  Specifically, while 
mental health services may be better at involving informal support networks than they 
once were (Donnelly, 2009; Roupie et al., 2000), there needs to be a greater 
understanding of the role of non-statutory support services, such as support workers at 
drop-in centres.  There also needs to be an acknowledgement of the immense burden 
placed on informal supports during periods of diminished capacity, especially when 
enforcing a course of action the compromised individual does not agree to.   
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Accordingly, systems must not only safeguard and empower individuals with 
diminished capacity, but also their support people.  Empowering support people might 
involve psychoeducation or training in rehabilitative skills (to prevent dependence).  
But most importantly empowerment of support people necessitates their inclusion in 
planning discussions, addressing any concerns they may have, and considering 
questions such as:  do they hold contradictory views from the individual with mental 
illness?  If so, how should this be resolved?  Are there decisions they feel more or less 
comfortable with?  What support do they need, and how can this best be provided?  
Have all parties considered the impact that ‘difficult’ (read: contentious) decisions may 
have on their ongoing relationship, and does this change their views on whether they 
wish to be involved?  
 
 
4.4 Further Research 
 
 
This study raises as many questions as it answers, suggesting many avenues for 
future research.  Now that a range of views have been ascertained, the next step is to 
quantify and operationalise these in a way that allows for studies that gauge the 
prevalence of these views.  From here, more specific questions could be answered: Are 
there cultural differences in preferences?  Are there overall trends in preferences for 
decision-making models?  Are there statistical differences in views according to 
diagnostic categories, and what about the views of people who fit diagnostic categories 
not sampled in this research, such as anorexia nervosa?  Further research could also 
explore what exactly people want when they ask for supported decision-making or how 
the capacities of support people can be strengthened.  Research exploring the 
development and implementation of a “discussion tool” as recommended above could 
also be useful. 
  





If nothing else, this research has demonstrated that capacity is both socially and 
personally constructed and that people’s preferences are unique, complex and fluid.  
While this project struggled to find order in the cacophony of participant voices, in 
retrospect this is hardly surprising – people will always have different opinions 
according to their experiences, values and beliefs.   
Although the fluidity and variety of participant views was a challenge for the 
research project, it emphasises the importance of innovative and individualised 
planning with people with mental illness.  Despite expectations to the contrary, all 
participants engaged candidly in discussion and freely considered different points of 
view.  While some participants held more complex views than others; none had no views 
whatsoever. Creating systems and legislation that have the flexibility to hear these views 
and incorporate people’s (changing) preferences is a challenge, but it could also herald a 
new way of working with people where intervention isn’t ‘pigeon-holed’ according to an 
arbitrary assessment of incapacity. 
Ultimately, what this project shows is the importance of frequent frank, 
respectful and validating conversations.  This is not about another paperwork exercise 
for already overworked Community Mental Health professionals, subject to auditing 
(although there is a risk it may become so).  It is not about a single discussion that can be 
“ticked off” the list of things to do.  It does not even need to be done by mental health 
professionals or with people with mental illness.  It is about process.  It is about knowing 
what our loved ones want and making sure they know the same about us.  It is a process 
of engagement; getting to know a person and finding out what makes them tick, who is 
important to them and what is important to them.   
Funnily enough, it is about relationships. 
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Appendix F: Guide Questions 
 
 
Note.  These guides provide an overview of topics discussed and sample 
questions.  Discussion was led by participants and therefore topics and questions not 
listed in these guides but deemed relevant to the research questions were also pursued. 
The exact wording in these guides was not used, questions were not asked in the same 
order and some questions were not asked at all.   
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